DUTERTE ASKING THE PEOPLE TO HELP HIM TO STOP CORRUPTION

TAKEN FROM DUTERTE'S SONA 2017.

JANET LIM NAPOLES COMPLETE LIST OF 20 SENATORS AND 100 CONGRESSMEN IN HER STATEMENT

LOOK: Complete list of 20 senators and 100 congressmen who listed by Janet Lim Napoles in her statement RESEARCHED FROM PINOY TRENDING Posted on 13 May 2017 by pinoytrending Because of some rumors that Janet Lim Napoles would became a state witness, some politicians believed that many people would go to jail if the pork barrel queen will testified against her former clients who allegedly misused their pork barrel funds. In her affidavit that submitted to the Department of Justice three years ago, Janet Lim Napoles listed the names of the 20 senators, 100 congressmen that she allegedly transacted with. Some even reported that Napoles might even not even included the names of the other politician because someone influenced her, but now as a state witness, the lawyer of the pork barrel queen said that she’s ready to spill the beans. This are the list names of the politician with their agent that Janet Lim Napoles implicated on 2014. Senators: Biazon, Rodolfo | Bernard Barbers, Robert | Rose Palacio Enrile, Juan Ponce | Doña Señora Ruby Chan Tuazon, Lucila “GIGI” reyes, Tet De Joya, Freddie Villamor; Butch Tuazon Estrada, Jinggoy |Doña Señora Ruby Chan Tuazon Estrada Loi | Lyn and Matt Ranillo, Butch Tuazon, Tet De Joya, Pauline Labayen Honasan, Gringo | Atty. “Danny” Jaworski, Robert |  Tet De Joya Dudut Jaworski Lapid, Lito | Zenaida Ducut Legarda, Loren | Catherine Mae “Ma’am Maya” Canlas Santos Magsaysay, Ramon |  Patricia “Gay” Agana Tan, Bibing Agana Villacorta, Atty. Yacky Agana Marcos, Ferdinand Jr. | Catherine Mae “Ma’am Maya” Canlas Santos Oreta, Tessie Aquino | Carlos ‘Caloy’ Reyes Pimentel, Aquilino | Mon Arcenas Pimentel, Koko | Jewel Pimentel and Luis Louie Cruz Revilla Ramon Jr. | Richard Cambe Sotto Vicente | Jennifer “Jen” Corpuz Villar Cynthia | Arman Padilla Villar Manny | Jun Adriano Cayetano, Alan Peter | NO AGENT Escudero, Francis Chiz | NO AGENT Congressmen: ABAD, FLORENCIO | MANUEL JARMIN  AGARAO, BENJAMIN | CATHERINE MAE “ma’am Maya” CANLAS SANTOS  ALBANO, RODOLFO | CLAVEL MARTINEZ AMATONG, PROSPERO | HON.ICLAVEL MARTINEZ  ANGARA-Castillo BeHarlot | ARMAN PADILLA (Minority Block)  ARROYO, IGGY | CARLOS “Butch” TUAZON  ARROYO, MIICEY | CARLOS “Butch” TUAZON  BAGATSING, AMADO | MINA NIEVA  BANAAG, LEOVIGILDO  BATERINA, SALACNIB | RUTH ALLEN RUSTE  BERATIO, NAPOLEON BLAZON, RUFFY | BERNARD CAGAS, MARC DOUGLAS | ZENNY DUCUT  CHAVEZ, LEONILA | CORA GONZALES  CHIONGBIAN, ERWIN | RUTH ALLEN RUSTE AND BEBOT LAYUG CHIPECO, JOAQUIN | ARMAN PADILLA CUENCO, ANTONIO | MARGIE TAHON DANGWA, SAMUEL | CARLOS LOZADA DEFENSOR, MATIAS | MATTE DEFENSOR  DEL MAR, RAUL | CLAVEL MARTINEZ  DILANGALEN, DIGADEN  DIMAPORO, ABDULLAH | ZENY DUCUT  DUCUT, ZENAIDA  ECLEO, GLENDA | PATRICIA “Gay” AGANA TAN | GIBING AGANA VILLACORTA | ATTY. YACKY AGANA  EMANO, Yevgeny VICENTE | CHERYL “Cheche” YARRA  ESPINOSA EDGAR  ESTRELLA, CONRAD III | DEXTER MANALO  ESTRELLA FtEYMUND | DEXTER MANALO  FABIAN, ERICO | RUTH ALLEN RUSTE  FALCON, JESNAR | LEOVIGILDO, BANAAG  FALCON, PETER | LEOVIGILDO, BANAAG  FLORES, FLORENCIO  FUENTEBELLA, ARNULFO | ZENNY DUCUT  GULLAS, GERALD | CHERYL “Cheche” YARRA  JOAQUIN, ULIRAN | ALICE NAVALES VILLANUEVA  JARAULA, CONSTANTINO  LAGDAMEO, ANTONIO JR | LUIS ‘LOUIE’ CRUZ  LANETE, RIZALINA SEACHON  LANETE, SCOTT DAVIES  LIBANAN, MARCELINO | CATHERINE MAE “Ma’am Maya” CANLAS SANTOS  MACARAMBON, BENASING JR.  MADAMBA, SUNNY ROSE | JOHNNY ROXAS  MAGSAYSAY, EULOGIO | WIFE  MALANYAON, CORAZON |BOMBIT DELA PENA  MALAPITAN, OSCAR  MARTINEZ, CLAVEL  MERCADO, ROGER  MIRAFLORES, FLORENCIO | ZENNY DUCUT  MIRANDA, ANTHONY | MICKY ARROYO  MONTEJO, NEIL BENEDICT | MARIA CRISTINA “C3″ TUANO  NIEVA, ERNESTO “Bazai” | MINA NIEVA, Daughter  OLANO, ARREL  ORTEGA, MANUEL | ZENNY DUCUT and CLAVEL MARTINEZ  ORTEGA VICTOR | ZENNY DUCUT  PABLO, ERNESTO | JOHNNY ROXAS  PADILLA, CARLOS | ARMAN PADILLA (Minority Block)  PANGANDAMAN, HUSSEIN  PANGANDAMAN, NASSER  PICHAY, PROSPERO | ZENY DUCUT  PINGGOY, ARTHUR  PLAZA, RODOLFO  RAMIRO,  HERMINIA | ALICE NAVALES-VILLANUEVA  REAL, ISIDRO | PATRICIA ‘Gay” AGANA TAN, BIBING AGANA VILLACORTA, ATTY. YACKY AGANA  REMULLA, GILBERT | TET DE JOYA  RODRIGUEZ, MAXIMO |  RODRIGUEZ, OCA  RODRIGUEZ, RUFUS | MAX RODRIGLlEZ  ROMUALDO, JURDIN JESUS | MAITE DEFENSOR  ROMUALDO, PEDRO | JURDIN JESUS ROMUALDO  SANDOVAL, RICKY | TET DE JOYA  SANDOVAL, VICENTE | TET DE JOYA  SANTIAGO, JOSEPH | JULIE UNICO  SOLIS, JOSE | CORA GONZALES  SUPLICO, ROLEX | ARMAN PADILLA  TULAGAN, GENEROSO | RAFAEL NANTES  UMALI ALFONSO “Boy” | CORA GONZALES  UMALI, AURELIO “Oyi” | MAITE DEFENSOR UMALI, REYNALDO  UNGAB, ISIDRO | MARIA CRISTINA “C3″ TUANO  UNICO, RENATO | JULIE UNICO  VALDEZ, EDGAR  VALENCIA, RODOLFO | CELIA CUASAY  VELOSO, EDUARDO | ZENY DUCUT  VILLANUEVA, JOEL  | MAITE DEFENSOR  YUMUL-HERMIDA, Georgilu | ARMAN PADILLA  ZAMORA, MANUEL “Way Kurat” | ARMAN PADILLA  ALVARADO, WILHEMINO  CORTUNA, JULIETA  DAZA, NANETTE COSTELLO | BOBBY  ECHEVERRI, RECOM | TET DE JOYA  LAPUZ, JESLI | MON ARCENAS  MONFORT, NARCISO | CLAVEL MARTINEZ  NANTES, RAFAEL  NOGRALES, PROSPERO  PABLO, ERNESTO | JOHNNY ROXAS  PLAZA, MARIA VALENTINA | CHRIS LINDO  ROMAN, ANTONIO | RUTH ALLEN RUSTE  ROMUALDO, JURDIN JESUS | MAITE DEFENSOR  SAN LUIS, RODOLFO | ARMAN PADILLA  ZIALCITA, EDUARDO The list of Napoles was a little bit different than Benhur Luy’s files: Benhur Luy was the former finance officer of Janet Lim-Napoles. Senators showed in the files of Benhur Luy last 2014: Juan Ponce Enrile, Ramon Revilla Jr., Jinggoy Estrada, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Vicente “Tito” Sotto, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Gringo Honasan, Loren Legarda, Aquilino Pimentel III, Manuel “Lito” Lapid, Cynthia Villar, JV Ejercito, Franklin Drilon, Ralph Recto Alan Peter Cayetano. Edgardo Angara, Manny Villar, Tessie Oreta, Nene Pimentel, Rodolfo Biazon, Robert Jaworski, Robert Barbers, Loi Estrada, Ramon Magsaysay Ramon Revilla Sr. Do you believe that Napoles didn’t revealed the complete names of her clients? Is the Pork Barrel Queen was not the most guilty in the Pork Barrel Scam? Is there people that more higher than her? All of that might be answered once Napoles became a state witness. Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre revealed that talks are underway for making alleged pork barrel queen Janet Lim Napoles a state witness in the Justice Department’s reinvestigation of the P10-B pork barrel scam. But several politicians already opposed the alleged plan of the government to turn Napoles as state witness including Senator Kiko Pangilinan and Leila De Lima. According to Senator Leila De Lima, the government might use Napoles to blackmail and threaten any remaining opposition in Congress. Pangilinan said that the idea to make Janet Lim Napoles as state witness was ridiculous. “Paano nangyari na yung pinakamalaki ang nakulimbat sa pork barrel na mas malaki pa sa bawat politico – dahil sa lahat nung congressman at senador na kanyang kasabwat ay may hati siya — ay gagawing state witness?” said Pangilinan in a statement.

LACSON: "PORK SHIFTS FROM LP TO MINDANAO SOLONS"

During the budget plenary debates, Lacson and lawmakers from the lower house hit a deadlock after the senator insisted on removing P8.3 billion the lawmakers took from the budget of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and allocated to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).  “The ARMM congressmen came to see me to plead their case. Inabot nga kami ng 10 p.m. sa office ko (Our meeting lasted until 10 p.m. in my office) explaining in so many words, thus – ‘buti nga daw sila, tig P1.5-B lang na projects, yung iba raw mga congressmen abot ng tig P5-B (they said they only get P1.5 billion in projects each, while others get P5 billion each),’” Lacson said. “Change is coming? Maybe, pero (but) it's (pork allocations) changing hands from LP (Liberal Party) congressmen to those from Mindanao.” Lacson, a staunch enemy of the pork barrel system, which used to be called Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), believes that the approved budget is still laden with what he believes is an illegal form of funding. “What I'm trying to say is, Filipinos are made to believe that PDAF is dead after the SC [Supreme Court] ruling in 2013. I am not stupid. Filipinos are not stupid. They are just resigned, I think. After all these years that I and my staff scrutinize the budget books year in and year out, I know pork when I see it,” Lacson said. “I believe our people, especially our taxpayers, should know the real score behind all these pretenses and denials about the existence of pork.” Lacson also claimed that some of his Senate colleagues quipped that their lower chamber counterparts apparently got bigger pork allocations than them. “At least two of my colleagues commented in the lounge during session suspensions, ‘Sobra naman sila... tayo ngang mga senador, tig P300-M lang (they're too much... even us senators only got P300 million),’” he said. Lacson clarified, however, that as in the past, he did not submit a list of projects for the supposed P300 million pork barrel allocation. “Senators Tito Sotto and Kiko Pangilinan approached me on separate occasions to inform me that they too did not submit. I don't know who else among my Senate colleagues likewise did not submit their list,” he said. “There is no saying here that those who identified their projects in the 2017 national budget, both from the Senate and the House, would get commissions from contractors.” The House leadership has been insisting that the contested funding cannot be considered as pork barrel since no post-enactment intervention will be carried out.  SHARED FROM

Philippine president-elect says 'corrupt' journalists will be killed

news article from

JUDGE MURO REINSTATEMENT DECISION AFTER A YEAR OF DISMISSAL (REFERENCE)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 December 11, 1995 STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, respondent. (MY NOTE: THE DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF DECISION IS NOT CASTED IN STONE) DISPOSITIVE PORTION (REINSTATEMENT FROM FROM FIRST DISMISSAL) "WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Court's September 19, 1994 Decision is MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro is considered suspended from office without pay for the period from September 19, 1994 to the date this Resolution is promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to office immediately. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the respondent's personal record.           SO ORDERED." R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: In a PER CURIAM Decision dated September 19, 1994, the Court declared that respondent judge Manuel T. Muro'smotu propio dismissal of eleven (11) criminal cases filed against Mrs. Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank foreign exchange restrictions, admittedly prompted by mere newspaper reports of the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions which are characterized as "hearsay evidence, twice removed" 1 and therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, 2 and without waiting for the defense to file a motion to quash nor at least affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, constitutes gross ignorance of the law calling for his dismissal from the service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration of said decision to which complainants (state prosecutors) filed a comment. Respondent's reply thereto was further opposed by complainants' rejoinder. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court Judges Association of Manila, Inc. and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) filed separate petitions ". . . For Leave to Intervene As Amicus Curiae". Both petitions were however denied by the Court in its Resolutions of October 18, 1994 and November 8, 1994, respectively. In pressing for the dismissal of the complaint against him, respondent, in a nutshell, maintains that his dismissal of the criminal charges against Mrs. Marcos in the aforedescribed manner was not motivated by bad faith or by any corrupt and insidious intent. And to further belie his imputed "gross ignorance of the law", respondent stresses that "he graduated from the law school, magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed 6th in the Bar examination". 3 xxx xxx xxx IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law. The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that if had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking "through his hat" and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then nonexistent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny. In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious. 8 However, certain notable matters and turn of events since the filing of respondent's motion for reconsideration stir the Court to undertake a re-examination of the penalty of dismissal originally imposed on him. Respondent attests to his unsullied name and service record prior to this administrative case and further displays a humble and contrite gesture by making a "solemn commitment" that: a) he will avoid creating a situation that spawns suspicion of arbitrary and improper conduct (Canon of Judicial Ethics, par. 17); b) he would "adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgment or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of the court." (Ibid, par. 39); c) he would avoid all appearances of impropriety, specially those that create suspicion of partiality, bias or improper motive. (Ibid, par. 3; Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2). 9 And as if moved by the verity of respondent's attestation and the sincerity of his renewed pledge, complainants, in their Comment 10 to the motion for reconsideration and Rejoinder 11 to respondent's reply to their Comment, have mellowed down in pushing for respondent's removal from the sevice and now leave to these Court's sound discretion whether to lessen or modify respondent's penalty. These indeed are favorable considerations warranting the commutation of respondent's penalty of dismissal, if only to give him the chance to redeem himself from an error of this magnitude which he committed only for the first time. After all, this Court is not bereft of compassion and mercy. But respondent ought to be reminded of certain fundamental legal precepts which just might have escaped him momentarily and which will keep him guarded against committing the same or similar mistake a second time. Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases. 12 In every litigation, . . ., the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. 13 What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 14 The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 15 In line with the Court's pronouncement in "In Re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon" 16 and borrowing the words therein, the decision to dismiss respondent judge took effect on September 19, 1994. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for the administrative infraction. We, therefore, order his reinstatement. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Court's September 19, 1994 Decision is MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro is considered suspended from office without pay for the period from September 19, 1994 to the date this Resolution is promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to office immediately. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the respondent's personal record. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Regalado, J., took no part. Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration. Separate Opinions BELLOSILLO, J., concurring and dissenting: I am glad that the majority finally decided to reconsider the Decision dismissing respondent judge from the service. Truly he does not deserve to be out of the judiciary. However I disagree with the majority opinion, hence my dissent, insofar as it suspends him from office — and for more than one (1) year — for which reason I reiterate and incorporate herein my Dissenting Opinion in the Decision of the Court. I find it extremely difficult to attribute bad faith on the part of respondent judge for dismissing the eleven criminal cases against the accused therein. As I have said, I see no insidious intentions on his part. For — [D]ismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 1 Bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. 2 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood obligation. 3 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 4 None of these is respondent guilty of. I do not agree with the findings of the majority that respondent judge committed an egregious legal error "serious enough to amount to misconduct." It was a simple case of believing in good faith that the basis for the criminal charges against the accused had been eliminated, having heard the public announcement of no less than the President himself that among the beneficiaries of the lifting of the foreign exchange restrictions was the accused herself. Hence there was no reason for the cases to remain pending in the calendar having in mind the desire of the Court to unclog court dockets. Thus, as I said in my dissent, where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant to call for an administrative sanction. 5 Accordingly, if respondent judge committed any error at all it was a "legal error" rectifiable by appeal, not by administrative sanction. Let it be emphasized that the policy of the Court as regards administrative cases is to dismiss the charge if the remedy is judicial, as in the case before us. Why then should we single out respondent judge among all other judges whose cases against them have been dismissed on the ground that the remedy of complainants was judicial and not administrative? Time and again this Court has ruled that a judge cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 6 There is no showing whatsoever that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Consequently, I have no choice but to maintain my vote to exonerate him. But assuming arguendo that respondent judge committed a "legal error" which would make him liable to judicial discipline, I find too excessive the commuted penalty, i.e., suspension from office from 19 September 1994 until the resolution of this Court commuting his dismissal is promulgated. By that time respondent judge would have been suspended from office for more than one (1) year which is quite disproportionate to the "infraction" committed. The severity of the penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of the offense. The period of suspension arrived at by the majority may be a convenient device to do away with a hiatus that would be created were a shorter period of suspension be imposed by the Court, with the respondent judge having served his penalty and yet unable to assume office in the meantime that the instant motion for reconsideration is being resolved. I maintain that if a shorter period of suspension is called for because it is just and fair, then let it be so imposed, even if a time fracture is created. For under this circumstance, respondent judge could very well be considered simply as being on leave from office for that period. After all, a verification from the Leave Section of this Court reveals that he has sufficient leave credits to offset the period he is out of the service. There should be no question that in the imposition of an administrative sanction the primary consideration is not facility or convenience but the proper and fair administration of justice. To this extent, I must dissent. Separate Opinions BELLOSILLO, J., concurring and dissenting: I am glad that the majority finally decided to reconsider the Decision dismissing respondent judge from the service. Truly he does not deserve to be out of the judiciary. However I disagree with the majority opinion, hence my dissent, insofar as it suspends him from office — and for more than one (1) year — for which reason I reiterate and incorporate herein my Dissenting Opinion in the Decision of the Court. I find it extremely difficult to attribute bad faith on the part of respondent judge for dismissing the eleven criminal cases against the accused therein. As I have said, I see no insidious intentions on his part. For — [D]ismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 1 Bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. 2 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood obligation. 3 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 4 None of these is respondent guilty of. I do not agree with the findings of the majority that respondent judge committed an egregious legal error "serious enough to amount to misconduct." It was a simple case of believing in good faith that the basis for the criminal charges against the accused had been eliminated, having heard the public announcement of no less than the President himself that among the beneficiaries of the lifting of the foreign exchange restrictions was the accused herself. Hence there was no reason for the cases to remain pending in the calendar having in mind the desire of the Court to unclog court dockets. Thus, as I said in my dissent, where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant to call for an administrative sanction. 5 Accordingly, if respondent judge committed any error at all it was a "legal error" rectifiable by appeal, not by administrative sanction. Let it be emphasized that the policy of the Court as regards administrative cases is to dismiss the charge if the remedy is judicial, as in the case before us. Why then should we single out respondent judge among all other judges whose cases against them have been dismissed on the ground that the remedy of complainants was judicial and not administrative? Time and again this Court has ruled that a judge cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 6 There is no showing whatsoever that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Consequently, I have no choice but to maintain my vote to exonerate him. But assuming arguendo that respondent judge committed a "legal error" which would make him liable to judicial discipline, I find too excessive the commuted penalty, i.e., suspension from office from 19 September 1994 until the resolution of this Court commuting his dismissal is promulgated. By that time respondent judge would have been suspended from office for more than one (1) year which is quite disproportionate to the "infraction" committed. The severity of the penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of the offense. The period of suspension arrived at by the majority may be a convenient device to do away with a hiatus that would be created were a shorter period of suspension be imposed by the Court, with the respondent judge having served his penalty and yet unable to assume office in the meantime that the instant motion for reconsideration is being resolved. I maintain that if a shorter period of suspension is called for because it is just and fair, then let it be so imposed, even if a time fracture is created. For under this circumstance, respondent judge could very well be considered simply as being on leave from office for that period. After all, a verification from the Leave Section of this Court reveals that he has sufficient leave credits to offset the period he is out of the service. There should be no question that in the imposition of an administrative sanction the primary consideration is not facility or convenience but the proper and fair administration of justice. To this extent, I must dissent. Footnotes 1 3 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed., Sec. 1084. 2 People v. Cabral and Mercado, G.R. No. L-29412, Sept. 13, 1933; Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438. 3 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. 4 Such as the petition for certiorari brought by the "People" assailing the dismissal of the 11 criminal charges on grounds of excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, and which was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated April 29, 1993 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 29394 reinstating the criminal cases, Rollo, pp. 80-86. 5 E.g., In re Quigley, 32 N.Y.S. 828 [1895]; Murtagh v. Maglio, 195 N.Y.S. 2d 900 [1960]; In re Mattera, 168 A. 2d 38 [N.J. 1961]; In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E. 2d 203 [1973]; People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Cts. Comm'n., 372 N.E. 2d 53 [III. 1977]; Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 596 P. 864 [Okla. 1979]; West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Comm'n. v. Dostert, 271 S.E. 2d 427 [W.Va. 1980]. 6 Stern, Is Judicial Discipline in New York a Threat to Judical Independene?, 7 Pace L. Rev. 291, 303-45 [1987]. 7 Stern, supra. 8 Decision, September 19, 1994, pp. 17-19. 9 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10. 10 p. 4. 11 pp. 3-4. 12 Barron, A Lawyer Looks At The Rules, West. Pub. Co., 1954, p. 27. 13 Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124, 127. 14 Yash Vyas, quoted in The Lawyers Review, Vol. VIII, Oct. 31, 1994, No. 10. 15 Justice B.N. Cardozo, quoted in The Lawyers Review, ibid. 16 Adm. Case No. 3086, May 31, 1989, 173 SCRA 719, 726. BELLOSILLO, J., concurring and dissenting: 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 6. 2 State v. Griffin, 100 S.C. 331, 84 S.E. 876, cited in Black's Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1951, p. 176. 3 5 Words and Phrases 14, citing Nelson v. Board of Trade, 58 Ill. App. 399. 4 Board of Liquidators, v. Kalaw, No. L-18805, 14 August 1967, 20 SCRA 1007. 5 See Dissenting Opinion, p. 9., citing Lampauog v. Judge Villarojo, Adm. Matter No. 381-MJ, 28 January 1974, 55 SCRA 304. 6 Id., p. 2, citing Louis Vitton S.A. v. Judge Villanueva, Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA which in turn cited Mendoza v. Judge Villaluz, Adm. Case No. 1797-CCC, 27 August 1981, 106 SCRA 664, and Valdez v. Judge Valera, Adm. Matter No. 1676-CAR, both promulgated 31 January 1978, 81 SCRA 246; Morada v. Judge Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 7 February 1994, 229 SCRA 723.

CORRUPTION IN THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS

Caught on surveillance video: An employee of the Philippine Ports Authority receiving bribe for shipments at the Bureau of Customs.

The justices decided in session to initiate a fact-finding investigation on the four judges and treat the announcement of the President as a complaint against them, SC spokesman Theodore Te said in a press conference. File photo SC starts probe of judges in Rody drug list By Edu Punay (The Philippine Star) | Updated August 10, 2016 - 12:00am MANILA, Philippines – They need not surrender without a warrant for their arrest, but four active judges linked by President Duterte to the illegal drug trade now face investigation by the Supreme Court (SC). The SC acted on Duterte’s public naming of the judges, which Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno said was “premature” and would have “unwarranted effect” on their safety and duties in the judiciary. The justices decided in session to initiate a fact-finding investigation on the four judges and treat the announcement of the President as a complaint against them, SC spokesman Theodore Te said in a press conference. To formalize the probe, the high tribunal directed the Palace through Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea to submit formal complaint-affidavits against the four judges within seven days. The four judges – Exequil Dagala of the Dapa-Socorro, Surigao municipal trial court; Adriano Savillo, Iloilo City Regional Trial Court; Domingo Casiple of Kalibo, Aklan RTC; and Antonio Reyes of Baguio City, Benguet RTC – will then be required to submit their answers within seven days from receipt of notice. Te also revealed the designation of retired SC Associate Justice Roberto Abad as investigator who would conduct the probe in 30 days from submission of the answers from the four judges. Headlines ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1He explained the complaint would undergo “standard investigation,” but clarified hearings would not be open to the public in accordance with the confidentiality rule for administrative cases filed with the SC. He further stressed the proceedings in the SC would be administrative in nature – not criminal. “If there is a basis for criminal action, a separate tribunal will handle that,” Te pointed out. Criminal charges could be filed against erring judges before the prosecutor’s office. The SC initiated the probe even after Chief Justice Sereno advised the four judges not to surrender to police without existing warrant of arrest against them. An insider bared it was Sereno who had strongly pushed for an investigation into the judges’ alleged drug links during the SC regular session. “The Chief Justice really wanted an investigation, consistent with her stance that the Court must deal with offenders in the judiciary firmly but fairly,” the member of the Court revealed to The STAR. The President named last Sunday seven judges allegedly involved in narcotics trade, but three of them are no longer with the judiciary. Judge Roberto Navidad of the Calbayog City, Samar RTC was killed on Jan. 14, 2008 at age 69, while Judge Lorenda Mupas of Dasmariñas, Cavite MTC was dismissed in 2007 for gross ignorance of the law. On the other hand, Judge Rene Gonzales of Iloilo City municipal trial court retired last June and did not handle drug cases.   Meanwhile, Senate President Pro-Tempore Franklin Drilon is urging the Duterte administration to come up with long-term solutions to solve criminality and bring back the people’s trust in the justice system. “The challenge to all of us is to come up with  complete and significant reforms in our justice system, so that the government does not have to resort to a ‘shame campaign’ strategy in an effort to solve criminality,” Drilon said. He stressed a “shame campaign” would not put criminals behind bars. Drilon earlier defended one of his allies, Iloilo City Mayor Jed Mabilog, who was among those named by Duterte as protectors of drug syndicates. He also decried Duterte’s labeling Iloilo as the most “shabulized” province in the country. Iloilo is Drilon’s home province. “The effective deterrent against the commission of crimes is the certainty of punishment and expeditiousness of the proceedings,” he said. Drilon also said he was appalled by the lack of public indignation over the spate of killings of alleged drug suspects. But he said he could understand that such was “a manifestation of public’s frustration brought about by inefficiency in the country’s justice system.” “There is a failure of the justice system. Our people are upset because of the inability of our justice system to address criminality and punish the criminals with dispatch,” Drilon maintained. - With Paolo Romero shared from

DUTERTE LAMBASTED CJ SERENO

Ombudsman Morales, nagulat sa pagbasura ng sc sa plunder case vs. Arroyo

PLUNDER TRIAL KAY GLORIA IBINASURA NG SUPREME COURT PERO MARAMI PANG IBA

30TH PERSUASIVE MESSAGE_OBJECTION TO HEARSAY PLEADINGS

                           

JULY 15, 2016  SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE As magistrates of the PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT concerned about  the social ills profoundly discussed by President Duterte,  you have in your discretion to accept or deny the fact that  there is peoples' erosion of faith in our judicial system, as part of the real problems confronting the nation today.   You might have listened to the sound bite or read notes regarding this issue but to reiterate the president's  lamentations I have the excerpts provided especially for you: [1]"There are many among us who advance the assessment the problems that bedevil our country today which need to be addressed with urgency are  CORRUPTION both in high and low echelons of government,  CRIMINALITY in the streets, and  the rampant sale of ILLEGAL DRUGS in all strata of Philippine society  and the breakdown of LAW AND ORDER True but not absolutely so, for I say these ills are symptoms of a viral social disease  that creeps and cuts into the moral fiber of Philippine society.  I sense a problem deeper and more serious than than any of those  mentioned, or all of them put together, but of course, it is not to say that we will ignore them,  because they have to be stopped by means, by all means that the law allows.   Erosion of faith and trust in the government, THAT IS THE REAL PROBLEM that confronts us, resolving that from,  I see the erosion of the peoples' trust in our country's leaders,  the EROSION OF FAITH IN OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM,  the erosion of confidence in the capacity of our public servants to make the peoples' lives BETTER, SAFER AND HEALTHIER. "...                                                _President Rodrigo Roa Duterte from his Inaugural  speech  June 30, 2016 CORRUPTION CORRUPTION,  both in high and low echelons of government and if may I add, Corruption is to the human society and toxin is to the human body. Human interactions like blood being pumped through the heart then to the brain and to vital  organs of the human body through the largest and smallest arteries and veins and had to be  constantly cleaned by the kidney out of toxins in normal healthy functioning body vis-a-vis vibrant human society.   Today, the human body is sick. His blood is seriously contaminated with toxins but his kidney had failed and the human body is dying.  So with  the Philippine society.  Good that  the Philippines  found a kidney and a surgeon rolled into one in the person of President Duterte.  As a kidney, he has  processed fresh blood which liven up hope and fulfillment of peoples' aspirations for an honest and responsive government, where in the past had just been a pile of continuing years of toxic  frustration and angst and disillusionment. and hopelessness and despair. As a surgeon,  he is trained  to determine when the wound could still be treated by antiseptics or antibiotics or has to be managed by amputation or castration. Your honors, the choice is yours to make. Corruption has to be stopped, said the surgeon, clear and straightforward.  The president, with his several years as prosecutor and fiscal and a professor in criminal law is not brainless or ignorant to whom you can hide your corruption and crimes from. The president as a surgeon has the capacity of extricating gangrenes, shallow and deep alike and with all due respect, you may want to reform yourselves to revitalize the judicial institution which had been in the rotten state of decay and decomposition then do it  or  you might as well stay put and keep the your malignant disease gangrenes of corruption and be extricated yourselves in due time.  As the president in a number of speeches had warned the Abu Sayaff, "There will days of reckoning..."  the same is aptly I believe he may have wanted be addressed to you. Corruption, your honors, as I experienced dealing with you and the rest of your employees had been part of the normal daily chores of  doing judicial business in the Supreme Court. Corruption is rampant.  Everyone else is corrupt.  Corruption in the Supreme Court like trash,  is noticeable when there is one in a clean environment.  Even one as minute as a cigarette butt is easy to pinpoint when it, as I reiterate, is in a clean environment .  But when trash and garbage and filth abounds everywhere, no one could ever know though tons more are added to them.  That is the reality in the Philippine Supreme Court, perception of uprightness are mere cosmetics and products of their own self adulation, in contrast with their malignant crookedness and corruption. Filth abounds everywhere, as corruption is.  The Philippine Supreme Court as the emperor of filth propagation  occupies the throne from which power to the grandiose rubbish machinery emanates.  A machinery,  though reprehensible to the morally upright man,  has been allowed to operate, licensed under the doctrine of presumption of regularity.  This doctrine cloaked magistrates with enormous discretionary power to uphold or disregard the constitution or the law at will or bend the rules depending in who the client they would want to serve.  So sometimes, their decisions seemed to look constitutionally or lawfully right or in some cases but not few, often they ridiculously and stealthily did incorporate a new provision in the constitution to comply with the needs of their client and the same is equally true with the same evil motive when these justices spitefully legislated a new law  from the bench entirely contrary to the existing  law through the skillful manipulation of meticulously applied rhetorics in jurisprudence coupled with voluminous citations from various books in law and courts in the United States and all over the globe, where not one in a million people would not have the interest or patience even bother to read or least look at it and just accept it.  Or, and if ever there would be one who would see truth on the contrary nobody would ever listen to him,  no difference with the child who asserted that the emperor is wearing nothing or naked inconsistent with the elders' pretentious acceptance of the lie that the emperor is wearing a majestic new clothing which wont be visible to men unfit for their position or stupid. The emperor and the elders naturally wanted to appear fit for their position or not lacking intelligence, though they really are but wanted to continue receiving perks and benefits meant for the fit and intelligent, they blindly accepted the myth espoused by the emperor's new clothes. That is corruption told through tale during the ancient times being reenacted, true to life here, in the Philippine Supreme Court.  The Justices as the emperor exceedingly fond of vanity and insatiable greed had swindled themselves into believing that the robes they are wearing, the robes of the presumption of regularity are no less than the emperor's new clothes where corruption hidden underneath though in reality are visible but justices  and other guardians of law pretended they see not for they are wearing the same robes and benefiting therefrom,  thereby creating a community founded on deceit and corruption..... from top to bottom ...everywhere. Shell,  based on  the verified documents I presented here is an expert in the field of deception and corruption.  I have no doubts that Shell shrewd as it actually is have anchored its roots within the community of corrupt arbiters, commissioners and justices thriving in the judiciary.  I have strong reasons  to believe, that Labor Arbiter (Lontoc) had decided the case the manner she did,   on account of her being under the influence of Shell. If not she was working for the interest of Shell and absent of any corrupt motive, she having been informed by Atty. Quiroz that GM Bersamin is the Individual [2]respondent to the case I filed against Shell, Lontoc  should have not allowed certain Remedios Vargas, who was not a party[2.1]to the dispute, to sign the verification for  GM Bersamin[3], despite  of complainant's objection[4][5] thereto.  The pleadings by GM Bersamin having verified by person other than Bersamin amounts to hearsay testimony and therefore should have been struck down and this case should have decided by Lontoc ex parte.  But for reasons known only to Lontoc, attributable to corruption,  she entertained GM Beramin's pleadings though they were hearsay testimony and not within the exceptions specified in the rules.[5.1]   This is one among the list of acts of partiality by L A Lontoc. determinant of overt influence of Shell on her amounting to corruption and this influence as I learned, is not free. Moreover, I reiterated this objection on Atty. Quiroz disbarment[10] AC-10084. As in my previous persuasive appeal, the president, in case you deny the veracity of his observations and continued to preserve the status quo for your own client and personal benefit and interest and relentlessly resumed your corrupt and wicked ways and farther fanned the flames engulfing the remaining pillars of faith the people have in you, then, he may,  as expected resort to the political options of impeachment as  means to catapult reforms in the judicial system as maybe necessary.   In this regard,  you may want to re-evaluate your position regarding the manner you are treating me. Time is on my side. Every ticks file up to my benefit as it amounts to prolonged and sustained pain and injury and suffering, that you deliberately,  with evil motive,  meant and intended against me and my family and convincingly serve as evidence of collusion between you and Shell being having unity of purpose,  through your grave abuse of discretion and deliberate gross inexcusable negligence, to perpetuate the injustice,  pain and suffering to my family and myself which we are are experiencing since 2003 up to the present time. May you be guided by the following:  "SEC 200_ Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong."         _ John Locke : Second Treatise of Civil Government,           Chapter xviii : Of  Tyranny May this message serves as the 30th PERSUASIVE APPEAL for you to reconsider your position with respect to your appreciation of cases GR-183273 and AC-10084 and institute through your own volition disciplinary actions against erring guardians of law in relation to the cases mentioned as preliminary to showing convincing evidences proving that the court is not acting in collusion with Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,  its officers and managers, jointly and severally,  to perpetuate pain and suffering and  injustice against me and my family. Otherwise, you all, are in admission of the act of collusion between Shell, her lawyers and you, having unity of purpose,  to perpetuate injustice, pain and suffering against me and my family, as charged. Sincerely, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr. FOOTNOTES [1] video REAL PROBLEM CONFRONTING US [2] ON GR-183273 RICO BERSAMIN IS THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENT NAMED IN THIS AFFIDAVIT AND MADE THE  STATEMENTS AND COUNTER STATEMENTS THEREON. HENCE, RICO BERSAMIN SHOULD BE THE ONE TO BE SWORN IN AND SHOULD BE THE ONE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT AS MANDATED BY RULE 3, Parties to Civil Actions  SECTION 2 Parties in interest [2.1] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED (RULES 1-71, RULES OF COURT) EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1997 Per Resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 Adopted in Baguio City on April 8, 1997 RULE 3 Parties to Civil Actions Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. — Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counter-claim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant. (1a) Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) Section 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (3a) Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. (4a) Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. — A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. (5a) Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6n) Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7) Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a) Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. — Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (8a, 9a) Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. (10) Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (11a) Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a) Section 13. Alternative defendants. — Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other. (13a) Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. — Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner heir devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require, when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accordingly. (14) Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. — When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known. In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the persons composing said entity must all be revealed. (15a) Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (16a, 17a) Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard. (18a) Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem. (19a) Section 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. (20) Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a) Section 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a) Section 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or a representative duly designated by him. (23a) [3] CERTAIN REMEDIOS VARGAS,   WHOM I DID NOT NAME IN MY  COMPLAINT ( NOT A PARTY IN  THE DISPUTE) AND HAD  NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE  FACTS, INCIDENTS, ALLEGATIONS  STATED BY RICO BERSAMIN,  SIGNED VERIFICATION  OF THE DOCUMENTS.  I RAISED OBJECTION THERETO IN MY REPLY. [4] MY OBJECTION  WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY LABOR ARBITER LONTOC YET SHE  CONFORMED WITH REMEDIOS VARGAS  IN SIGNING THE POSITION PAPER  AFFIDAVIT FOR RESPONDENT RICO  BERSAMIN THOUGH VARGAS HAS NO  PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ON  THE  FACTS,  INCIDENTS AND ISSUES STATED BY BERSAMIN THEREIN.  LABOR ARBITER LONTOC SHOULD  HAVE ORDERED ATTY. QUIROZ TO TO MAKE THE NEEDED CORRECTION ON THOSE DOCUMENTS /PLEADINGS AS MANDATED BY RULE 3, Parties to Civil Actions SECTION 2_Parties in interest  OTHERWISE,  LABOR ARBITER LONTOC SHOULD HAVE STRUCK OUT THOSE  PLEADINGS FOR HAVING NO  PROBATIVE VALUE BEING HEARSAY  TESTIMONY AND BEING VARGAS  NOT A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE NOR VARGAS STATEMENTS COVERED BY EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE.  Sections 37 to 47...  see [5.1] See last two lines of this page and the first two lines of the next page on  item 5...to wit: "Complainant questioned the verification of the respondent's position paper by Remedios M. Vargas  [5] arguing that respondent Bersamin as refinery General Manager  has a wider grasp of the issues on this case than Ms. Vargas."                         [5.1]               SECTION 36, RULE 130, RULES OF COURT  5. Testimonial Knowledge Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30a) 6. Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31a) Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a) Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a) Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (34a) Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. (35) Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36a) Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (37a) Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38) Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39) Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a) Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a) [6] G.R. NO. 155619 LEODEGARIO BAYANI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES August 14, 2007 XXX Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on hearsay evidence, to wit: Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.[10] [10] Bon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 152160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 101, 109. XXX [7] G.R. NO. 164457 APRIL 11, 2012 ANNA LERIMA PATULA Petitioner Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent XXX On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared ExhibitsB to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.    To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.[19] Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[20] The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21] Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.[24] Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz: Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a) The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly: Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a) Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that:In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings. We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[27] [19] 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Edition, pp. 267-268; citing Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johnson (N.Y.), 45, 50, 6 Am. Dec. 253. [20] Id., citing Minea v. St. Louis Corp., 179 Mo. A., 705, 716, 162 S.W. 741. [21] Id., p. 268. [22] Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracys Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221. [23] Id. [24] 20 Am Jur 404. [25] People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946). [26] Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243. [27] Gulam v. Santos,G.R. No. 151458, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 463, 473. xxx [8] G.R. NO. 194320  February 1, 2012MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC Petitioner vs. RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES Respondents  XXX Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own perception.[18] Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters.[19] Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.[20] [18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 36. [19] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 253-254. [20] Id. at 254. XXX [9] G.R. No. 103737 December 15, 1994 NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,respondents. XXX The rule is clear and explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. 23  23 Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court. [10] ON AC-10084 ATTY. RAUL QUIROZ DISBARMENT OBJECTION ON VARGAS SIGNING VERIFICATION IN PLACE OF  BERSAMIN REITERATED HERE. On the matter of the Second deceitful act committed by Atty. Quiroz, in  naming Rico Bersamin as the  respondent in the complaint and  having another, REMEDIOS VARGAS, signing the Position Paper for him. WHERE IN ISSUES like, among others,  A. Sanity in the Perfect Attendance Award Scheme,  Vargas has no  interaction with me about this issue. B. The issue about me, having not to cut my hair since January 2000,  until sanity of the Perfect Attendance Award Scheme is addressed, Vargas  had no interaction with me about  this issue. C. My INQUIRY about the missing  CBA minutes of negotiation meetings, and violations of the GROUND rules,  Vargas had no interaction with  me about this issue. D.  My claim of the Performance    Related Bonus in behalf of Ritche  Coronel,  Vargas had no interaction with me about this issue. E.  My petition for having the criterion of long years of service (16 years)  which have been applied to Senior  Office staff in giving them 10%  increase, and the same be applied  to me being in the same Senior level  position as they were with even a  longer years of service of 24 years.   Vargas had no interaction with me  about this issue. F.  The decision of Rico Bersamin for  having ignored giving recognition to the achievement of my son for  garnering the top 1 of the April 2002  Electronics and Communications  Engineering Licensure Examinations, despite of my son being a Shell high school and college scholar. Vargas had no interaction with me about this issue. G.  The execution of the "rigged      ranking" exercise to serve as a  basis for terminating me from  employment.  Vargas had no  interaction with me about this issue. H.  The violation of the CBA  Security of tenure provision  to wit: "The union recognizes the right of  the company to contract out work. However, no employee shall suffer loss of employment on  account of contracted out work." Vargas had no interaction with  me about this issue. These instances are part of the  AC-10084 Disbarment Complaint against Atty. Quiroz written in Pilipino or Tagalog Titled "Pangalawang  Pandaraya" ...see [11] below: [11]