JUNE 3, 2016
SALUTATION
Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al:
   
MESSAGE
PREFATORY
1
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employers judgment in the conduct of his business. The Labor Code and its implementing rules do not vest in the labor arbiters nor in the different divisions of the NLRC nor in the courts managerial authority.[16] The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees has been traditionally identified as a management prerogative subject to limitations found in the law, a collective bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair play and justice. This is a function associated with the employers inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.[17]
REGALADO, J.:
[16] Almodiel vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100641, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 341.
[17] Abbot Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement is the law between the parties
It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.[16] We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. [17]
Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.[18]
[16] Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165486, May 31, 2006, 490 SCRA 61, 72.
[17] G.R. No. 145561,
[18] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1370.
2
It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws,[17] and to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.[18]Substantial impairment as conceived in relation to impairment of contracts has been explained in the case of Clemons v. Nolting,[19] which stated that: a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
Excerpts from the case of Clemons v. Nolting shown next:
G.R. No. L-17959 January 24, 1922
ROBERT S. CLEMONS, petitioner,
vs. WILLIAM T. NOLTING, as Auditor of the Government of the Philippine Islands, respondent.
Contracts are made for things, not names or sounds, and the obligation of the contract arises from its terms and the means which the law affords for its enforcement. Under the Civil Code the contract constitutes the law of the parties unless it violates some provision of law or public policy. The parties themselves make the law by which they shall be governed, and it is the business of the courts to see that the parties to a legal contract comply with its terms. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. An interference with the terms of a legal contract by legislation is unwarranted and illegal. A contract is not fulfilled by the delivery of one thing which is different from the thing the contract provides for. Words in contracts are to be given the meaning which they were understood to have by the parties at the time of the making of the contract. There cannot exist in this jurisdiction one law for debtors and another law for creditors. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our Government amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation, and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; it may declare new crimes and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; it may command what is right and forbid what is wrong, but it cannot change innocence into guilt and punish innocence as a crime, or violate the rights of an antecedent lawful private contract or the right of private property. (Calder vs. Bul, 3 Dallas, 388.)
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred, and that includes contractual rights. (Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters, 657.)
The union, TASREA, and Shell had series of collective bargaining agreements since 1980's to the present, each contained in it Job Security provision to wit :
2001 CBA Article XIV Section 3_ CONTRACTING OUT
"TASREA recognizes the right of the company to contract out work. However. no employee shall suffer loss of employment on account of contract out work.".[18]
This provision means that the union will not interfere or contest with the right of the company to contract out work up to the extent that even jobs which the union members were normally doing were likewise, been contracted out, like the jetty operations which 10 job positions together with several instrument and electrical technicians positions been lost to contractors. The union, though it wanted to file opposition about our jobs being contracted out, could not do so, simply because management assured no one in our ranks would suffer loss of employment in consonance with the job security provision of the collective bargaining agreement, and not that JETTY OPERATIONS :NEVER A PART OF THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE REFINERY nor JETTY OPERATIONS : THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND PERSONS OF THOSE WORKING AT THE JETTY as Atty. Raul Quiroz deceitfully alleged. The union merely dutifully abided by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
JETTY OPERATIONS:NEVER A PART OF THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE REFINERY_THIS IS A LIE.
Atty. Quiroz et al lied on stating that :
"the union agreed to the contracting out of the jetty operations because it was never a part of the regular business of the refinery. "If it was never a part of the regular business of the refinery why should the company still asked and mentioned and asserted that the union agreed with it? Why bother sought for the union agreeing to it if it were not part of the regular business of the refinery? Moreover, refinery operations involve receiving raw materials (crude in bulk quantities) from ship tankers and loading finished products, likewise to tankers via the jetties SHOWING THE JETTY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE REFINERY OPERATIONS. See 44.1 AC-10084 defense argument JETTY OPERATIONS : THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND PERSONS OF THOSE WORKING AT THE JETTY._THIS IS A LIE
This alibi was a lie. The truth of the matter was, the issue, handing over the jetty operations to contractor operators, did not translate into a full blown conflict between the union and the company due to the fact that the union was obliged to honor what was embodied in the CBA that : TASREA acknowledges the right of the company to contract out work. However, no employee shall suffer loss of employment on account of the contracted out work. The company on their part gave the assurance that no employee shall suffer loss of employment on account of the contracted out work. In other words, the union was bounded by the spirit of the agreement thus the union on her part allowed that jetty operations, AMONG OTHER JOBS, be contracted out WITH EXPECTATION AND ASSURANCE THAT THE COMPANY SHALL HONOR THE SAME TO THE EFFECT THAT AS LONG AS THE JETTY AND OTHER JOBS ARE BEING CONTRACTED OUT, NO EMPLOYEE SHALL SUFFER LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT..
And assuming without agreeing, for the sake of argument, this threat alibi was true, This alibi would not help the company MOVE OUT OF THE CONTROVERSY but rather put them on a WORST perspective due to the fact that the company merely shifted the risk of the threat from the union member operators to the contractor operators. Safety and security considerations must be must be common to all. It is not fair on part of the contractor operators to be subjected to threats that management as per their assessment were existing while saving union member operator from it. If there was really a threat to safety and security, then this is an action applicable to safety department to address by imposing strict security measures up to the extent of asking police assistance when necessary and not by merely shifting the threat from one group of workers to another group. THEY ARE BOTH PEOPLE HAVING COMMON SAFETY AND SECURITY NEEDS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE ACCORDED COMMON SAFETY AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. This is ridiculous. This did not make sense.
As I personally observed, it did not alter or change that threat. Everything else was the same. What significantly changed as I happened to talk to these contractors, was the much lower pay and less benefits these contractor operators were receiving in exchange for their services.
Contracting out the jetty operations and other electrical and instruments technicians jobs are continuing processes up to the time when an old plant was closed. At this point it was time for the company to reciprocate obligation mandated by the job security provision of the CBA as the union been faithful to it a couple of years back when 10 jetty operators position were contracted out.. Instead of faithfully performing obligations by reciprocity under the CBA , the company opted to terminate employment of three union members. It is important to note that there were 10 employees that were terminated. Among the 10 employees terminated only 3 are union members and 7 were executives and volunteered to be terminated. Among the three union members, two volunteered, leaving Antonio Buensuceso, alone contesting his termination invoking among others, the job security provision of the CBA.
On this case, the company proceeded to terminate Buensuceso, disregarding the existing CBA between them.
On this regard the termination of my employment clearly is violative of the job security provision of the collective bargaining agreement-contract existing between union and the company and depicted an invalid use of management prerogative ; hence, illegal.
Yours faithfully,
Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.
additional note
See 44.1 AC-10084 defense argument below:
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