When quibbling is a form of lying: SC affirms Cudia dismissal

When quibbling is a form of lying: SC affirms Cudia dismissal By Ina Reformina, ABS-CBN News Posted at Feb 24 2015 02:57 PM | Updated as of Feb 24 2015 10:57 PM MANILA - The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), absolving the academy of allegations of violating Cudia's right to due process, and upholding the PMA's academic freedom. In a decision penned by Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, the high court junked Cudia's petition which sought a reversal of the PMA's action. "Wherefore, the petition is denied. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Military Academy is hereby affirmed. No costs," the decision read. The high court also agreed with the PMA's findings that Cudia lied about the reason for his tardiness in one of his classes, which served as basis for Cudia's dismissal. Cudia, for his part, justified his tardiness by saying that he was dismissed late in a previous class. "As a factual matter, the Court also noted that petitioner committed a violation of the Honor Code by 'quibbling' which constitutes 'lying.' Citing an Honor Reference Handbook cited in a US case, the Court defined 'quibbling' as a situation where the person creates a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When this is done with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling; and because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying," the high court said. The high court noted that Cudia was "quibbling" when he used the words "dismiss" and "class" since he very well knew that "by no stretch of the imagination can four cadets constitute a 'class.'" "[P]etitioner 'cunningly chose words which led to confusion;' [the SC] also noted that 'it is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy... (as) (t)here is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of an Honor Code violation. The Court also noted that the penalty of dismissal for violation of the Honor Code is appropriate and not disproportionate under the circumstances," the high court said. In ruling that the PMA did not violate Cudia's right to due process, the SC said "minimum standards of fairness were met" in investigating and dismissing Cudia. "[T]he Court stated that 'in order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence.' The Court noted that petitioner had been so afforded these two rights. "In affirming the action taken by the PMA, the Court noted that 'by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or conclusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitriness, or capriciousness is manifest. In this case, the Court found no reason to deviate from the findings of the PMA," the high court said.

Dismissed PMA cadet Cudia passes UP Law entrance exams

Dismissed PMA cadet Cudia passes UP Law entrance exams Published April 10, 2015 7:18pm By MARK MERUEÑAS, GMA News His dream of becoming a military officer might have been snatched from him, but dismissed Philippine Military Academy cadet Aldrin Cudia might in a few years' time become a lawyer. The Public Attorney's Office on Friday confirmed that Cudia passed the University of the Philippines Law Aptitude Examination (LAE) for school year 2015-2016. The PAO is representing Cudia in his legal battle to overturn a PMA decision to dismiss him for lying about why he came late to class. PAO chief Persida Acosta said even without a diploma to present, Cudia was still allowed by UP to take the test. "Kasi may transcript siya na may note na (naka) indefinite leave siya," Acosta told GMA News Online. Persida said this makes Cudia's admission to UP Law "provisional." The results of the UP LAE can be viewed here. In February, the Supreme Court had already turned down Cudia's petition against his dismissal. The ruling, however, has yet to become final, as a motion for reconsideration later filed by Cudia is yet pending. In its ruling last February, the SC found Cudia guilty of "quibbling" which constitutes "lying," when he explained that he and his previous "class" were "dismissed" a bit late, causing his tardiness for his next class. The SC defined quibbling as a situation where a person creates a false impression to his listener by "cleverly wording what he says, omitting facts or telling a partial truth." The SC said Cudia was considered to have "quibbled" because "by no stretch of imagination can four constitute a 'class.'" Cudia claimed he was with three other classmates when they were supposedly dismissed late by their previous class. The SC said the PMA did not violate Cudia's right to due process when it enforced its rules on discipline, including the Honor Code, for lying. The high tribunal said the case is "subsumed under (the PMA's) academic freedom" because the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." But in its MR, Cudia asked the high tribunal to "take a second hard look" at the facts and circumstances of his case, and clarified that it respects the PMA's academic freedom and does not "seek to deprive" the school of its rights. In February 2014, the PMA Honor Committee found Cudia guilty of lying about his reason for being late for a class, a violation that led to his dismissal from the academy. The PMA, the PMA Honor Committee of 2014 and the PMA Cadet Review and Appeals Board, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their consolidated comment last June 17, 2014. The comment was countered by Filipina in a reply on July 14 and later adopted by Renato Cudia. Cudia did not march with the Siklab Diwa batch during the PMA’s graduation rites in Baguio City last year since his appeal was still pending before the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the PMA at the time. Cudia’s classmates ostracized him after he opted to stay in the PMA even after the Honor Committee recommended his dismissal. His family, however, has claimed there were irregularities on how the committee voted on his case and asked President Benigno Aquino III to overturn the decision. Cudia's family insisted that the PMA Honor Committee should have acquitted the cadet because one of its members had originally voted in his favor. Under PMA rules, an accused can be acquitted with just one "not guilty" vote. —NB, GMA News - See more at: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/467710/news/nation/dismissed-pma-cadet-cudia-passes-up-law-entrance-exams#sthash.bq93Rwes.dpuf

PANAMA CANAL OPENING

TODAY IN #LABORHISTORY

Betrayal of public trust By: Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. @inquirerdotnet Philippine Daily Inquirer 01:04 AM March 26th, 2012 Very much at the heart of the current impeachment proceedings is a search for a definition of “betrayal of public trust.” But as Justice Conchita Carpio Morales said, in the impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, defining impeachable offenses is beyond the scope of judicial power. Hence, whether or not the offenses allegedly committed by Chief Justice Renato Corona are impeachable offenses is a difficult question for the impeachment court. How should the impeachment court evaluate those acts? It should first be noted that betrayal of public trust was added only by the 1987 Constitution. As our constitutional text stands now, we have six impeachable offenses: “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Betrayal of public trust is only one of a set joined together by the conjunctive word “or.” Under the eiusdem generis rule, words linked together as belonging to a class are understood to have common characteristics. If we are to discern the meaning of “betrayal of public trust,” therefore, we must see what characteristics its companion offenses have. Let us see what the drafters of the 1987 Constitution said. Commissioner Regalado Maambong, speaking of “high crimes,” quoted Enrique Fernando who said: “In the United States Constitution, the term is high crimes and misdemeanors. The Philippine Constitution speaks only of high crimes. There is support for the view that while there need not be a showing of criminal character of the act imputed, it must be of sufficient seriousness as to justify the belief that there was a grave violation of trust on the official sought to be impeached.” Next, Maambong quoted a line from the Congressional Record on the attempted impeachment of President Elpidio Quirino: “High crimes refer to those offenses which, like treason and bribery, are indictable offenses and are of such enormous gravity that they strike at the very life or orderly working of the government.” And from the same Congressional Record he quoted: “Culpable violation of the Constitution means willful and intentional violation of the Constitution and not violation committed unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith or through honest mistake of judgment.” And again from Fernando: “Culpable violation implies deliberate intent, perhaps even a certain degree of perversity for it is not easy to imagine that individuals in the category of these officials would go so far as to defy knowingly what the Constitution commands.” On the specific offense of “betrayal of public trust,” Commissioner Ricardo Romulo said that it could “cover any violation of the oath of office.” But Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes, author of the amendment, elaborated: “And so the term ‘betrayal of public trust,’ as explained by Romulo is a catchall phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statute as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render an officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute.” Commissioner Jose Nolledo added: “I think plain error of judgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term.” For his part, Commissioner Serafin Guingona cited the proposal of the UP Law Center Project  which specified “Acts which are short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, gross negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers.” When we add up all these, what do we get? In all that has been said, the common characteristic is gravity or seriousness of the offense. Not every form of deviation from a public officer’s duty is an impeachable public offense. The deviation must be intentional and as serious in gravity as treason or bribery which are the paradigms of impeachable offenses: treason because it strikes at the life of the nation, and bribery because it impedes the proper functioning of government. It was against this background that the 1987 Constitution commissioners approved “betrayal of public trust” as an impeachable offense. But as Justice Morales observed, “An examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear-cut definition or even a standard therefor.” Having said all this, are the offenses alleged against Chief Justice Corona impeachable offenses? To arrive at a conclusion, the impeachment court will have to single out every alleged offense and decide whether the applicable rules on evidence justify the conclusion that they “involve what is thought to be a serious abuse of official power or a stark incompatibility between the offense and the offender’s ability to faithfully execute the duties of his or her office in a manner that will not endanger the office or the nation.” For example, is error in accomplishing the statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN), so much discussed last week and so commonly committed even by high-ranking officials, an impeachable offense? Let us hope that the Holy Season will help the impeachment court arrive at a fair conclusion! Read more: http://opinion.inquirer.net/25637/betrayal-of-public-trust#ixzz4AAdZh2H2 Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook