REFERENCE CITED : LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA  EN BANC
July 4, 2017
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
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G.R. No. 231771
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
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G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the President's Report:
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to conclude that -
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.:
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as follows:
The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.
The Petitions
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived capability".15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of the military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon.18Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic.19 It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law.20
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts".21
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of the Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the armored vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was commandeered.23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists.24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State University.25
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested.26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis.30
In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658.32
B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII"33 of the Constitution, likewise seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. 34
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.39
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging.40
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities.41
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao.42
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort46 and should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.49
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of substantiation.53
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents.55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant information"56in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
The Consolidated Comment
The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by the Court. Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind one true flag and defend it against all threats from within and outside our shores".59
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII.61Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the discretion not to give due course to the petition.63
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on the factual basis"66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must prove"67 and that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional.68
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the decision was made.69 It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard.70 It reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the information and data available to him at the time he made the determination.71 The OSG thus asserts that facts that were establishedafter the declaration of martial law should not be considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety of revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended.72
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be expected to personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on governmental acts".76
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216".77
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the Court's Ruling.
ISSUES
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void:
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda.
OUR RULING
I. Locus standi of petitioners.
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer."81
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".83 In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing.
II. Whether or not the petitions are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88
The Court agrees.
a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clearlegislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.91
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case ofLansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
d) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
e) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:
f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additionalsafeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
g) Jurisdiction of the Court is
not restricted to those enumerated in Sections I and 5 of Article VIII
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of the Court to review oncertiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).103
h) Unique features of the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing."104In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
III. The power of the Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
a) The judicial power to review
versus the congressional power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised independently from the congressional power to revoke.
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the following exchange:
c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that:
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding.111
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency
of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action."113
a) Extraordinary powers of the
President distinguished.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review."117
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent danger."121
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court.123
b) What really happens during martial law?
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State.126
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza)Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".128
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.129
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to a sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.132
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
d) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the Congress not to interfere a priori in the decision-making process of the President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege.133
The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
e) The Court must similarly
and necessarily refrain from calibrating the President's decision of which among his extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation or condition.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the country.138The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.
j) The recommendation of the
Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
g) In any event, the President
initially employed the most benign action - the calling out power - before he declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it.
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
be considered vague and thus void because of (a) its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the absence of any guideline specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
This argument lacks legal basis.
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."141
b) Vagueness doctrine applies
only in free speech cases.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."143
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking down statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.146 "Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness."147
c) Proclamation No. 216
cannot be facially challenged using the vagueness doctrine.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
d) Inclusion of "other rebel
groups " does not make Proclamation No.216 vague.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
a) The calling out power is in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law:
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.155
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis.156
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ ofhabeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
b) The operative fact doctrine.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.158
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.
a) The scope of the power of
review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
b) The "sufficiency of factual
basis test".
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio inFortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. inFortun:
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g.,the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.169
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
VIII. The parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
a) Actual invasion or rebellion,
and public safety requirement.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).172
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article 134 of the RPC:
Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see k s to prevent.174
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."175
b) Probable cause is the
allowable standard of proof for the President.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused."177
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpusin the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
The contention lacks merit.
a) Facts, events and
information upon which the President anchored his decision to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM,180 the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
b) The President's Conclusion
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:
c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-evidence.231
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis.
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.
d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections not Applicable.
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedolmade it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial."240 Here, the question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.
e) There are other independent
facts which support the finding that, more likely than not, rebellion exists and that public safety requires it.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
X. Public safety requires the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared:
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
XI. Whole of Mindanao
a) The overriding and
paramount concern of martial law is the protection of the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public.
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present.
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant, classified, and live information which equip and assist him in making decisions.
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.Otherwise stated, the President believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President."255
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."257
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
c) The Court has no machinery
or tool equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions.
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However, this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the Court,260 which it did during the closed door session last June 15, 2017.
d) The 1987 Constitution
grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.
e) The Constitution has
provided sufficient safeguards against possible abuses of Commander-in- Chief's powers; further curtailment of Presidential powers should not only be discouraged but also avoided.
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards against presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:
Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution thatsufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would not generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a whole. Thus:
f) Rebellion and public safety;
nature, scope, and range.
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines, particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's compound.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that allarmed participants should congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpusin the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or anypart thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in theentire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance".270 Direct assault,271murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge."277Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense".279 "All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.280
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed public uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
g) The Court must stay within
the confines of its power.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system."281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in Mindanao.
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"282 by attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act."283
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:
h) Several local armed groups
have formed linkages aimed at committing rebellion and acts in furtherance thereof in the whole of Mindanao.
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South."285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
i) Terrorism neither negates
nor absorbs rebellion.
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e.,(a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayattherein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements.300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.
Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences and prejudices?
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARESit as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Dissenting Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Chief Justice
with separate opinion
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
2 Id. 3 Id. at 38-39. 4 Id. at 40. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 40-41. 7 Id. at 41. 8 Id. at 42-43. 9 Id. at 43. 10 Id. at 44-45. 11 Id. at 3-32. 1 12 Id. at 15. 13 Id. at 16. 14 Id. at 16-17. 15 Id. at 17. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. at 19. 19 Id. at 20. 20 Id. at 20-21. 21 Id. at 23. 22 Id. at 24. 23 Id. 24 Id. at 24-25. 25 Id. at 25. 26 Id. 27 Id. at 26-27. 28 Id. at 28. 29 Id. at 29. 30 Id. at 29-30. 31 Id. at 48-50.
32 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 80-83; rollo of G.R. No. 231774, pp. 47-50.
33 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 4, 7.34 Id. at 5. 35 Id. at 23. Italics supplied. 36 Id. at 23-24. Italics supplied. 37 Id. at 24. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 27. 40 Id. at 24-25. 41 Id. at 28-29. 42 Id. at 31. 43 Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 3. 44 Id. at 6. 45 Id. at 8. 46 Id. at 11. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 12. 50 Id. at 15. 51 Id. at l7. 52 Id. at 12. 53 Id. at 20-21. 54 Id. at 23. 55 Id. at 24. 56 Id. 57 Id. at 25. 58 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 85-135. 59 Id. at 130. 60 Id. at 105. 61 Id. at 106. 62 Id. at 105. 63 Id. 64 Id. at 107. 65 Id. 66 Id. at 111. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. at 112. 70 Id. at 113. 71 Id. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. at 114. 75 Id. 76 Id. 77 Id. at 119. 78 See Notice dated June 13, 2017, id. at 211-216.
79 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 850.
80 Id., citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937); Police General Macasiano (Ret.) v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 64 (1993).
81 Bernas, Joaquin G., Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, 2010 ed., p. 795.82 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 7. 83 Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 6. 84 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 4-5.
85 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 852.
86 Id. at 85l.87 TSN of Oral Argument, June 13, 2017, p. 83. 88 Id.at21-22. 89 De Jesus v. Garcia, 125 Phil. 955, 959 (1967).
90 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 ed., p. 167, citing Pimentel v. Commission on Elections,189 Phil. 581, 587 (1980) and Dimagiba v. Geraldez, 102 Phil. 1016, 1019 (1958).
91 De Jesus v. Garcia, supra at 960.92 149 Phil. 547 (1971). 93 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 edition, p. 109.
94 Bernas, Joaquin, G ., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.
95 91 Phil. 882, 887 (1952).
96 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 585-586.
97 206 Phil. 392 (1983).98 Id. at 419.
99 See also Cruz, Isagani, A., Philippine Political Law, 2002 edition, pp. 225-226.
100 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).
101 V RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 1009-10 10 (October 15, 1986). Emphasis supplied
102 "The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
103 "Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
104 Ballentine, J., Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 1948 ed., p. 1023; Bouvier, J., Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, 8th ed., Vol. II, p. 2730.
105 TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, pp. 99-100.
106 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 767 (2006), citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 643 (2000).
107 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 503-504 (July 31, 1986).108 Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526 (2012). 109 Id. at 558. 110 Id. at 561.
111 Any reference in the Majority Opinion and in the Dissent of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo to acting ''in tandem", "not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly'', and "sequential or joint" pertains to the interplay of powers/actions between the President and the Congress; not of the Judiciary. See Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 557, 560, 604.
112 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18.
113 Bernas, Joaquin G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 456.
114 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 780.
115 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 642 (2000).
116 Id. at 639-640.
117 Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 472.
118 Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 474.
119 Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the I 986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.
120 Id. at 458.121 Id.
122 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.
123 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 115 at 643.
124 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 398 (July 29, 1986),125 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 402 (July 29, 1986).
126 Bernas, Joaquin, G. Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 20 10 ed., p. 473.
127 Supra note 106.128 Id. at 781-782.
129 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio, Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 599.
130 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.
131 SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 510-511 (2004).
132 Id. at 518.
133 Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 464.
134 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 469 (July 30, 1986).135 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986). 136 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 471(July30, 1986). 137 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986). 138 11 RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).
139 WHEREAS, this [May 23, 2017 Marawi incident] recent attack shows the capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao
140 Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel & Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 325 (1967).
141 People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988).142 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 354 (2001).
143 Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 122 (2014).
144 Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 390-391 (2008).
145 Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 142 at 430-432.
146 Id. at 355.147 Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 283 (2004).
148 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 490 (2010).
149 Supra note 106.150 Supra note 141. 151 Id. at 286-287. 152 690 Phil. 72, (2012). 153 Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied. 154 Supra note 115. 155 Id. at 640. 156 Id. at 632-634. 157 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18, par. 3.
158 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary; 1996 ed., p. 865.
159 Id. at 864-865, citing Fernandez v. Cuerva, 129 Phil. 332, 340 (1967).
160 Supra note 92.
161 Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution do not have the equivalent provision of Section 18, par. 3, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
162 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 586. See Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.473.
163 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 475.
164 Id. at 473.
165 According to petitioner Lagman, "the length of the proclamation and the assertion of facts therein is the call of the President; see TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, p. 67.
166 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 607.
167 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).
168 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 629.
169 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).
170 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 610.
171 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, 2003, pp. 187-189.
172 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 592.
173 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 412 (July 29, 1986).
174 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 595.
175 Id. at 594-595.176 Id. at 597-598. 177 Id.
178 Caraig, Benjamin R., The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, 2008 revised ed., p. 59.
179 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 267.180 Id. at 380. 181 See Proclamation No. 216, 1st Whereas Clause. 182 See Proclamation No. 216, 4th Whereas Clause. 183 See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause. 184 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 187-193. 185 Id. at 189. 186 Id. 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 190 Id. 191 Id. 192 Id. 193 Id. 194 Id. 195 Id. 196 Id. 197 Id. 198 Id. 199 Id. 200 Id. 201 Id. 202 Id. at 190. 203 Id. 204 Id. 205 Id. 206 Id. 207 Id. 208 Id. 209 Id. at 191. 210 Id. 211 Id. 212 Id. 213 Id. 214 Id. 215 Id. 216 Id. 217 Id. 218 Id. 219 Id. 220 Id. 221 See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause. 222 See Report, p. l, 1st par., rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 187. 223 Id. at 3, last par., id. at 189. 224 Id. at 6, 1st par., id. at 192. 225 Id., 2nd par., id. 226 Id., 3rd par., Id. 227 Id., 4th par., Id. 228 Id., 5th par., Id. 229 Id. at 7, penultimate par., id. at 193. 230 Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 112 at 595-598. 231 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 275-276. 232 Id. at 320-332. 233 Id. at 331-332, 343-344. 234 Id. at 320-323. 235 Id. 236 Id. at 347-348. 237 Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000). 238 See rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 29. 239 621 Phil. 498 (2009). 240 Id. at 517. 241 TSN of the Oral Arguments, June 14, 2017, pp. 10-23. 242 See Report, p. 3, 2" par. Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 189. 243 Id. at 4; id. at 190. 244 Id.; id. 245 Id. at 5; id. at 191. 246 Id.; id. 247 Id.; id. 248 Id.; id. 249 Id. at 6; id. at 192. 250 Id.; id. 251 Id.; id. 252 Id. at 7; id. at 193. 253 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 710 (July 17, 1986). 254 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 774 (July 18, 1986). 255 TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2014, p. 67. 256 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986). 257 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986). 258 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 767. 259 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 486. 260 Id. 261 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 394 (July 29, 1986). 262 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482 (July 30, 1986). 263 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 483 (July 30, 1986). 264 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 485 (July 30, 1986). 265 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986). 266 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995).
267 People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 96 (1956); People v. lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995).
268 Definitions of PUBLIC SAFETY
269 People v. Dasig, 293 Phil. 599, 608 (1993). Italics supplied.270 People v. Lovedioro, supra note 266 at 488. 271 People v. Dasig, supra 269 at 608-609.
272 People v. Mangallan, 243 Phil. 286 (1988) cited in People v. Dasig, supra at 609.
273 People v. Lovedioro, supra at 488.274 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, 267 Phil. 603, 612 (1990). 278 Id. 276 Id. 277 People v. Dasig, supra at 609. 278 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 603. 279 People v. lovedioro, supra at 490. 280 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 61l. 281 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 550 (1956). 282 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986). 283 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 510 (July 31, 1986). Emphasis supplied. 284 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (August 6, 1986). Emphasis supplied.
285 History of Lanao del Sur
286 Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background
287 Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background
288 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 40-41.289 Id. at 156. 290 Id. at 146. 291 Id. 292 Id. 293 Id. at 147-148. 294 Id. at 146. 295 Id. 296 Id. 291 Id. 298 President Duterte's Report to Congress, May 25, 2017, p. 3; id. at 37.
299 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, lists the following predicate crimes of terrorism:
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection); c. Article 134-a (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private persons; d. Article 248 (Murder); e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention); f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction, or under (2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990); (3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968); (4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law); (5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives).
300 In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 148 at 493, the Court held that the elements of terrorism are as follows: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
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Showing posts with label LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 16, 2018
MARTIAL LAW EXTENSION ORAL ARGUMENTS ( DAY 1 OF 2DAYS)16JAN18 AND LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDIA
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SYNDICATED ESTAFA
MY QUEST FOR SWINDLED
RETIREMENT PAY BY SHELL
 
SWINDLING ITO, SYNDICATED ESTAFA
HOT PURSUIT
DUTY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES
SHELL SWINDLING OF RETIREMENT PAY 5TH YEAR
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