30TH PERSUASIVE MESSAGE_OBJECTION TO HEARSAY PLEADINGS

                           

JULY 15, 2016  SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE As magistrates of the PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT concerned about  the social ills profoundly discussed by President Duterte,  you have in your discretion to accept or deny the fact that  there is peoples' erosion of faith in our judicial system, as part of the real problems confronting the nation today.   You might have listened to the sound bite or read notes regarding this issue but to reiterate the president's  lamentations I have the excerpts provided especially for you: [1]"There are many among us who advance the assessment the problems that bedevil our country today which need to be addressed with urgency are  CORRUPTION both in high and low echelons of government,  CRIMINALITY in the streets, and  the rampant sale of ILLEGAL DRUGS in all strata of Philippine society  and the breakdown of LAW AND ORDER True but not absolutely so, for I say these ills are symptoms of a viral social disease  that creeps and cuts into the moral fiber of Philippine society.  I sense a problem deeper and more serious than than any of those  mentioned, or all of them put together, but of course, it is not to say that we will ignore them,  because they have to be stopped by means, by all means that the law allows.   Erosion of faith and trust in the government, THAT IS THE REAL PROBLEM that confronts us, resolving that from,  I see the erosion of the peoples' trust in our country's leaders,  the EROSION OF FAITH IN OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM,  the erosion of confidence in the capacity of our public servants to make the peoples' lives BETTER, SAFER AND HEALTHIER. "...                                                _President Rodrigo Roa Duterte from his Inaugural  speech  June 30, 2016 CORRUPTION CORRUPTION,  both in high and low echelons of government and if may I add, Corruption is to the human society and toxin is to the human body. Human interactions like blood being pumped through the heart then to the brain and to vital  organs of the human body through the largest and smallest arteries and veins and had to be  constantly cleaned by the kidney out of toxins in normal healthy functioning body vis-a-vis vibrant human society.   Today, the human body is sick. His blood is seriously contaminated with toxins but his kidney had failed and the human body is dying.  So with  the Philippine society.  Good that  the Philippines  found a kidney and a surgeon rolled into one in the person of President Duterte.  As a kidney, he has  processed fresh blood which liven up hope and fulfillment of peoples' aspirations for an honest and responsive government, where in the past had just been a pile of continuing years of toxic  frustration and angst and disillusionment. and hopelessness and despair. As a surgeon,  he is trained  to determine when the wound could still be treated by antiseptics or antibiotics or has to be managed by amputation or castration. Your honors, the choice is yours to make. Corruption has to be stopped, said the surgeon, clear and straightforward.  The president, with his several years as prosecutor and fiscal and a professor in criminal law is not brainless or ignorant to whom you can hide your corruption and crimes from. The president as a surgeon has the capacity of extricating gangrenes, shallow and deep alike and with all due respect, you may want to reform yourselves to revitalize the judicial institution which had been in the rotten state of decay and decomposition then do it  or  you might as well stay put and keep the your malignant disease gangrenes of corruption and be extricated yourselves in due time.  As the president in a number of speeches had warned the Abu Sayaff, "There will days of reckoning..."  the same is aptly I believe he may have wanted be addressed to you. Corruption, your honors, as I experienced dealing with you and the rest of your employees had been part of the normal daily chores of  doing judicial business in the Supreme Court. Corruption is rampant.  Everyone else is corrupt.  Corruption in the Supreme Court like trash,  is noticeable when there is one in a clean environment.  Even one as minute as a cigarette butt is easy to pinpoint when it, as I reiterate, is in a clean environment .  But when trash and garbage and filth abounds everywhere, no one could ever know though tons more are added to them.  That is the reality in the Philippine Supreme Court, perception of uprightness are mere cosmetics and products of their own self adulation, in contrast with their malignant crookedness and corruption. Filth abounds everywhere, as corruption is.  The Philippine Supreme Court as the emperor of filth propagation  occupies the throne from which power to the grandiose rubbish machinery emanates.  A machinery,  though reprehensible to the morally upright man,  has been allowed to operate, licensed under the doctrine of presumption of regularity.  This doctrine cloaked magistrates with enormous discretionary power to uphold or disregard the constitution or the law at will or bend the rules depending in who the client they would want to serve.  So sometimes, their decisions seemed to look constitutionally or lawfully right or in some cases but not few, often they ridiculously and stealthily did incorporate a new provision in the constitution to comply with the needs of their client and the same is equally true with the same evil motive when these justices spitefully legislated a new law  from the bench entirely contrary to the existing  law through the skillful manipulation of meticulously applied rhetorics in jurisprudence coupled with voluminous citations from various books in law and courts in the United States and all over the globe, where not one in a million people would not have the interest or patience even bother to read or least look at it and just accept it.  Or, and if ever there would be one who would see truth on the contrary nobody would ever listen to him,  no difference with the child who asserted that the emperor is wearing nothing or naked inconsistent with the elders' pretentious acceptance of the lie that the emperor is wearing a majestic new clothing which wont be visible to men unfit for their position or stupid. The emperor and the elders naturally wanted to appear fit for their position or not lacking intelligence, though they really are but wanted to continue receiving perks and benefits meant for the fit and intelligent, they blindly accepted the myth espoused by the emperor's new clothes. That is corruption told through tale during the ancient times being reenacted, true to life here, in the Philippine Supreme Court.  The Justices as the emperor exceedingly fond of vanity and insatiable greed had swindled themselves into believing that the robes they are wearing, the robes of the presumption of regularity are no less than the emperor's new clothes where corruption hidden underneath though in reality are visible but justices  and other guardians of law pretended they see not for they are wearing the same robes and benefiting therefrom,  thereby creating a community founded on deceit and corruption..... from top to bottom ...everywhere. Shell,  based on  the verified documents I presented here is an expert in the field of deception and corruption.  I have no doubts that Shell shrewd as it actually is have anchored its roots within the community of corrupt arbiters, commissioners and justices thriving in the judiciary.  I have strong reasons  to believe, that Labor Arbiter (Lontoc) had decided the case the manner she did,   on account of her being under the influence of Shell. If not she was working for the interest of Shell and absent of any corrupt motive, she having been informed by Atty. Quiroz that GM Bersamin is the Individual [2]respondent to the case I filed against Shell, Lontoc  should have not allowed certain Remedios Vargas, who was not a party[2.1]to the dispute, to sign the verification for  GM Bersamin[3], despite  of complainant's objection[4][5] thereto.  The pleadings by GM Bersamin having verified by person other than Bersamin amounts to hearsay testimony and therefore should have been struck down and this case should have decided by Lontoc ex parte.  But for reasons known only to Lontoc, attributable to corruption,  she entertained GM Beramin's pleadings though they were hearsay testimony and not within the exceptions specified in the rules.[5.1]   This is one among the list of acts of partiality by L A Lontoc. determinant of overt influence of Shell on her amounting to corruption and this influence as I learned, is not free. Moreover, I reiterated this objection on Atty. Quiroz disbarment[10] AC-10084. As in my previous persuasive appeal, the president, in case you deny the veracity of his observations and continued to preserve the status quo for your own client and personal benefit and interest and relentlessly resumed your corrupt and wicked ways and farther fanned the flames engulfing the remaining pillars of faith the people have in you, then, he may,  as expected resort to the political options of impeachment as  means to catapult reforms in the judicial system as maybe necessary.   In this regard,  you may want to re-evaluate your position regarding the manner you are treating me. Time is on my side. Every ticks file up to my benefit as it amounts to prolonged and sustained pain and injury and suffering, that you deliberately,  with evil motive,  meant and intended against me and my family and convincingly serve as evidence of collusion between you and Shell being having unity of purpose,  through your grave abuse of discretion and deliberate gross inexcusable negligence, to perpetuate the injustice,  pain and suffering to my family and myself which we are are experiencing since 2003 up to the present time. May you be guided by the following:  "SEC 200_ Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong."         _ John Locke : Second Treatise of Civil Government,           Chapter xviii : Of  Tyranny May this message serves as the 30th PERSUASIVE APPEAL for you to reconsider your position with respect to your appreciation of cases GR-183273 and AC-10084 and institute through your own volition disciplinary actions against erring guardians of law in relation to the cases mentioned as preliminary to showing convincing evidences proving that the court is not acting in collusion with Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,  its officers and managers, jointly and severally,  to perpetuate pain and suffering and  injustice against me and my family. Otherwise, you all, are in admission of the act of collusion between Shell, her lawyers and you, having unity of purpose,  to perpetuate injustice, pain and suffering against me and my family, as charged. Sincerely, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr. FOOTNOTES [1] video REAL PROBLEM CONFRONTING US [2] ON GR-183273 RICO BERSAMIN IS THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENT NAMED IN THIS AFFIDAVIT AND MADE THE  STATEMENTS AND COUNTER STATEMENTS THEREON. HENCE, RICO BERSAMIN SHOULD BE THE ONE TO BE SWORN IN AND SHOULD BE THE ONE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT AS MANDATED BY RULE 3, Parties to Civil Actions  SECTION 2 Parties in interest [2.1] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED (RULES 1-71, RULES OF COURT) EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1997 Per Resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 Adopted in Baguio City on April 8, 1997 RULE 3 Parties to Civil Actions Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. — Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counter-claim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant. (1a) Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) Section 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (3a) Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. (4a) Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. — A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. (5a) Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6n) Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7) Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a) Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. — Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (8a, 9a) Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. (10) Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (11a) Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a) Section 13. Alternative defendants. — Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other. (13a) Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. — Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner heir devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require, when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accordingly. (14) Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. — When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known. In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the persons composing said entity must all be revealed. (15a) Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (16a, 17a) Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard. (18a) Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem. (19a) Section 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. (20) Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a) Section 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a) Section 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or a representative duly designated by him. (23a) [3] CERTAIN REMEDIOS VARGAS,   WHOM I DID NOT NAME IN MY  COMPLAINT ( NOT A PARTY IN  THE DISPUTE) AND HAD  NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE  FACTS, INCIDENTS, ALLEGATIONS  STATED BY RICO BERSAMIN,  SIGNED VERIFICATION  OF THE DOCUMENTS.  I RAISED OBJECTION THERETO IN MY REPLY. [4] MY OBJECTION  WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY LABOR ARBITER LONTOC YET SHE  CONFORMED WITH REMEDIOS VARGAS  IN SIGNING THE POSITION PAPER  AFFIDAVIT FOR RESPONDENT RICO  BERSAMIN THOUGH VARGAS HAS NO  PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ON  THE  FACTS,  INCIDENTS AND ISSUES STATED BY BERSAMIN THEREIN.  LABOR ARBITER LONTOC SHOULD  HAVE ORDERED ATTY. QUIROZ TO TO MAKE THE NEEDED CORRECTION ON THOSE DOCUMENTS /PLEADINGS AS MANDATED BY RULE 3, Parties to Civil Actions SECTION 2_Parties in interest  OTHERWISE,  LABOR ARBITER LONTOC SHOULD HAVE STRUCK OUT THOSE  PLEADINGS FOR HAVING NO  PROBATIVE VALUE BEING HEARSAY  TESTIMONY AND BEING VARGAS  NOT A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE NOR VARGAS STATEMENTS COVERED BY EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE.  Sections 37 to 47...  see [5.1] See last two lines of this page and the first two lines of the next page on  item 5...to wit: "Complainant questioned the verification of the respondent's position paper by Remedios M. Vargas  [5] arguing that respondent Bersamin as refinery General Manager  has a wider grasp of the issues on this case than Ms. Vargas."                         [5.1]               SECTION 36, RULE 130, RULES OF COURT  5. Testimonial Knowledge Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30a) 6. Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31a) Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a) Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a) Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (34a) Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. (35) Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36a) Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (37a) Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38) Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39) Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a) Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a) [6] G.R. NO. 155619 LEODEGARIO BAYANI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES August 14, 2007 XXX Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on hearsay evidence, to wit: Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.[10] [10] Bon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 152160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 101, 109. XXX [7] G.R. NO. 164457 APRIL 11, 2012 ANNA LERIMA PATULA Petitioner Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent XXX On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared ExhibitsB to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.    To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.[19] Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[20] The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21] Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.[24] Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz: Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a) The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly: Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a) Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that:In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings. We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[27] [19] 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Edition, pp. 267-268; citing Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johnson (N.Y.), 45, 50, 6 Am. Dec. 253. [20] Id., citing Minea v. St. Louis Corp., 179 Mo. A., 705, 716, 162 S.W. 741. [21] Id., p. 268. [22] Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracys Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221. [23] Id. [24] 20 Am Jur 404. [25] People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946). [26] Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243. [27] Gulam v. Santos,G.R. No. 151458, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 463, 473. xxx [8] G.R. NO. 194320  February 1, 2012MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC Petitioner vs. RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES Respondents  XXX Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own perception.[18] Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters.[19] Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.[20] [18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 36. [19] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 253-254. [20] Id. at 254. XXX [9] G.R. No. 103737 December 15, 1994 NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,respondents. XXX The rule is clear and explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. 23  23 Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court. [10] ON AC-10084 ATTY. RAUL QUIROZ DISBARMENT OBJECTION ON VARGAS SIGNING VERIFICATION IN PLACE OF  BERSAMIN REITERATED HERE. On the matter of the Second deceitful act committed by Atty. Quiroz, in  naming Rico Bersamin as the  respondent in the complaint and  having another, REMEDIOS VARGAS, signing the Position Paper for him. WHERE IN ISSUES like, among others,  A. Sanity in the Perfect Attendance Award Scheme,  Vargas has no  interaction with me about this issue. B. The issue about me, having not to cut my hair since January 2000,  until sanity of the Perfect Attendance Award Scheme is addressed, Vargas  had no interaction with me about  this issue. C. My INQUIRY about the missing  CBA minutes of negotiation meetings, and violations of the GROUND rules,  Vargas had no interaction with  me about this issue. D.  My claim of the Performance    Related Bonus in behalf of Ritche  Coronel,  Vargas had no interaction with me about this issue. E.  My petition for having the criterion of long years of service (16 years)  which have been applied to Senior  Office staff in giving them 10%  increase, and the same be applied  to me being in the same Senior level  position as they were with even a  longer years of service of 24 years.   Vargas had no interaction with me  about this issue. F.  The decision of Rico Bersamin for  having ignored giving recognition to the achievement of my son for  garnering the top 1 of the April 2002  Electronics and Communications  Engineering Licensure Examinations, despite of my son being a Shell high school and college scholar. Vargas had no interaction with me about this issue. G.  The execution of the "rigged      ranking" exercise to serve as a  basis for terminating me from  employment.  Vargas had no  interaction with me about this issue. H.  The violation of the CBA  Security of tenure provision  to wit: "The union recognizes the right of  the company to contract out work. However, no employee shall suffer loss of employment on  account of contracted out work." Vargas had no interaction with  me about this issue. These instances are part of the  AC-10084 Disbarment Complaint against Atty. Quiroz written in Pilipino or Tagalog Titled "Pangalawang  Pandaraya" ...see [11] below: [11]