US scuppers Shell's hopes of drilling Alaskan Arctic
By Rob Davies; PUBLISHED: 09:03, 10 January 2013
Shell's dream of drilling for oil in the Alaskan Arctic has suffered another blow, after US authorities announced a 'high-level' review likely to delay its plans still further.
US Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar said his department would launch a 60-day probe 'to review practices and identify challenges as well as lessons learned'.
It follows a series of accidents and setbacks that have hit Shell's Alaskan programme, the latest of which saw its drilling rig, the Kulluk, rescued after running aground on New Year's Eve.
Salazar said the probe had been 'expedited', suggesting the Kulluk incident has sharpened his department's focus on Shell's Arctic activities.
The US Coastguard launched a parallel probe into how the Kulluk ran aground.
The development will raise fears that Shell's plans, which have cost it £3billion so far, will be hampered by a government still cool on British oil firms after BP's spill at its Macondo well.
Salazar was instrumental in holding BP's feet to the fire after the catastrophe, saying he lacked confidence in the company, which had left him 'angry' and 'frustrated'.
'In the context of Macondo, no-one in government is going to err on the side of giving oil companies a break,' said Stuart Joyner, oil analyst with City firm Investec.
He said Shell (up 9p to 2141p) was likely to suffer delays to its Arctic plans as a result of its problems in Alaska and would have to address the setbacks at its fourth-quarter results this month.
He said investors hoping for Arctic operations to move more quickly could become 'tetchy', amid fears that Britain's two oil giants are losing their touch.
But he added the firm was unlikely to be fazed by delays to a project that is already expected to take between five and ten years to come to fruition.
Shell would also welcome stiff regulation if it meant avoiding a major disaster like BP's oil spill, he added.
The Anglo-Dutch firm welcomed the review, saying that it would 'help strengthen our Alaska exploration programme going forward'. But Shell acknowledged that it had 'experienced challenges' with its venture.
It suffered delays in securing approval to use a spill-response barge, the Arctic Challenger, that would collect oil in the event of an accident.
And a containment dome that would also be used in responding to a spill was 'crushed like a beer can' during testing.
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Posted in: Alaska, Arctic, Corporate Governance, Daily Mail, Environment, Oil,Pollution, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Shell Project Delays, United States.
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · Chukchi Sea · Oil · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · Chukchi Sea · Oil · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Tom Botts
Botts was in charge of Southern as GasDirector UEG with his buddy Finlayson as Oil Director UED. It's interesting the connection with Wood Group as one of the guys killed by the combined neglect of Birnie, Bayliss, Berget, Finlayson, Botts, Hill and their mentor TFA Brinded was a Wood Group employee, who of course was blamed for contributing to his own demise…
John,
Thought you may like this press release in todays Scotsman and also Aberdeen Press and Journal.
Botts was in Aberdeen following Finlayson so he continued the TFA policy during his tenure. Shortly after his departure the Brent B fatalities took place sliding the blame on his successor!
Botts implemented Brindeds ruthless staff reductions and dilution of retained skill levels resulting in todays Management profiles of the inability to do anything.
Botts finished up in Houston overseeing the Motiva refinery expansion resulting in a massive cock up on start up costing many millions and months of delayed start up
More Shell dross being recycled that's for sure, stand by your beds in Wood Group, Botts will be behind the massive job losses which will be in the pipeline very soon.
John Wood Group PLC announces the following board appointment.
Thomas M. Botts joins Wood Group as a non-executive director on 8 January 2013 and will also join the Board's Nomination Committee.
Tom worked for Shell for 35 years, starting as a production engineer, later as Treasurer of Shell's US activities and then in senior roles in London, Aberdeen and The Hague where he led Shell's European Exploration and Production business from 2003. In 2009 Tom was appointed as Global head of Shell's manufacturing business (including Shell's worldwide refineries and chemical complexes). Tom retired from Shell in October 2012. He is a non-executive director of EnPro Industries, Inc., is a member of Council at the Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University, is on the Governor's Task Force at the University of Wyoming, and is a longstanding member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers.
Allister Langlands, Chairman, said "We are delighted to welcome Tom to the Board. His in-depth experience of the international oil & gas industry, both in upstream and in petrochemicals and refineries, will be of great value to the Group".
There are no other details which require to be disclosed under the Listing Rules LR 9.6.13. and Mr Botts does not have any interest in the shares of Wood Group.
COMMENT BY RETIRED SHELL HSE GROUP AUDITOR, BILL CAMPBELL
Botts was in charge of Southern as GasDirector UEG with his buddy Finlayson as Oil Director UED. It's interesting the connection with Wood Group as one of the guys killed by the combined neglect of Birnie, Bayliss, Berget, Finlayson, Botts, Hill and their mentor TFA Brinded was a Wood Group employee, who of course was blamed for contributing to his own demise to hide from public scrutiny the failures of the HSE and the Scottish CPS.
Posted in: Bill Campbell, Malcolm Brinded, Oil, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, TOUCH F*** ALL.
Tagged: Chris Finlayson · Malcolm Brinded · Royal Dutch Shell Plc · Shell Brent Bravo Scandal · Tom Botts · Wood Group
Tagged: Chris Finlayson · Malcolm Brinded · Royal Dutch Shell Plc · Shell Brent Bravo Scandal · Tom Botts · Wood Group
SHELL'S ALASKAN FOLLY
Do we really need to have another disaster on the scale of Piper Alpha or Alexander Kielland before Shell starts to apply the same standards to their Alaskan operations as are applied to their international operations? Has anyone ever heard of a 47 year old drilling vessel being used in the Arctic in Norway, or even a 30 year old drilling vessel? Or helicopters without de-icing equipment? Shell has lost control of both of their vessels in Alaska, leading to well publicised groundings. Why do we never hear of loss of control incidents and vessels running aground in the Norwegian Arctic?
COMMENT ON SHELL'S ALASKAN FOLLY BY AN EXPERT
Many of your readers will be familiar with the two major North Sea disasters (Piper Alpha and Alexander Kielland) which together resulted in 290 deaths in the 1980s. Those with longer memories will remember the Sea Gem which was lost (with 13 lives) while being moved in December 1965.
These vessels were all constructed in accordance with the standards in force at the time. The standards simply could not have anticipated the ferocity of the conditions under which the vessels would be used, or the specifics of the export system to which the Piper Alpha platform was attached.
As suggested by Tennille Tracy's article, standards are created to address the circumstances of accidents/incidents that have already happened. They cannot anticipate new circumstances and are usually the result of compromises which try to balance the economic costs of applying new standards with the perceived benefits. The Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster proposed the use of Safety Cases which would review both operating practices and equipment standards for specific anticipated circumstances. The Safety Case approach has been adopted globally (outside the US) and has undoubtedly contributed to the fall in the number of accidents/incidents in the offshore oil and gas industry.
The US should have learned a lesson from BP's Macondo disaster, but continues to rely on standards which were written long before deep water or arctic drilling was even considered: fortunately most international operators have their own internal standards (which are required to support their Safety Cases) which far exceed the minima of the applicable statutory requirements, if indeed such statutory requirements exist. However, when no internal operator standard is available and costs can be reduced by applying legal minima, the application of standards written for a different world may result in a disaster. Most US standards are based on operations in the Gulf of Mexico or on land, so it is hardly surprising that they are inadequate for the Arctic.
Do we really need to have another disaster on the scale of Piper Alpha or Alexander Kielland before Shell starts to apply the same standards to their Alaskan operations as are applied to their international operations? Has anyone ever heard of a 47 year old drilling vessel being used in the Arctic in Norway, or even a 30 year old drilling vessel? Or helicopters without de-icing equipment? Shell has lost control of both of their vessels in Alaska, leading to well publicised groundings. Why do we never hear of loss of control incidents and vessels running aground in the Norwegian Arctic?
The Noble Discoverer was designed long before the Sea Gem accident, and the Kulluk long before Piper Alpha: the creation of new standards will not fix the shortcomings inherent in their designs.
These vessels were all constructed in accordance with the standards in force at the time. The standards simply could not have anticipated the ferocity of the conditions under which the vessels would be used, or the specifics of the export system to which the Piper Alpha platform was attached.
As suggested by Tennille Tracy's article, standards are created to address the circumstances of accidents/incidents that have already happened. They cannot anticipate new circumstances and are usually the result of compromises which try to balance the economic costs of applying new standards with the perceived benefits. The Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster proposed the use of Safety Cases which would review both operating practices and equipment standards for specific anticipated circumstances. The Safety Case approach has been adopted globally (outside the US) and has undoubtedly contributed to the fall in the number of accidents/incidents in the offshore oil and gas industry.
The US should have learned a lesson from BP's Macondo disaster, but continues to rely on standards which were written long before deep water or arctic drilling was even considered: fortunately most international operators have their own internal standards (which are required to support their Safety Cases) which far exceed the minima of the applicable statutory requirements, if indeed such statutory requirements exist. However, when no internal operator standard is available and costs can be reduced by applying legal minima, the application of standards written for a different world may result in a disaster. Most US standards are based on operations in the Gulf of Mexico or on land, so it is hardly surprising that they are inadequate for the Arctic.
Do we really need to have another disaster on the scale of Piper Alpha or Alexander Kielland before Shell starts to apply the same standards to their Alaskan operations as are applied to their international operations? Has anyone ever heard of a 47 year old drilling vessel being used in the Arctic in Norway, or even a 30 year old drilling vessel? Or helicopters without de-icing equipment? Shell has lost control of both of their vessels in Alaska, leading to well publicised groundings. Why do we never hear of loss of control incidents and vessels running aground in the Norwegian Arctic?
The Noble Discoverer was designed long before the Sea Gem accident, and the Kulluk long before Piper Alpha: the creation of new standards will not fix the shortcomings inherent in their designs.
RELATED
Posted in: Alaska, Arctic, BP, Corporate Governance, Environment, GoogleNews, Gulf of Mexico, Oil, Pollution, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Shell Employee Safety, United States.
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · BP · Chukchi Sea · Kulluk · Noble Discoverer · Oil · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · BP · Chukchi Sea · Kulluk · Noble Discoverer · Oil · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Royal Dutch Shell tax dodging key factor in Kulluk debacle
By John Donovan
Royal Dutch Shell has a history of tax avoidancestretching back many decades. A Shell spokesmanhas confirmed that the Kulluk was being towed from Alaskan waters for tax reasons. The timing was designed to take advantage of a tax loophole, which allowed the oil giant to avoid $6 million in Alaska state taxes. Should be no surprise since the company is infamous for putting profit before offshore safety. And the company is now run by a pair of ruthless bean counter fat cats, Voser and Henry.
COMMENT BY "OUTSIDER"
From the information on this site, the need for a "Safety Case" approach for Shell's Alaskan operations seems to be overwhelming. Helicopters that couldn't fly in ice and fog, two vessels aground, and the failure of the containment dome are all examples of how the prescriptive approach used in the US does not work when circumstances change. Shell has experience of operations all over the world, but apparently applied only their knowledge of operations in the Gulf of Mexico to their Alaskan fiasco.
Posted in: Alaska, Arctic, Business Principles, Corporate Governance, GoogleNews,John Donovan, Oil, Peter Voser, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Simon Henry, United States.
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · Chukchi Sea · John Donovan · Peter Voser · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Tagged: Alaska · Arctic Ocean · Beaufort Sea · Chukchi Sea · John Donovan · Peter Voser · Royal Dutch Shell Plc
