PERJURY

PERJURY Angelo Lopez IIIPosted on August 31, 2014 Categories Criminal, Law Angelo Lopez III Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. Perjury as a Crime As a crime, perjury is penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: “Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. “Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.” Essential Elements of the Crime of Perjury Gathered from the said provision, the following are the essential elements of the crime of perjury: (a)     The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b)     The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c)     In the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (d)     The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. First Element of Perjury The first element of perjury requires that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact. For instance, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;  (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Thus, in relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations, which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. Second Element of Perjury The second element of perjury requires that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The phrase “competent person authorized to administer an oath” means a person who has a right to inquire into the questions presented to him upon matters under his jurisdiction. A lawyer, who is also a duly commissioned notary public, is a competent person authorized to administer an oath. Not all lawyers, however, are notaries public. But all notaries public are lawyers. Lawyers become notaries public only when the appropriate Regional Trial Court Executive Judge acts on their petition and issues in their favor the corresponding notarial commissions. Thus, a person who executes an affidavit containing a falsity upon a material matter before a lawyer, who is also a duly commissioned notary public, may be held liable for perjury. Third Element of Perjury The third element of perjury requires that, in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. Thus, a mere assertion of a false objective fact or a falsehood is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. “Willfully” means “intentionally,” with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact.  It is equivalent to “knowingly.” Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth.  Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. “Deliberately” implies “meditated,” as distinguished from “inadvertent acts.”  It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. A felony is committed by dolo when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases. The basis of the third element of perjury is the phrase “knowingly making untruthful statements” in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. The word “knowingly” suggests that the assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate. Hence, there is no perjury through negligence or imprudence. Fourth Element of Perjury The fourth element of perjury requires that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. For instance, in consonance with Section 1 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for offenses where a preliminary investigation is required, a criminal action is instituted by filing a complaint with the proper officer, such as a public prosecutor, for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. That complaint, in turn, must be made under oath, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “Sec. 3. Complaint defined. – A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.” Thus, a person who executes a criminal complaint containing a falsity upon a material matter may be held liable for perjury. However, in an unpublished decision (People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October 12, 1943) it was held that the word “requires” in the phrase “in cases in which the law so requires” (in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code) may be given the meaning of “authorizes.” Hence, the fourth element may be read “that the sworn statement (or affidavit) containing the falsity is authorized by law.” Thus, even if there is no law, requiring the statement to be made under oath, as long as it is made for a legal purpose, it is sufficient. Policy of the Law on Perjury Of great importance is the policy of the law on perjury, which the Supreme Court laid down in People v. Cainglet (G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966). In that case, the Supreme Court emphatically stressed that every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not. [References: Antonio B. Monfort III, et. al. v. Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, et. al., G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012, Celsa P. Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, et. al., G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005, Page 275 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, citing U.S. v. Go Chanco, 23 Phil. 641, Philip S. Yu v. Hernan G. Lim, G.R. No. 182291, September 22, 2010, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, Page 276 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, Section 1 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Page 277 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October 12, 1943, People v. Cainglet (G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966), and Alfonso C. Choa v. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003, citing People v. Cainglet, G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966]

WHY HILLARY AND TRUMP BACK OUT FROM DEBATING BERNIE?

Senator Bernie Sanders on Debating Trump

Published on May 27, 2016 Senator Sanders talks about the possibility of debating Donald Trump and competing against Secretary Hillary Clinton in California.

Boxing promoter Bob Arum offers $20M for Trump-Sanders debate By Jessica Chasmar - The Washington Times Friday, May 27, 2016 Bob Arum’s Top Rank Promotions has offered to promote a proposed Donald Trump vs. Bernie Sanders debate, pledging to donate the proceeds, a minimum of $20 million, to charity. “It’s the debate of the century between two of the top pound-for-pound politicians in the country — Mr. Trump, the Republican Party’s presumptive nominee and Senator Sanders, the Democratic candidate,” Mr. Arum said in a press release. “We have two contenders ready, willing and able to go mano a mano over the most important issues facing the United States. And I am ready to promote it.”

This is how cities of the future will get their energy

This is how cities of the future will get their energy By Chelsea Harvey May 20 A photo taken on February 26, 2015 in Paris, shows two 7-meter high vertical axis wind turbines generating 10,000 kwh, installed on the second floor of the Eiffel tower. (JACQUES DEMARTHON/AFP/Getty Images) In the global effort to fight climate change, cities have some of the greatest potential– and the greatest imperative — to make a difference. With an increasing global migration into the world’s urban areas, which are expected to support at least two-thirds of the total human population by 2050, experts have argued that cities have no choice but to transition toward low-carbon systems if they’re going to remain sustainable. Energy will need to be a primary focus of that effort. From the expansion of renewable energy sources to the adoption of cutting-edge energy efficiency and storage technologies, cities have the opportunity to drastically reduce their carbon footprints. This is the focus of a new paper, published Thursday in the journal Science, that discusses the ways cities can integrate renewable energy, as well as energy-saving technologies, into the urban landscape. This can be a challenge, given that cities — with their closely packed buildings and dense populations — don’t always lend themselves to traditional renewable techniques. It’s not exactly practical to fit an acres-long solar panel array in the middle of Shanghai, for instance, or to place a 200-foot-tall wind turbine in downtown New York City. READ MORE

FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS

SENATOR SANTIAGO  ON "FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS" DOCTRINE DURING SC CJ CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL [1]"Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood." SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. SIMILARLY,  when Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid,  speak to a fact in respect to which they cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the reading  of this simple one page "Release or Quitclaim" document  [2]Annex 5,  where  it is vividly shown that the accounts pertaining to my [3]retirement pay had been disbursed as separation pay which is an UNLAWFUL being an act of circumventing the retirement pay law.  It is fundamental that lawyers be allowed to defend a lawyer who is charged of violation the lawyers oath, among others.  But caution and prudence must be exercised by these defense lawyers so as not to justify a wrong and unlawful action with an [4]alibi equally false and reprehensible. It is extremely difficult to exempt them from  the charge of deliberate falsehood that merit  disciplinary action and /or disbarment for all  of them, altogether. (IN RE AC-10084)  through by own volition of the supreme  court, propia voluntate et iudicio. How can people lend you at least an iota of  trust when you let these lawyers be on the  loose in spite of clear and convincing  evidence to support their disbarment or at  least be disciplined for their wrongful actions? This issue, among others, the circumvention of retirement  pay, with respect to case GR-183273, having brought to your  attention, but instead of performing your duty to correct  the wrong, you joined the appellate court wrongful adjudication, as in failure of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts  made by the courts below as succinctly explained here: [5]where the trial courts, labor tribunals were found to have had overlooked important evidences, the  appellate court has the duty to revise the findings of facts made by the court below.  May I most respectfully remind you that when cases are submitted to you for review, you should have functioned with due care and diligence so that these problems of unlawful, wrongful, unfair, unjust and unconstitutional adjudication that tend to erode the remaining honor and credibility of the court should have been avoided. It is worthwhile to listen to no less than the Chief Justice, when she rebuked Atty. Coronel during the oral argument on the validity of the condonation doctrine, saying that when cases are submitted to the court for review, the court considers looking at it from [6]the point of inception all the way up to the writ of preliminary injunction in the court of appeals. By virtue of equal protection of the laws it is earnestly prayed that same be extended to the cases GR-183273 and AC-10084 to serve the interest of justice and avoid miscarriage of the same.    The lower courts and your honors, might have been too naive in believing the false pretenses foisted by Shell, Bersamin, Vargas and Quiroz. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. [7]But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless. Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid employed deceit to earn dismissal of AC-10084. Deceit in this case refers to a false representation of a matter of fact and/or multiples of facts (whether by words or conduct, false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another, in this case the court,  so that the court shall act upon it to the court's, your honors,  legal injury. [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] To stress my point next is verbatim excerpt from sc decision [9]The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21]    verbatim from sc decision [10]The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. end of verbatim excerpt I am most respectfully sending you this message as a matter  of 20th Persuasive Appeal for you to reconsider your  decision with respect to GR-183273 and AC-10084. Yours faithfully, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.  FOOTNOTES ADDITIONAL NOTE : FOOTNOTES IN RED IS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCE DOCUMENT [1] Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5275             August 25, 1953 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants. Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao. Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: XXX The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454, thus: Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating expression of the scope of the rule: As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given false testimony.Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith, 48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610;Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796; Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658. In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said: "As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the case of Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that his entire testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as to one matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether. The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony. And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any material statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far as it was corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement. It is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a material point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82 Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous. When analyzed, it plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F. Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness, whether defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly false on any material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . . The mere fact, however, that he is contradicted as to some material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection of his evidence altogether. In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the court instructed the jury that "if they believe any witness has testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness' testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this instruction the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely upon some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the jury would not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is the corrupt motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury to disregard the testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."  XXX [2]   Annex 5 Shell position paper [3]  Annex 5 retirement pay accounts expanded view [4] [5] SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-39. February 1, 1946.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIAN ABANA, Defendant-Appellant. Maximo Calalang for Appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo and Solicitor Alvendia for Appellee. D E C I S I O N DE JOYA, J. xxx When the trial court has overlooked important evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts made by the court below, and to render judgment accordingly. (United States, v. Singson, 41 Phil., 53; People v. Istoris, 53 Phil., 91.)  xxx [6] THIRD DIVISION [7] ELSA JOSE, G.R. No. 148371 Petitioner, Present: Panganiban, J, Chairman, - versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,* Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; REJIE RAMOS DEL ROSARIO; and the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Promulgated: Court of Makati, Branch 148, Respondents. August 12, 2004 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: xxx P rivate respondent might have been too naive in believing the false pretense foisted by petitioner. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless.   PANGANIBAN, J __________________ * On leave. xxxx xxx [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] [11] Dissenting Opinion of Perfecto, J. in People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72, 95, February 1, 1946, per De Joya, J. xxx [9] FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 3548. July 4, 2002] JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: xxx The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21] xxxx [18] Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 1 February 2002. [19] A.C. No. 2417, 6 February 2002. [20] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [21] Id., p. 629. [10] FIRST DIVISION [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002] ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent. D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. xxx [18] Ducat, Jr. vs. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [19] Id., p. 629. [20] Richards vs. Asoy, 139 SCRA 529 (1985). [21] See Rule 138, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000] JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents. D E C I S I O N DE LEON, JR., J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.[10] xxx [9] Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Cruz vs. Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto,Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000 citing Maligsa vs. Cabantig, 272 SCRA 408 (1997) [10] Leonito Gonato and Primrose Gonato vs. Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza, Adm. Case No. 4083, March 27, 2000 citing Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1(1992)