EN BANC
RE: RELEASE BY JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, RTC, BRANCH 54, MANILA, OF AN ACCUSED IN A NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
(SECOND DISMISSAL DECISION)"WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge MANUEL T. MURO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. His dismissal shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of a copy of this Decision which must be personally served by the Office of the Court Administrator."  
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.
There goes our exhortation to the members of the bench in Administrative Case No. 00-7-09-CA, entitled In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,[1] the precursor of the present case which involves another episode in the grand scheme to secure for Yu Yuk Lai, detained without bail, temporary liberty and possibly an acquittal.
The present case re-echoes the above clarion call.
On July 16, 2000, Yu Yuk Lai, one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-169862,[2] was re-arrested by the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) while playing baccarat without jail guards at the Holiday Inn Pavilion Casino. At that time, she was supposed to be detained at the Manila City Jail since her petition for bail was previously denied by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr.[3] Forthwith, a news article was published in the Philippine Star[4] entitled BJMP told to explain drug queens case. It reported that Yu Yuk Lai had obtained an order signed by Judge Manuel T. Muro (Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila) allowing her hospital confinement for medical and humanitarian reasons.
Acting on the news report, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in Memoranda dated July 20, 2000, July 25, 2000 and July 26, 2000, directed Judge Manuel T. Muro, respondent, to comment on the article and to submit to this Court pertinent documents showing that the order was regularly issued.[5]
After respondent judge had complied with the Memoranda, the Court en banc, in a Resolution[6] dated August 8, 2000, designated Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals to conduct an investigation and to submit to this Court her report and recommendation. In the same Resolution, this Court suspended respondent judge from office until further orders.
It appears from the investigation that on May 3, 2000, Atty. Rodolfo G. Tablante, Yu Yuk Lais counsel, filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of Accused in a Hospital,[7] alleging that:
2. Prior to April 29, 2000, due to recurring vertigo and other physical ailments, accused requested to be examined by a private medical doctor;
3. Last April 29, 2000 with the approval of her request by the warden of the City Jail, she was examined by Dr. Roy R. Cuesta, M.D., MBM Medical Surgical Clinic and found accused suffering from toxic goiter and Estrogen Deficiency and recommended her hospital confinement for:
1. Complete gynecological evaluation and
2. Clearance
3. Edoctrine evaluation
4. Possible (HRT) Hormonal Replacement
5. Therapy
6. Paps Smear
7. Pelvic Ultrasound
8. Blood Chemistries
9. Thyroid Studies
A Clinical Abstract prepared by Dr. Roy Cuesta, Yu Yuk Lais physician, was attached to the motion.
On May 3, 2000, Judge Angel V. Colet, then presiding judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, to where Criminal Case No. 99-169862 was re-raffled,[8] directed State Prosecutor Pablito C. Formaran III and the Chief of the Manila City Jail Medical Clinic to comment on Yu Yuk Lais motion.[9]
In a letter dated May 8, 2000, Doctor Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief, Health Services of the Manila City Jail, did not oppose the motion. Instead, he requested that the accused be brought to the Philippine General Hospital for confinement for a maximum period of seven (7) days.[10] Prosecutor Formaran, on the other hand, manifested that if the doctor of the Manila City Jail Infirmary concurred in the recommendation of the physician of Yu Yuk Lai, then for humanitarian reasons, he would interpose no objection to her hospital confinement for a reasonable period set by the court.[11]
Meanwhile, Judge Colet died. The case was assigned to his pairing judge, respondent herein.
On May 15, 2000, respondent judge issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accuseds aforesaid motion to be well taken and for humanitarian reasons and upon request of the accused, the City Warden is hereby ordered to allow the confinement of accused Yu Yuk Lai at the Manila Doctors Hospital immediately upon receipt of this order, all medical bills at the expense of the accused for medical examination and treatment for a period not exceeding seven (7) days and that proper safeguards be taken to prevent her escape for the duration of the confinement.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On May 19, 2000, Yu Yuk Lai filed an urgent motion for extension of her medical confinement[13] for a period of two (2) months. She claimed that the results of her ECG, PAPS smear, pelvic ultrasound, KUB, T3, T4 and other blood chemistries were not yet completed; and that according to her attending physician at the Manila Doctors Hospital, Dr. Peregrino C. Lao, he needed a period of two (2) months to complete the laboratory examination and treatment. She submitted a copy of the Progress Report Medical Evaluation signed by Dr. Lao.
This time, Prosecutor Formaran opposed Yu Yuk Lais motion on the following grounds:
1. The present request of accused Yu Yuk Lai for extension of medical confinement for a period of two (2) months is bereft of strong basis and unprecedented.It must be pointed out that the medical evaluation by the private doctor of accused Yu Yuk Lai, which is not even notarized, does not indicate that the latters illness is so serious. From the doctors diagnoses, accused Yu Yuk Lai is allegedly suffering from urinary tract infection, acute vaginitis, and estrogen deficiency, which cases can be treated without need of hospital confinement as per opinion by the physician of the Department of Justice when consulted by the undersigned;
2. Moreover, the undersigned wonders why the result of accused ECG, Paps Smear and other required laboratory examinations were not completed despite the 7 days given to conduct the same. Perhaps, it need not be mentioned that the result of the ECG and Paps Smear can be had in one day especially taking into consideration the technology of the hospital wherein the accused is being confined and examined. And assuming that those laboratory examinations are not yet completed x x x with due respect, can be made and completed without need of further hospital confinement of the accused for obvious reason;
3. Besides, the said medical findings being not coming from an impartial and independent government physician, the same cannot be taken hook, line and sinker.[14]
On May 29, 2000, Yu Yuk Lais counsel filed a Manifestation[15]attaching thereto a copy of the Clinical Abstract Report of Dr. Lao and a Certification of Dr. Felix Salgado, a specialist from the Philippine General Hospital, stating that furher work-ups and diagnostic test are recommended [for Yu Yuk Lai] to rule out possibility of other underlying organic cause.
The hearing of the motion and opposition was inserted in the courts calendar on May 26, 2000. However, for some reasons, the incidents were not heard. Respondent judge simply issued an order submitting them for resolution.[16] Thereafter, on June 5, 2000, he granted Yu Yuk Lais motion, thus:
Acting on the Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement, dated May 19, 2000, filed by accused Yu Yuk Lai, through counsel, and the Opposition thereto, dated May 25, 2000, filed by State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III, and considering that the reason of the movant-accused in requesting for extension of medical confinement is to complete her medical work-ups and management, as advised by Dr. Peregrino Ceniza Lao, attending, contained in his Progress Report Medical Evaluation and Clinical Abstract Report, copies of which are attached to the records, and concurred in by Dr. Felix Salgado, Specialist-Consultant, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Phil. General Hospital, who conducted his own gynecologic evaluation and assessment on accused Yu Yuk Lai, and recommended further work-ups and diagnostic tests to rule out the possibility of other underlying organic cause, contained in his Certification, dated May 26, 2000, let the motion be granted.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Yu Yuk Lais motion to be well-taken, for medical consideration and humanitarian reason and upon request of the accused, this Court hereby allows the extension of medical confinement of accused Yu Yuk Lai at the Manila Doctors Hospital for completion of her medical examination and treatment for a period of one (1) month, or until such a time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital, as certified to by her attending physician, who is directed to regularly submit to this Court his progress report on the condition of the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Subsequently, on July 6, 2000, unidentified employees[18]of the Regional Trial Court of Manila wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice (copies were furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman and respondent judge) alleging that the (respondent) judge has issued an Order for the confinement of Yu Yuk Lai in the hospital even if she is not sick and there is already a rumor circulating around the City Hall that the notorious judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which will be granted for a consideration of million of pesos and the contact person is allegedly the daughter of the judge, who is an employee in the said branch.
On July 14, 2000, Prosecutor Formaran filed a motion[19]asking respondent judge to inhibit himself from further handling the case and/or resolving the demurrer to evidence. Pending resolution, Yu Yuk Lai was arrested while playing baccarat at the Casino Filipino, Holiday Inn Pavilion.
In her exhaustive report, Justice Fernando came up with the following findings, conclusion and recommendation, thus:
On the basis of a Clinical Abstract of one Dr. Roy Cuesta, Judge Muro issued the May 12, 2000 Order which is highly irregular. The stated order indicated the name of Judge Angel Colet but contained the signature of Judge Muro. Judge Muro had no reason to sign the Order over the name of Judge Colet who may have died at that time or was on leave of absence. Besides, the May 12, 2000 hearing on the Motion was without notice to the State Prosecutor irrespective of the fact that he already filed his Comment to the Motion. In fact, the parties were not present during the hearing as there was no order setting the same for hearing on May 12, 2000. This is a clear violation of Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that:
Sec. 4, Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
x x x x x x
It was highly irregular that Judge Muro admitted as gospel truth the allegations on the physical condition of Yu Yuk Lai and failed to check the veracity of the findings in the Clinical Abstract. The mere fact that the Clinical Abstract was notarized does not prevent Judge Muro from verifying the truth considering that Yu Yuk Lai is charged with a very serious offense. Besides, it is common knowledge that it is so easy to have documents notarized. Considering further that Judge Muro is not a doctor and has insufficient knowledge of what were stated in Clinical Abstract, with more reason that he should have exercised extreme caution before issuing order of this sort. If he had set the Motion for hearing, he would have discovered that Dr. Rosal of the Manila City Jail Infirmary whose recommendation he had given so much weight, did not even bother to check the actual medical condition of Yu Yuk Lai, when he could have done it very easily and he ought to do it as he was ordered by the court to file his Comment. The recommendation of Dr. Rosal was purely guesswork. It was admitted by Dr. Rosal that he never examined accused Yu Yuk Lai despite the report that Yu Yuk Lai complained of some illnesses while on detention. Even before he filed his Comment as ordered by Judge Colet, Dr. Rosal did not verify if Yu Yuk Lai was still suffering from those illnesses, nor check the accuracy of the Clinical Abstract.
x x x x x x
Without exerting any effort, undersigned was able to get an admission from both Dr. Lao and Dr. Salgado that there was no need for Yu Yuk Lai to be confined. Dr. Lao merely acceded to the requests of Yu Yuk Lai and accommodated her.
The Order dated May 15, 2000 of Judge Muro which granted the Motion for Confinement for a period of seven (7) days at the Manila Doctors Hospital is likewise highly irregular. During the investigation, Judge Muro admitted that he issued the Order without reviewing the records of the case. Further, the doctors summoned during the investigation categorically admitted that the medical condition of Yu Yuk Lai did not warrant confinement at the hospital and the laboratory examinations and treatments which they recommended can all be done on an out-patient basis. Had Judge Muro been sincere to his duties he would have easily detected that the medical reports were not truthful and did not state the actual condition of the patient. If he wanted to know the truth and have solid and legal basis for his Order, all he needed was little time to hear and inquire into the state of health of Yu Yuk Lai. He could have done better but he never even attempted to do. This is gross negligence on the part of Judge Muro.
Relative to the issue at hand, the main reason for the release of accused Yu Yuk Lai was her confinement at the hospital for medical treatment, as ordered by Judge Muro. But the same does not sidetrack the issue that in the issuance of an order for confinement of an accused, all necessary precautions should be employed before the same be issued. Judge Muro had failed to prove and had in fact been very adamant in stating that the determination whether Yu Yuk Lai was really ill or not was not for his determination but lies with the doctors alone. The act of Judge Muro in issuing the Order in this fashion encouraged more deception. He gave all the opportunities to Yu Yuk Lai to submit fabricated medical reports. His leniency towards Yu Yuk Lai led to her release from detention. Such attitude runs afoul to Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which provides that:
4. Essential conduct
He should be temperate, patient, attentive, impartial, and since he is to administer the law and apply it to the facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law, diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
This is regardless of the fact that Judge Muros order for confinement indicated that proper safeguards be taken to prevent her escape for the duration of the confinement and his statement in his Final Supplemental Manifestation that Yu Yuk Lai was not the only accused who benefited from a humanitarian order such as an Order for Confinement.
In every case handled by a judge, even by a pairing judge as in this case, the same amount of effort in the determination and study of the issues should be accorded, lest miscarriage of justice results. The judiciary has no room for a judge who does (not) care to read and study the case assigned to him. Otherwise, the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court will come to naught:
The judiciary needs judges who read, study and ponder - judges who personify learning and equanimity.
The order for confinement for a period of seven (7) days commencing on May 15, 2000, the date of her actual confinement, expired on May 22, 2000. On May 19, 2000, a Motion for Extension of Confinement was filed this time based on the progress report of Dr. Peregrino Lao, the attending physician at the Manila Doctors Hospital. In the Order dated May 22, 2000, State Prosecutor Formaran was required to submit his Comment to the Motion for Extension of Confinement. An Opposition to the Motion was filed by State Prosecutor Formaran on May 26, 2000, the same day the motion was set for hearing. Peculiarly, the parties were not given an opportunity to orally argue on the issue. As stated by State Prosecutor Formaran, the proceeding was just. inserted during the hearing. It had been said that there was an on-going hearing of another case such that the State Prosecutor was not given the opportunity to make any manifestation. The actuation of Judge Muro ran contrary to his avowed duty to administer justice according to the law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus clear that Judge Muro delegated to the doctors the determination of the length of Yu Yuk Lais confinement in the hospital. His first consideration should have been the gravity of the charge against Yu Yuk Lai which is non-bailable. He created an easy vehicle for Yu Yuk Lai to attain temporary relief from detention. Had he conducted a simple inquiry on the actual medical condition of Yu Yuk Lai, he could have discovered easily that the same was not life threatening/or serious in nature which would require confinement in a hospital. Besides, mere reading of the Motions and the Medical Reports/Certifications would invite suspicion considering the complaints and the recommended treatment. A simple investigation would reveal that Yu Yuk Lai was allowed by the doctors to go out on pass on several accessions. This only shows that she was not suffering form any ailment needing hospitalization or that her medical condition was not that serious as the doctors wanted it to appear.
It has been said that when the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. However, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, the case presented herein was not mere ignorance of the law but amounts to grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to proper administration of justice.
X x x x x x
Conclusion and Recommendation
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that Judge Muros acts were so serious and indefensible in character as to call for the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service.[20]
We agree with the findings of Justice Fernando.
At the outset, it must be noted that this is not the first time that respondent judge has been charged administratively. In State Prosecutors v. Muro,[21]he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from reemployment in the government service for dismissing precipitately the eleven (11) cases of Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions filed by the State Prosecutors against Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent judge made the solemn commitment that: (a) he will avoid creating a situation that spawns suspicion of arbitrary and improper conduct; (b) he will adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgment or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of the court; and (c)he will avoid all appearances of impropriety, specially those that create suspicion of partiality, bias or improper motive.[22] Prompted by compassion and mercy, this Court gave him the chance to redeem himself by reducing the penalty to mere suspension from office without pay.
Unfortunately, respondent judge fails to honor his commitment.
This time, respondent judge committed serious lapses in issuing the orders dated May 15, 2000 and June 5, 2000. In granting Yu Yuk Lais motions without conducting a hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations contained therein and of the attached documents, he opened the administration of justice vulnerable to false claims and, ultimately, to the improper release from jail of an accused charged with a heinous crime. The strong Opposition filed by Prosecutor Formaran had already provided, the caveat. It is odd that respondent judge did not bother to conduct, further inquiry and require Yu Yuk Lais counsel to present evidence showing that her continuous imprisonment would pose danger to her health. In People v. Honorable Ireneo Gako, Jr.[23]the prosecution vigorously objected to the confinement of the accused in the hospital, questioning the ill health of the latter. Judge Gako, Jr., instead of ascertaining the true state of health of the accused, inexplicably relied on a court order, issued six years ago, authorizing the confinement of the accused in the hospital. In setting the proper course of conduct, this Court ruled that Judge Gako, Jr. should have recalled the order of confinement and ordered the detention of the accused until the defense could prove through competent evidence that the imprisonment of said accused would imperil his health.
We have reasons to expect from respondent judge the highest degree of circumspection. For one, Yu Yuk Lai was charged with a heinous crime and the evidence against her is prima facie strong, for which reason her petition for bail was denied.[24] Incidentally, it maybe recalled that in applications for bail, the importance of the Rule requiring a hearing is emphasized. This is because on its result depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-a-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judges decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.[25] The same considerations apply in the present case. Respondent judge should have set the motion for hearing and require Yu Yuk Lai to prove that her detention will imperil her health. The fact that she would likewise be guarded at the hospital is of no moment. It is beyond dispute that her detention in the Manila City Jail afforded more protection to the state than her confinement in a hospital where she had greater mobility. True enough, she was arrested gambling at the Holiday Inn Pavilion Casino on July 16, 2000.
The fact that the evidence of Yu Yuk Lais guilt is strong, is more than enough reason to alert respondent judge. As it turned out, there was really no necessity for Yu Yuk Lai to be confined in a hospital. Without exerting any effort on her part, Justice Fernando was able to secure from Dr. Lao and Dr. Salgado an admission that Yu Yuk Lais illness does not need confinement. Dr. Lao also admitted that he merely acceded to the request of Yu Yuk Lai.[26]
Clearly, respondent judge violated the clear mandate that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law.[27] He forgot that trial judges, in this jurisdiction, are judges of both the law and the facts. The mere failure to propound a proper question to a witness, which might develop some material fact upon which the judgment of the case would vary is considered negligence in the performance of their duties if a miscarriage of justice resulted therefrom. A judge therefore must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know, and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every party.[28] These qualities are wanting on the part of respondent judge, as shown by his testimony, thus:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
x x x x x x
Q Judge, before issuing the May 15 order, did you inquire if there was an emergency situation that would prevent you or the doctor from further evaluation or examination of the patient?
A No. Im not the doctor.
Q How about you?
A Im not the doctor. Whatever the doctor will say, I can accept.
Q But even if we are not doctors, by merely looking at a person, you would know if he or she is suffering from serious ailment.
A It depends on the disease of the person.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q So, you did not require or you did not ask the accused to appear, before you issued the order?
A I did not find it necessary because the doctors have more knowledge of the situation recommended.
xxx xxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q Did you call for Dr. Lao?
A No.
Q Did you ask Dr. Lao to appear before you and explain?
A No I did not.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q Because we cannot just accept what is written in the certification because we have to examine them if they were really telling the truth even if the document is under oath. We have to examine and determine the urgency of that request as well as the actual medical condition of the patient.
A I did not. Im not the doctor.
Q Youre not a doctor, yes, I admit, thats why with more reason that you have to examine very carefully and ask for the assistance of the doctor who issued that certification to explain to you the condition of the patient, so that would be the basis of whatever order you are going to issue.
Q Did you examine the doctor and ask what is vaginitis, estrogen deficiency, and so forth?
A I took his word for it.
Q Did you inquire from the defense counsel if the accused was still in the hospital when he filed his urgent motion?
A I did not.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q You did not verify?
A No.
Q Did you grant the motion?
A I granted the motion on June 5, 2000 for confinement of the accused at the Manila Doctors Hospital for completion of her medical examination and treatment for a period of one (1) month or until such a time that she is fit to be discharged from the said office.
x x x x x x
Q Was there a comment filed by State Prosecutor Formaran?
A There is an opposition dated May 25.
Q Was there an opposition?
A Yes. The reason for the opposition is that it is medical in nature. They cannot understand the need because the oppositor says that they wonder why the result of the accuseds ECG, pap smear, and other required medical examinations were not completed despite the 7 days given to conduct the same. The position of the Prosecutor is that the doctors....
Q So, this time, the Prosecutor opposed the extended confinement and the reason was that?
A He said that the doctor should have completed the various examinations
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q May we go back to the urgent motion for extension. Counsel for the accused was asking for extension because the results of the pap smear, the ECG, were not yet completed. The blood chemistry examinations are to be conducted in the succeeding weeks. The opposition states. We could not agree because in a matter of one (1) day you could get the results of the ECG and pap smear. What was your order after the opposition was filed?
A I granted the motion for extension of one (1) month or until subject is fit to be discharged from the said hospital as certified to by the attending physician, and directed to regularly submit a report on the condition of the accused.
Q Before issuing the June 5 order, did you conduct a hearing?
A No, because...
Q You merely relied on the motion, the opposition, as well as the medical certificate issued by Dr. Lao concurred by Dr. Salgado, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor. On May 26, my order says the motion for extension is deemed submitted for resolution.
Q Was there a hearing conducted on May 26?
A No more. There was already the motion and opposition,
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q So, you merely relied on the pleadings and the attached medical certificates issued by the two doctors. So, you did not verify is you could secure the result of the pap smear in one day?
A I am not the doctor.
Q Yes, you did not verify. With more reason, you are not a doctor, you have to inquire.
A They are the doctors. By the way Your Honor, we are going deep into the medical certificates.[29]
In placing absolute reliance on the findings and recommendations of Dr. Lao and Dr. Salgado, respondent judge manifested his gross inefficiency and partiality in favor of Yu Yuk Lai. His repeated excuse that the doctors are the ones knowledgeable on medical matters does not justify such reliance. Under our rules on evidence, experts opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true. They are generally regarded only as purely advisory in character.[30] Thus, while a trial judge may rely on the statements of someone knowledgeable on the subject, it should not be to the extent that such reliance would already amount to a surrender of his authority to decide. Inherent in the office of a judge is the duty to resolve factual and legal issues, i.e. the duty to decide. Rendering a decision does not mean the mere issuance of an order. It involves the intelligent assessment of the evidence in support of the parties respective claims. Statement such as whatever the doctor says I can accept, amounts to an abdication of the judges primordial duty to decide.
As shown by the records, respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,[31] for being utterly inefficient[32]and for manifesting partiality.[33]
Misconduct implies wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[34] In not conducting a hearing on the incidents of the case, respondent judge disregarded a rule of procedure which is so basic and simple. Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant, is so clear that we find no justification why respondent judge overlooked it. With his more than ordinary credentials and qualifications,[35] we have the reason to assume and expect that he is well-versed and familiar with the rules. His deviation appears to this Court as nothing but a product of a willful and deliberate intent to disregard the rule to favor Yu Yuk Lai. And, as stated by this Court in State Prosecutors v. Muro[36] his impressive scholastic record as student of law all the more punctuates his blunder rather than temper it.
Inefficiency, on the other hand, implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. There is inexcusable inefficiency on the part of a judge when he fails to observe in the performance of his duties that degree of diligence, prudence, and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.[37] By the very delicate nature of their functions in dispensing justice, judges are expected to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.[38] And it is said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[39]
Partiality indicates bias, predilection or the inclination to favor one side.[40] While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Like Ceasars wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.[41]
In the present case, respondent judge opened himself to suspicion of partiality when he exhibited extraordinary leniency and indulgent attitude towards Yu Yuk Lai.
First, despite the request of Dr. Rosal, the government physician, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital, respondent judge preferred the Manila Doctors Hospital on the ground that it was the choice of Yu Yuk Lais counsel.[42]
Second, he extended Yu Yuk Lais confinement until such a time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital, as certified to by her attending physician. This, in effect, subjected the length of Yu Yuk Lais medical confinement to the will of her physicians. That this was the real purpose of respondent judge is shown in his testimony, thus:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
x x x x x x
Q You issued the June 5 order granting an extension of one (1) month or until such a time that she is fit to be discharged from the hospital as certified to by the attending physician, who was directed to regularly submit to this court his progress report on the condition of the accused. So, in short, this order is an open-ended order. It could not be shorter than a month.
ATTY. SAGUISAG:
But the periodic report may say that she is fit for release after a month.
JUDGE MURO:
Your Honor, I did that without further motions for extension, so the doctors will be the one to determine if the patient should be released.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So, they dont need to file further extensions because you have an open-ended order.
A Yes, the doctors are in the best position to determine.[43]
And third, respondent judge did not bother to make an incisive inquiry to ascertain the true state of facts despite the Opposition filed by Prosecutor Formaran. Considering that his attention was already called by Prosecutor Formaran, prudence dictates that he should conduct a hearing. When he threw all his cautions to the wind in favor of Yu Yuk Lai, he effectively manifested partiality. Such irregular conduct did not escape the observation of Prosecutor Formaran. He testified:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q You mentioned that your colleagues warned you to be very careful in this case. Why was it so?
A Because I have complained to them why this is so. Ive been filling an opposition and yet the judge did not even discuss my points raised in my opposition, and had been so lenient to the accused.
Q What were the series of events that made you decide to file a motion for inhibition?
A The first order for hospital confinement, because the recommendation there is, the accused should be confined at PGH, and yet Judge Muro ordered the confinement at the Manila Doctors Hospital. And second, the order granting another extension of one (1) month and it appears indefinite. So these series of events really convinced me that there is something wrong. Thats why I have complained to my colleagues and consulted them what I should do, and in fact, to me, any decision of judge Muro has been lenient in the past, specially drugs cases.
X x x x x x
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q Did you actually file a motion for inhibition?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When did you file this motion?
A I filed it on July 14, 2000.
Q This was before the arrest of Yu Yuk Lai?
A That was before the arrest of Yu Yuk Lai. And I would like to cite, Your Honor, the statement that I was trying to impress upon the judge, Your Honor, that an honest medical examination of Yu Yuk lais state of health will surely prove that her illness was not that serious to require that long period of confinement and this was proven when accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested at the Holiday Inn at the casino playing baccarat on July 16, 2000.[44]
Time and again, this Court has admonished judges not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.[45] Judges are enjoined to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.[46] The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public competence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.[47]
Indeed, no less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.[48] In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism.[49] He is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice.[50] He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Never for a moment must he act like a petty tyrant or provide any opportunity to be perceived as such through the abuse or misuse of the authority or power vested in him, otherwise the faith of the people in the courts could be irreparably eroded.[51] In Dimatulac v. Villon,[52] we ruled:
The judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him.
Undoubtedly, respondent judge has impaired the image of the judiciary to which he owes the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep it at all times above suspicion and worthy of the peoples trust.[53]
Judicial office demands the best possible men and women in the service. This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.[54]
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we impose upon respondent Judge the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits except his accrued leave credits pursuant to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,[55] thus:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge MANUEL T. MURO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. His dismissal shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of a copy of this Decision which must be personally served by the Office of the Court Administrator.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of respondent judge with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.
[1] In this case, the Court En Banc dismissed from the service Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio G. Demetria for interceding in behalf of Yu Yuk Lai in Criminal Case No. 99-169862.The Court finds that Justice Demetria joined forces with PATAFA President Go Teng Kok , and Atty. Reinerio Paas in persuading State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno to withdraw the formers Motion for Inhibition against Judge Manuel T. Muro in the above-mentioned criminal case. Justice Demetria was quoted as saying to CSP Zuno Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro. Go Teng Kok pleaded the same thing, saying that the Motion for Inhibition would delay the resolution of the case and if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend Yu Yuk Lai.
[2] People of the Philippines versus Kenneth Maceda y Sy, alias William Sy and Yu Yuk Lai alias Sze Yuk Lai.
In an information dated December 9, 1998, State Posecutor Formaran III charges Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy and Yu Yuk Lai alias Sze Yuk Lai of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crime, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes). The case was raffled to the sala ofJudge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Manila. The information alleged that on or about November 7, 1998, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug. (Records of Criminal Case No. 99-169862, p. 3).
[8] Criminal Case No. 99-169862 was re-raffled from Branch 18 to Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila pursuant to the Order dated January 28, 2000 of Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr., inhibiting himself from hearing the case for the peace of mind of both accused who filed a Joint Motion for his Inhibition. (Records of Criminal Case No. 99-169862, p. 223)
[32] Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
[33] Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
[34] Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 6th Ed., 1997, p. 457. Gross misconduct of a judge refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence.
[35] He graduated from the law school, magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed 6th in the Bar examination. (See State Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 114 (1995)
[37] Fernandez v. Imbing, 260 SCRA 586 (1996); Cuaresma v. Enriquez, 248 SCRA 454 (1995); Suroza v. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388 (1981).
x x x x x x
Q So why did you choose Manila Doctors instead of Philippine General Hospital which was the hospital recommended by Dr. Rosal?
A In case that the accused be brought to the Philippine General Hospital but this was a time, in a letter addressed to Judge Colet...
Q Yes, Judge, but the case was already assigned to you and you were the one who issued the orders based on the record. Because we cannot ask Judge Colet anymore. He is already dead. You inherited the case from him. Thats why we are asking you the reason why you chose Manila Doctors instead of PGH. Before issuing the May 15, 2000 order, did you personally see the accused and verify the physical condition?
A No, I did not see her.
Q Then, why Manila Doctors, Judge?
A I do not know. It was the choice of the lawyer. My order of May 15, 2000 said Finding the aforesaid motion of the accused to be well-taken, and for humanitarian reason, upon request of the accused, court allows the confinement at the Manila Doctors Hospital. (TSN, August 24, 2000, pp. 17-18).
[49] Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct. Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig v. Judge Estrella, Adm. Mat. No. 0l-1608-RTJ, January 16, 2001
[55] Per Administrative Order No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001.
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Wednesday, October 5, 2016
RE: RELEASE BY JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, RTC, BRANCH 54, MANILA, OF AN ACCUSED IN A NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE.
62ND PERSUASIVE APPEAL_6OCT16_TO SCP JUSTICES: PMA ADMITS, NOTHING TO GAIN ON CUDIA'S DISMISSAL...
 
EXCERPTED FROM CADET CUDIA'S CASE DECISION
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial – According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet 1CL Cudia’s charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1CL, was part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet 1CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC members.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet 1CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: “Your brother, he lied!” The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA’s clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what. For their part, respondents contend that the CHR’s allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he “paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudia’s] sham trial by the Honor Committee” is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia’s tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales. As to the CHR’s finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise “in bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own” because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates against PMA’s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets. The Court differs with petitioners.    |
61ST PERSUASIVE APPEAL_5OCT16_TO SCP JUSTICES: HONOR CODE REIGN SUPREME OVER THE CONSTITUTION
    DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997)
Justice Isagani A. Cruz eloquently expound the essence of this great doctrine in this wise:
“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” (Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11)
BAR QUESTION (2004)
BNN Republic has a defense treaty with EVA Federation. According to the Republic's Secretary of Defense, the treaty allows temporary basing of friendly foreign troops in case of training exercises for the war on terrorism. The Majority Leader of the Senate contends that whether temporary or not, the basing of foreign troops however friendly is prohibited by the Constitution of BNN which provides that, "No foreign military bases shall be allowed in BNN territory." In case there is indeed an irreconcilable conflict between a provision of the treaty and a provision of the Constitution, in a jurisdiction and legal system like ours, which should prevail: the provision of the treaty or of the Constitution? Why? Explain with reasons, briefly.
ANSWER: In case of conflict between a provision of a treaty and a provision of the Constitution, the provision of the Constitution should prevail. Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty when it conflicts with the Constitution. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]).
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http://www.prohealthlaw.com/2015/04/doctrine-of-constitutional-supremacy.html
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Tuesday, October 4, 2016
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997)
Justice Isagani A. Cruz eloquently expound the essence of this great doctrine in this wise:
“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” (Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11)
BAR QUESTION (2004)
BNN Republic has a defense treaty with EVA Federation. According to the Republic's Secretary of Defense, the treaty allows temporary basing of friendly foreign troops in case of training exercises for the war on terrorism. The Majority Leader of the Senate contends that whether temporary or not, the basing of foreign troops however friendly is prohibited by the Constitution of BNN which provides that, "No foreign military bases shall be allowed in BNN territory." In case there is indeed an irreconcilable conflict between a provision of the treaty and a provision of the Constitution, in a jurisdiction and legal system like ours, which should prevail: the provision of the treaty or of the Constitution? Why? Explain with reasons, briefly.
ANSWER: In case of conflict between a provision of a treaty and a provision of the Constitution, the provision of the Constitution should prevail. Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty when it conflicts with the Constitution. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]).
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GR NO. L-47388 OCT 22 1940_PEOPLE VS. MARCOS ET AL(SEARCHED REFERENCE FROM LAWPHIL PROJECT))
IMAGE CREDIT:WIKIPEDIA.ORG
 JUSTICE JOSE P. LAUREL ACQUITED MARCOS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47388 October 22, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARIANO R. MARCOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
The defendants and appellants in their own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Solicitor Guerrero for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
In the elections of 1934 in which Mariano Marcos and Julio Nalundasan, both of Batac, Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for the office of representative for the second district of said province, Nalundasan was elected. The term for which the latter was elected was, however, cut short as a result of the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines under the general elections for members of the National Assembly were by law set for September 17, 1935. In these general elections Julio Nalundasan and Mariano Marcos resumed their political rivalry and were opposing candidates for assemblyman in the same district. In the strife Nalundasan again came out triumphant over Marcos. In the afternoon of September 19, 1935, in celebration of Nalundasan's victory, a number of this followers and partymen paraded in cars and trucks through the municipalities of Currimao, Paoay and Batac, Ilocos Norte, and passed in front of the house of the Marcoses in Batac. The parade is described as provocative and humiliating for the defeated candidate, Mariano Marcos. The assemblyman-elect, Julio Nalundasan, was not, however, destined to reap the fruits of his political laurels for on the night of September 20, 1935, he was shot and killed in his house in Batac. Very intensive investigation of the crime by the Government authorities, particularly the Philippine Constabulary, followed, as a consequence of which an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte charging one Nicasio Layaoen, a businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, with having committed the murder of Nalundasan. After trial, however, Layaoen was acquitted. This acquittal resulted in another protracted investigation and detective work by the Governmental agencies, particularly the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, with a view to solving the Nalundasan murder. On December 7, 1938. or more than three years after the death of Nalundasan, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were prosecuted for the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte under the following information:
Que en o hacia la noche del 20 de septimbre de 1935, en el Municipio de Batac, Provincia de Ilocos Norte, Filipinas, y dentrio de la jurisdiccion de este Honorable Juzgado, los acusados arriba nombrados, armados con armas de fuego, puestos de acuerdo y conspirandose entre si, voluntaria, elegal y criminalmente, con alevosia y premeditacion conocida y con intencion de matar, dispararon contra Julio Nalundasan, entonces electo Diputado por el Segundo Distrito de Ilocos Norte, tocandole en su costado derecho habiendo la bala interesado organos vitales internos, lesionandolos, las cuales lesiones causaron la muerte instantinea de dicho Julio Nalundasan.
Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley y con las circunstancias agravantes de nocturnidad y de haberse cometido el delito en la morada del occiso.
On June 10, 1939, before the conclusion of the trial, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo filed eight separate complaints before the justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, who was still under cross-examination in the trial against Lizardo, with the offense of false testimony allegedly committed in the preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and during the trial. The defense had not yet completed the presentation of its evidence, and the prosecution was preparing its rebuttal testimony. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, the trial court ordered the provincial dismissal of the complaints. Fiscal Higinio Macadaeg also moved said court to find the Marcoses and Lizardo guilty of contempt of court, by virtue of which the latter were ordered to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After the conclusion of the trial, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte rendered judgment the dispositive parts of which read as follows:
En su virtud, el Juzgado halla a los acusados Quirino S. Lizardo y Ferdinand E. Marcos culpables, fuera de toda duda recional, del delito de asesinato, con agravante de morada, pero compensada por la atenuante de provocacion en el caso de Quirino S. Lizardo, y por la circunstancia adicional de minoria de edad en el caso de Ferdinand E. Marcos, y condena al primero a la pena de resolucion perpectua, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de una cuarta parte de las costas procesales; y al segundo, a la pena indeterminada de diez anos como minima a diecisiete anos y cuatro meses como maxima, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de una cuarta parte de las costas procasales; y ambos a indemnizar mancomunada y solidtriameiite a los herederos del occiso en la cantidad de mil pesos (P1,000), pero sin prision subsidiaria en caso de Insolvencia; y se absuelve a los acusados Mariano R. Marcos y Pio Marcos, con la mitad de las costas procesales de oficio, y con la cancelacion de la fianza que han prestado para su libertad provisional.
Por lo expuesto, el Juzgado declara a los acusados en el incidente reos de desacato, y les condena a cada uno a pagar una multa de P200, o a sufrir la prision subsidiaria correspondiente en caso de insolvencia o falta de pago.
From this judgment the defendants Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino appealed, assigning the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in according greater credibility to the prosecution witnesses.
2. The trial court erred in convicting two and acquitting two accused upon the same evidence.
3. The trial court erred in considering the character of Quirino Lizardo against the accused.
4. The trial court erred in not crediting the electoral censo, Exhibit 84 for the defense, with any probative value. lawphil.net
5. The trial court erred in denying the motions of the accused for a reopening and a new trial.
6. The trial court erred in finding the four accused- appellant guilty of contempt.1awphil.nêt
The defendants Mariano Marcos and Pio Marcos have also appealed, but only from so much of the judgment as found them guilty of contempt. A three-volume brief was filed by the appellants and a comprehensive brief submitted by the Government. Both briefs are, however, more valueable for their literary value. Oral argument was had and doubtful points eliminated.
In view of the importance of the case and the fact that the Government asks for the extreme penalty of death for the defendants-appellants, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, we have taken over the case on appeal with utmost caution and searching scrutiny of the evidence presented both by the prosecution and by the defense. As a general rule, this court will not interfere with judgment of the trial court in passing upon the weight or credibility that should be attached to the testimony of witnesses; but this court may determine for itself the guilt or innocence of the defendant and may modify or reverse the conclusions of fact laid down by the trial court if there is some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been over- looked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
The theory of the prosecution, stripped of nonessentials, is that Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were prompted to conspire against the life of Julio Nalundasan by the latter's electoral victory over Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand and brother-in-law of Lizardo, on September 17, 1935; that Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, was a trusted and loyal attendant and bodyguard of Quirino Lizardo; that the said Calixto Aguinaldo was present in various conference of the Marcoses and Lizardo, in the last of which (that held on September 20, 1935) it was decided that Nalundasan must be killed; that Ferdinand was selected as the trigger man because he was a marks- man and because, if discovered and convicted, he would only be sent to Lolomboy reformatory school in view of his age, and that Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand, would in the meantime be in Laoag; that about nine o'clock in the evening of September 20, 1935, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, the first armed with an automatic pistol and the second with a police positive revolver, and accompanied by Calixto Aguinaldo, left for the fatal mission and, upon reaching Nalundasan's yard, they posted themselves at a point where they could not be detected but where they could get a full view of the intended human target; that Calixto Aguinaldo was asked to watch while his two companions, Ferdinand and Lizardo, were to execute the act that would put an end to Nalundasan's life; that Calixto Aguinaldo, after waiting for a few minutes, was seized by fear as a result of which he proceeded to return to the house of the Marcoses, but that on his way he heard the fatal shot from the direction of Nalundasan's home; that Ferdinand fired the fatal shot at Nalundasan while the latter's back was turned towards Ferdinand and Lizardo. On the other hand, the defense is one of complete denial of participation by any of the herein defendants in the commission of the crime. It is at once apparent that the validity of the theory of the prosecution rests upon the weight that should be accorded to the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution and the alleged companion of the defendants-appellants, Quirino Lizardo and Ferdinand Marcos on the night of the killing of Julio Nalundasan.
It is important to observe that, as stated, immediately after the death of Nalundasan and as a result of the efforts exerted by the agents of the Government, particularly the Philippine Constabulary, Nicasio Layaoen, a businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, was prosecuted for the murder of Nalundasan. In that case the star witness, Gaspar Silvestre, identified Layaoen as the man who fired the fatal shot at Nalundasan on the night in question, and the prosecution, with the same earnestness and vehemence exhibited in the case, prayed for the imposition of the extreme penalty of death upon the accused Layaoen. In that case it was claimed that the accused Layaoen was seen on the night in question with a revolver under the house of the deceased and that in a house immediately adjoining that of Layaoen and under the care and control of his wife, the Constabulary agents discovered eighty-one rounds of ammunition of the 22 long Lubaloy Western rifle, the brand and class of bullet which was alleged in that case and is alleged in the present case to have killed Nalundasan. Nevertheless the accused Layaoen was acquitted by the court of First instance of Ilocos Norte.
According to Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, he was present in the various stages of the conspiracy to murder Nalundasan and, as noted above, he was present at the time of the commission of the murder on the night of September 20, 1935. Aguinaldo also alleges to have been present at the meeting in the house of the Marcoses in the morning of September 15th as well as at the meetings in the morning and in the after- noon of September 20th, The very evidence for the prosecution therefore shows that Calixto Aguinaldo was a coconspirator. His testimony accordingly comes from a polluted source and should be received with a great deal of caution and, for this reason, should be closely and carefully scrutinized. A painstaking review of the evidence reveals several important considerations leading to the inescapable conclusion that the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo does not deserve the credit that was accorded by the trial court.
It is noteworthy that Aguinaldo claims to have been present at the various stages of the conspiracy and to have participated in the commission of the offense herein charged to the extent admitted by him. Nevertheless he remained silent for approximately three years, it appearing that it was only in November, 1938, that he broke his silence. The reason given the prosecution is that his loyalty to the defendant Quirino Lizardo prevented him from betraying the latter's confidence, and in this connection it was admitted in the argument by the representative of the prosecution that it was only when Aguinaldo was approached by the Constabulary agents that he decided to speak out the truth. The pretended loyalty of Aguinaldo is conspicuously disproved by the circumstance that, as the prosecution itself admits, although he was asked to watch, he returned to the house of the Marcoses before Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo has executed the alleged fatal act. But whatever might have Aguinaldo's reason, the fact is that his long continued silence creates serious doubts in the mind of this Court as to his motives for breaking that silence. The change of attitude could not have been due to a desireable impulse to serve the interest of justice and proves, if it proves anything at all, the tardy revival of stultified civic consciousness.
According to the theory of the prosecution, Ferdinand was selected as the trigger man for two reasons, namely: because he is experienced in pistol shooting, having been cadet major in the University of the Philippines, and because he was below eighteen years of age and, if discovered and convicted, would be merely sent to Lolomboy reformatory school. With reference to the first reason, it is even represented that Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand, not only acquiesced in the arrangement but apparently encouraged his son to perform the foul task, with the simple remark that an assurance be made that the target was not missed and, if we may believe further the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, that he (Mariano Marcos) was to go in the meantime to Laoag, Ilocos Norte, thereby leaving his son to accomplish the dirty job while he, the person most affected by the electoral triumph of Nalundasan, was to stay away safe and sound. This is something extraordinary for a father to feel and to do, and we incline to reject the testimony of Aguinaldo and the inferences deducible therefrom, because the story is, while possible, devoid of reasonable probability and opposed to the lessons of common experience and the teachings of experimental psychology. As regards the second reason, it appears that both the prosecution and the defense agree that Ferdinand Marcos was at the time of the commission of the alleged offense already over eighteen years of age. As a matter of fact, one of the ground invoked by the Solicitor-General in asking for the modification of the judgment of the lower court and imposition of the death penalty upon this appellant is that he was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the offense. It is of course reasonable to assume that at least his father and the interested party himself, if not his uncle Pio Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, knew this fact. The theory that Ferdinand was chosen to be the trigger man because of minority must therefore be decidedly false.
We find the claim of Calixto Aguinaldo that he was present at the alleged various conferences held in the house of the Marcoses as a mere bodyguard of Quirino Lizardo to be incredible, in view of the absence of a valid reason for the latter, admitted by the prosecution to be "a domineering, blustering giant of a man" and by the trial court to be "un hombre de rebusta constitucion fisica, de caracter implusivo, val;iente y decidido," to employ as his bodyguard Calixto Aguinaldo, who is only about one-half of Lizardo in size and who has not been shown to be capable, either by experience or by nature, to discharge such office. More incredible still is alleged participation of Aguinaldo in the actual conspiracy to kill Julio Nalundasan, especially in view of the fact that, notwithstanding the attempt of the prosecution to show that he was a trusted man of Quirino Lizardo, there is evidence to prove that the relationship between the two could not be said to be of the best, it appearing, according to the admission of Aguinaldo himself, that he lost his job in the Government by order of the University of Labor upon the strength of the findings in an administrative investigation in which Lizardo testified Aguinaldo. It is hard to believe that either the Marcoses or Quirino Lizardo would allow themselves to commit the stupidity of permitting Calixto Aguinaldo, who was a stranger to the Marcoses and who, as already stated, had reason to be antagonistic to Lizardo, to know their alleged plan to kill Nalundasan and of later asking Aguinaldo to merely play the insignificant, nay unnecessary, role of watcher, unless it was the intention of the defendant herein to facilitate the discovery of the alleged crime and to preserve the only means of their conviction. Since, according to the theory of the prosecution, Ferdinand Marcos was selected to be the trigger man, Quirino Lizardo, Mariano Marcos or Pio Marcos could easily have personally done the alleged watching.
Calixto Aguinaldo testified that when he and Quirino Lizardo arrived at noon in Batac, Ilocos Norte, Ferdinand was in the house of the Marcoses to whom he was introduced. It is a fact, however, that Ferdinand was a student of the University of the Philippines and left Manila in the morning of September 15, 1935, arriving in Batac only at 8:30 p. m. of that day. Aguinaldo therefore declared falsely when he stated that he met Ferdinand in the house of the Marcoses at the time he (Aguinaldo) and Lizardo arrived in Batac at noon of September 15, 1935.
The prosecution has pictured Quirino Lizardo as a person more interested and enthusiastic than his brother-in-law, Mariano Marcos, in seeing the latter win in the elections of September 17, 1935, against Julio Nalundasan at all costs. Thus it is represented that when Pio Marcos informed Lizardo prior to the elections about the imminent defeat of Mariano Marcos, Lizardo is alleged to have impulsively exclaimed " Eso no puede ser! !Si vamos a perder la eleccion ganaremos en otra cosa, y es . . . matar a Nalundasan! Con una bala voy a terminar la politica en Ilocos!" In this connection it is well to recall that after marriage of Quirino Lizardo to Maria Marcos, sister of Mariano and Pio Marcos, animosity and ill feeling arose between the Marcoses and Lizardo as a result of family questions, which culminated in the filing in court of a criminal complaint against Lizardo for attempted homicide in which the offended party was the mother of the Marcoses. In the light of this circumstance, we cannot align ourselves with the theory that Lizardo could thereafter have shown such interest in the candidacy of Mariano Marcos as to take the initiative not only of suggesting but of participating in the murder of Julio Nalundasan, even granting that previous family differences had been patched up.
The trial court was of the opinion that the Marcoses and Lizardo conceived the idea of killing Nalundasan with some seriousness only in the morning of September 209, 1935, after the provocative and humiliating parade held by Nalundasan's followers and partymen in the afternoon of the preceding day. But while the defeat of Marcos, followed by such insulting parade, might have irritated the herein defendants, the existence of a motive alone, though perhaps an important consideration, is not proof of the commission of a crime, much less of the guilt of the defendants-appellants.
By and large, we find the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo to be inherently improbable and full of contradictions in important details. For this reason, we decline to give him any credit. In view of this conclusion, we find it neither necessary nor profitable to examine the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution. Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise fail.
In passing we may state that the prosecution deserves commendation for the industry and zeal it has displayed in this case, although its failure to obtain the conviction of Nicasio Layaoen in the first case it is not necessarily vindicated by the instant effort to secure a judgment against the herein defendants-appellants, unless the latter's guilt is shown to the point of a certain degree of moral certainty and the judicial mind is set at ease as to their culpability.
The judgment of the lower court, herein appealed from is accordingly reversed, and the defendants-appellants, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, acquitted of the charge of murder and forthwith liberated from imprisonment and discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
With reference to the incident of contempt, it appears that on June 10, 1939, the four accused below filed eight separate complaints with the justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging the principal witness for the prosecution, Calixto, Aguinaldo, with the crime of false testimony because of alleged false declaration made by the latter in the preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and during the trial of the aforesaid four accused. When the several complaints for false testimony were filed, it appears that Calixto Aguinaldo was under cross-examination in the separate trial against Quirino Lizardo, and the trial of the other three accused, Mariano, Pio and Ferdinand Marcos, had not yet commenced. The judge of the Court of First Instance who was trying the murder case, upon motion of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, ordered the provincial dismissal of the various complaints filed in the justice of the peace court of Laoag against Calixto Aguinaldo and, thereafter, a motion was presented asking that the Marcos and Lizardo be declared in contempt. Lizardo and the Marcoses were ordered to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt and, simultaneously with the judgment on the principal case for murder, Quirino Lizardo, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos were adjudged guilty of contempt and sentenced each to pay a fine of two hundred pesos, with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
It is evident that the charges for false testimony filed by the four accused above mentioned could not be decided until the main case for murder was disposed of, since no penalty could be meted out to Calixto Aguinaldo for his alleged false testimony without first knowing the extent of the sentence to be imposed against Lizardo and the Marcoses (Revised Penal Code, art. 180). The latter should therefore have waited for the termination of the principal case in the lower court before filing the charges for false testimony against Calixto Aguinaldo. Facts considered, we are of the opinion that the action of the Marcoses and Lizards was calculated, or at least tended. directly or indirectly to obstruct the administration of justice and that, therefore, the trial court properly found them guilty of contempt. (In re Gomez, 6 Phil., 647; U.S. vs. Jaca, 26 Phil., 100.) In view of the result, however, arrived at in the principal case, and considering that the inherent power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle (Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil., 778), and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801), it is our view that this purpose is sufficiently achieved and the principle amply vindicated with the imposition upon each of the four accused above mentioned of a fine of fifty (50) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
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