COURT ENTERTAIN LETTER COMPLAINT _A.M. No. (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1333-P) (REFERENCE)

SECOND DIVISION CONCERNED CITIZEN C o m p l a i n a n t, - versus - ELEUTERIO C. GABRAL, JR., CLERK OF COURT II, MCTC, STA. RITA, SAMAR, R e s p o n d e n t. A.M. No. (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1333-P) Present: PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: December 15, 2005 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S I O N "WHEREFORE, respondent Elueterio C. Gabral Jr., having been found guilty of dishonesty and gross neglect of duty is DISMISSED from the service effective immediately, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government owned and controlled corporation. He is further ORDERED to restitute the amount of P162,385.00 representing the shortages in the following: JDF- P30,770.00; General Fund-P25,700.00; and Fiduciary Fund-P105,915.00. The Employees Division, Office of the Administrative Services-OCA, is likewise DIRECTED to compute the balance of respondents earned leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, which shall compute the money value of the same, the amount, as well as other benefits the respondent may be entitled to, to be included as restitution of the computed shortages. The OCA is also ORDERED to coordinate with the prosecution arm of the government to ensure the expeditious prosecution of the criminal liability of the respondent. SO ORDERED." CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This refers to the Letter-Complaint[1] dated 16 July 2001, addressed to the Chief Justice, of a concerned citizen (complainant) charging Eleuterio C. Gabral, Jr., Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Sta. Rita, Samar, with tardiness and violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Complainant alleged that she was the wife of the accused in a case for illegal gambling. That his husband paid a fine in said case. Thereafter, it was found out that his husband was innocent, thus, the trial court ordered the respondent to release the money deposited to him, but respondent delayed its release. Similarly, in other cases, the bonds deposited by the parties to the respondent were no longer released. If released, it was made on installment basis. Complainant claimed that respondent was misappropriating the courts funds. Further, she averred that the monies received by the respondent remained unaccounted for because he had been evading the auditor. Lastly, respondent was not observing office hours, he reports late to the court and leaves early therefrom. To determine the veracity of the accusations, the Court Administrator directed[2] the then Executive Judge Jovito O. Abarquez, Regional Trial Court, Basy, Samar, to conduct a discreet investigation on the matter. In compliance with this directive, Judge Abarquez questioned the respondent and the other court employees of the MCTC, Sta. Rita, Samar. On 05 February 2002, Judge Abarquez submitted its report[3] finding respondent guilty of the charges and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) month, or be fined in the amount equivalent to one (1) month of his salary. In his Comment[4] dated 07 May 2002, respondent Gabral assailed the legality of the investigation conducted by Judge Abarquez. He claimed that the testimonies of the court employees were inadmissible because they were not under oath. Anent his delay in returning the deposited bond, he averred that there must be a court order before he can release it. He denied that he evaded the auditor. He explained that indeed on April 2001, he was not ready for an audit because there was money yet to be entered in the cashbook. Thus, he arranged a meeting with the auditor. He went to the agreed place on the appointed date; however, the auditor had already left when he arrived. Respondent clarified that the money entrusted to him is intact. As to the remaining charge, he admitted that sometimes, he reports to the court late and goes home before 5 p.m. because he merely commutes to the court from his residence which is sixty (60) kilometres from the court. In a Report Agenda dated 10 October 2002, Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report[5] which was adopted by the Court in a Resolution[6] dated 04 December 2002, thus: 1.      DIRECT a team from the fiscal Monitoring Division, CMO, OCA, to conduct a financial audit at the MCTC, Sta. Rita, Samar, and submit its report on the same within a reasonable time from receipt of notices; 2.      HOLD IN ABEYANCE the disposition of this matter and the charge concerning office hours pending submission of the Financial Audit Report and the Summary of Attendance. In compliance with the Courts directive, a team conducted a financial audit in MCTC, Sta. Rita, Samar from 02 to 12 March 2003. In a Report dated 07 July 2003, the team found that respondent Gabral has accountabilities amounting to One Hundred Sixty Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos (P162,385.00), itemized as follows: NATURE OF FUNDS ACCOUNTABILITIES Judiciary Development Fund P 30,770.00 Clerk of court General Fund 25,700.00 Clerk of Court Fiduciary Fund 105, 915.00 TOTAL P162,385.00 Based on the audit report, a Memorandum[7] dated 07 July 2003 was issued by Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao directing respondent Gabral to: 1.      Restitute the amounts of P30,770.00, P25,700.00 and P105,915.00 representing the shortages in the JDF, General Fund and the Fiduciary Fund, respectively, by depositing the said amounts to the respective accounts, furnishing the Fiscal Monitoring Division, CMO, with the machine validated deposit slips as proof of remittance and to EXPLAIN why no administrative charges be taken (against you) for incurring said shortages; 2.      EXLAIN in writing within a period of fifteen (15 days from notice 2.a) (your) failure to submit (your) monthly reports of collections and deposits/withdrawals for the JDF starting July 1999 and for Clerk of court General Fund and Clerk of Court fiduciary Fund since (you) started collecting the said funds, 2.b) why only one remittance amounting to P2,000.00 on October 1997 was made to the JDF for the period October 1995 to February 28, 2003; and 3.      SUBMIT within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice the Statement of the outstanding Balance of the Cash Bonds deposited with the Municipal Treasurers Office of Sta. Rita, Talalora and Zumarraga, all in the province of Samar as of February 28, 2003 duly certified by the respective Municipal Treasurer and the Municipal Accountant. In a separate Memorandum of the same date, DCA Elepao directed[8] Judge Nieto A. Delantar, Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC, Sta. Rita, Samar, to relieve respondent Gabral as an accountable officer and to designate a competent and honest court employee to take charge of the collections of judiciary funds and to monitor its proper handling. On 01 June 2005, we referred this matter to OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the record. On 01 July 2005, OCA submitted its report,[9] thus: In view of the foregoing, respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that: 1.                              Respondent Eleuterio C. Gabral BE DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct, dishonesty and misappropriation of public funds with forfeiture of all withheld salaries, allowances and benefits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality in the government, including government owned and controlled corporations; 2.                              Respondent Eleuterio C. Gabral BE DIRECTED to restitute the amount of One Hundred Sixty Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos (P162,385.00) representing the shortages in the In a Letter to DCA Elepao dated 27 August 2003following: JDF-P30,770.00; General Fund-P25,700.00; and Fiduciary Fund-P105,915.00; 3.                              The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, BE DIRECTED to compute the balance of the respondents earned leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, which shall compute the money value of the same, the amount, as well as other benefits the respondent may be entitled to, to be included as restitution of the computed shortages; and, 4.                              The Legal Office of the Office of the Court Administrator BE AUTHORIZED to file criminal charges against the respondent before the appropriate court. We affirm the findings and recommendations of the OCA. It is worth noting that at first respondent denied the charges against him when he said that all money entrusted to him are intact and had never been used for his personal gain. It was only after the audit team submitted its report that respondent Gabral admitted in a letter dated 27 August 2003 addressed to DCA Elepao that he misappropriated the courts funds for the studies of his children and in a civil case which his family got involved in. He stated that because of financial difficulties, he was able to make only one remittance to the JDF in October 1997 for the period 1995 to February 2003. He averred further that the submission of the Statement of the Outstanding Balance of the Cash Bonds deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Talalora and Zumarraga would be delayed because of their distance from the court. He promised that he will pay all his obligations. The court finds the explanation unsatisfactory. It is been ruled that personal problems cannot justify his acts of using the judiciary funds in his custody.[10] We have said time and again that those involved in the administration of justice from the highest official to the lowest clerk must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service[11] bearing in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of men and women who work thereat.[12] Clerks of court are officers of the law who performs vital functions in the administration of justice.[13] They are designated custodian of the courts fund and revenues, records, properties, and premises.[14] Verily, they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of these functions. Indeed, the cats of respondent fell short of the exacting standards extolled by the Court, as he committed numerous infractions. He issued only one set of official receipts for the collections of all funds, in violation of Item No. 2 of SC Circular No. 22-94 dated 08 April 1994 which prescribes that in issuing official receipt, separate booklet must be used for each fund account for proper accounting and control of collections. SC Circular No. 32-92[15] prescribes the guidelines for the collection and custody of legal dues. This administrative circular was issued to attain maximum efficiency and accountability in the handling of collections and deposits of court funds. It enjoins all clerks of court and accountable officers to submit monthly reports of collections for all fund . . . not later than the 10th day of each succeeding month. Respondent clearly violated SC Circular No. 32-93. The audit team unearthed that the last Monthly Report of Collections and Remittances submitted by the respondent for the JDF account was in June 1999 and the last remittance was in October 1997. Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 dated 15 June 2000 which provides that the aggregate total of the Deposit Slips for any particular month should always be equal to and tally with the total collections for the month as reflected in the Monthly Report of Collections and Deposits and Cash Book. As found by the Audit Team, from March 1985 to September 1995, JDF collections were properly remitted, but, from October 1995 to 28 February 2003, respondent Gabral made only one remittance in October 1997 in the amount of P2,000.00. Clearly, he violated this circular. As to the Clerk of Court General Fund, respondent Gabral did not maintain an official cashbook nor submit a single report to the Accounting Division of this Office. Collections for this fund were received under receipt intended for the JDF. He also did not remit any collections for the period March 1999 to August 2000. Circular No. 50-95 dated 11 October 1995 provides that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof with the LBP. Further, in localities where there are no branches of the LBP, fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court with the Provincial City or Municipal Treasurer. But the audit team found that the court did not maintain an account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) as required in said Circular. Up to now, respondent failed to restore the amount which he misappropriated despite the lapse of almost two years from the time the Court through DCA Elepao required him to do so. Respondents refusal to obey directive aggravated his legal responsibility. The misappropriation of the courts funds, which respondent admitted, constitutes malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. All that is necessary to prove malversation are the following: (a) that the defendant received in his possession public funds or property (b) that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession when audited; and (c) that he could not give a satisfactory or reasonable excuse for the disappearance of said funds or property.[16] As custodian of court funds and revenues,[17] Clerks of Court has always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories[18] for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.[19] A failure to timely turn over cash deposited with them constitutes, not just gross negligence in the performance of their duty, but gross dishonesty, if not malversation.[20] For those who have fallen short of their accountabilities, we have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty.[21] This Court has never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.[22] There is no doubt that respondent had been delinquent in the performance of his duties as clerk of court with regard to financial concerns. He did not regularly submit his reports. He did not record his cash transactions in the cashbook. Worse, he misappropriated for himself the collections. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which are grave offense punished by dismissal.[23] Not even full payment of collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.[24]Verily, respondents grave misdemeanours justify his severance from the service. As to the charge of tardiness, it was not sufficiently shown that respondent is liable for tardiness. Absent substantial evidence, we are inclined to absolve respondent Gabral from this charge. Besides, the Certification dated 09 March 2005 issued by the Leave Division of this Office shows that respondent Gabral incurred only the following absences: 1999 Jan. 11, 19 2 days with pay Feb. 1, 8, 15 3 days with pay 2000                                                                              None 2001                                                                              None 2002                                                                              Oct. 21 1 day with pay The foregoing premises considered, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined a intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or registration.[25] In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloraza,[26] dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. Section 22(a), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292[27] as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999, provides that: SEC. 22. Administrative Offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effect on said acts on the government service. The following are grave offenses with corresponding penalties: (a)   Dishonesty 1st Offense-Dismissal Thus, dishonesty, as a grave offense, warrants the severe penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of even the first offense. It is well to remind respondent that dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary.[28] More particularly, we have repeatedly warned Clerks of Court, being next in rank to judges in courts of justice, that dishonesty, particularly that amounting to malversation of public funds, will not be countenanced as they definitely reduce the image of courts of justice to mere heavens of thievery and corruption.[29] Parenthetically, Section 56(a) of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 dated 31 August 1999 provides that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability. Under Section 58(a) of the same resolution, it shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision. WHEREFORE, respondent Elueterio C. Gabral Jr., having been found guilty of dishonesty and gross neglect of duty is DISMISSED from the service effective immediately, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government owned and controlled corporation. He is further ORDERED to restitute the amount of P162,385.00 representing the shortages in the following: JDF- P30,770.00; General Fund-P25,700.00; and Fiduciary Fund-P105,915.00. The Employees Division, Office of the Administrative Services-OCA, is likewise DIRECTED to compute the balance of respondents earned leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, which shall compute the money value of the same, the amount, as well as other benefits the respondent may be entitled to, to be included as restitution of the computed shortages. The OCA is also ORDERED to coordinate with the prosecution arm of the government to ensure the expeditious prosecution of the criminal liability of the respondent. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice       DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman, Second Division C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice [1] Rollo, p. 7. [2] Rollo, p. 5. [3] Rollo, pp. 2-4. [4] Rollo, pp. 12-16. [5] Rollo, pp. 19-23. [6] Rollo, p. 24 [7] Rollo, pp. 50. [8] Rollo, p. 51. [9] Rollo, p.60 [10] RE: Report on the Examination of the Cash Accounts of the Clerks of Court of the RTC and MTC of Vigan , Ilocos Sur, A.M.No. 01-1-13-RTC, 400 SCRA 387, 02 April 2003. [11] Solidbank v. Capoon, Jr., A.M. No. P-987-1266, 15 SCRA 1989, 289 SCRA 9. [12] Cajot v. Cledera, A.M. No. P-98-1262, 12 February 1998, 286 SCRA 238. [13] Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 342 SCRA 6, 04 October 2000. [14] b, Chapter 1, Manual for Clerks of Court. [15] Issued on 09 July 1993. [16] Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 14 May 1991. [17] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lucio P-96-1206, 11 June 1996, 257 SCRA 287 [18] Judiciary Planning Development and Implementation Office v. Calaguas, A.M. No.P-95-1155, 15 May 1996, 256 SCRA 690. [19] Ferriols v. Hiam, A.M. No. 90-414, 09 August 1993, 225 SCRA 205, 209. [20] Judge Veronica A. Dondiego v. Petromi;ia Cuevas,Jr., Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Norte, A.M. No. P-03-1681, 398 SCRA 386, citing Re: Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of MTC of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, 276 SCRA 257. [21] Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br.4, PAnabo, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 95-4-143-RTC, 13 March 1998, 287 SCRA 510; Gano v. Leonen, A.M. No. P-92-756,03 May 1994, 232 SCEA 98;Office of the Court Administrator v. Soriano, A.M. No. 2864-P, 16 May 1985, 136 SCRA 461; Estenzo v. Dejano, A.M. No. 2082, 20 September 1979, 93 SCRA 218; In re: Carloto U. Alvizo, A.M. No. 818-TEL.,18 April 1979,89 SCRA 426. [22] Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC-Br.117, Pasay City, A.M. No. 96-5-163-RTC, 18 June 1998, 291 SCRA 1 [23] Re: Report on the Examination of the Cash and Accounts of the Clerks of Court of the RTC and MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, 400 SCRA 387. [24] Re: Withholding of Other Emoluments of the Following Clerks of Court: Elsie C. Remoroza, et.al, A.M. No. 01-4-133-MTC, 409 SCRA 574; Re: Report of Regionsl Coordinator Felipe Kalalo on Alleged Anomalies Involving JDF Collections in MTCC, Angeles City and MCTC, Minalin, Pampanga, 326 Phil 703; 256 SCRA 690, 15 May 1996; [25] Abelardo V. Sevilla v. Lorna F. Gocon, G.R. No. 148445, 16 February 2004, citing Aquino v. The General Mgr. of GSIS, 130 Phil 488 (1968). [26] 412 SCRA l 114, 133 (2001). [27] The Administrative Code of 1997. [28] Lacurom v. Magbanua, A.M. No. P-02-1646, 22 January 2003, citing Pizarro v. Villegas, A.M. No. P-97-1243, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 42. [29] Re: Report Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br.4, Panabo, Davao del Norte, A.M.. No. 95-1155, 15 May 1996, 256 SCRA 690.

PDAF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGALITY _G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012 (REFERENCE)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio EN BANC G.R. No. 164987               April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., Petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the Congress, Respondents. "There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED." D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country,1 also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision. On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed a Reply thereto.2 On April 26, 2005, both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition: PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder – P 8,327,000,000.00 X x x x x Special Provision 1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority. Petitioner’s Position According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. "In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main features of the ‘pork barrel’ system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004).3 In its memorandum, LAMP insists that "[t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the ‘pork barrel’ system."4 In other words, "[t]he omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as ‘allocations’ to individual Members of Congress is a ‘casus omissus’ signifying an omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply."5 Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that "the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004."6 LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress cannot "virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayer’s money.7 Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. "It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,"8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, "does not include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department."9 By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant. Respondents’ Position For their part, the respondents10 contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,11 they argue that the former should not be equated with "pork barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording political opportunism."12 In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of "pork barrel," is a source of "dirty money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These "facts" have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the claim that Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved budget for a particular project. 13 Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause. Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are "appropriations for substantially similar, if not the same, beneficial purposes," 14 the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,15 where CDF was described as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. The Issues The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial review—an actual case or controversy. The Court’s Ruling To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.16 An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.17 In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy. Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.18 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."19 In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."20 Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.21 Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.22 Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works23 is authority in support of the petitioner: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.] Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. Now, on the substantive issue. The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional.24 The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.25 With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question: In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws? The Court rules in the negative. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,26 the Court held that: Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it."27 This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.28 The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the Court’s hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie.29 Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, "not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence."30 Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004. The process was explained in this wise, in Guingona v. Carague:31 1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels. Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC). With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same. 2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulatesan appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. x x x 3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the variousoperational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle. 4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved. Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments.32 While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. "The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive."33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."34 There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 7. 2 Id. at 113-117. 3 Id. at 9. 4 Id. at 10. 5 Id. at 163. 6 Id. at 152. 7 Id. at 154. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 156. 10 The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and filed a Comment for the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Treasurer of the Philippines and Commission on Audit, while then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jose De Venecia Jr. filed his separate Comment dated January 6, 2005. 11 Rollo, p. 66. 12 Id. at 62. 13 Id. at 149. 14 Id. at 67. 15 G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506. 16 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 35. 17Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883, and 187910, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 358, citing Guingona Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428. 18 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937). 19 Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 400, 434. 20 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160. 21 Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470. 22 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937). 23 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960). 24 Separate Opinion, Joker P. Arroyo v. HRET and Augusto l. Syjuco, Jr., 316 Phil. 464 (1995). 25 Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (1997). 26 463 Phil. 179, 197 (2003). 27 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251. 28Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135. 29 Dissenting Opinion, The Board of Election Inspectors et al. v. Edmundo S. Piccio Judge of First Instance of Leyte at Tacloban, and Cesario R. Colasito, G.R. No. L-1852, October 14, 1948/ September 30, 1948. 30 Lim v. Hon. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555, 580 (2002). 31 273 Phil. 443, 460, (1991). 32 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Sections 24 and 29 (1). 33 Rollo, p. 98. 34 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 158 Phil. 60 (1974).

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