FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS

SENATOR SANTIAGO  ON "FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS" DOCTRINE DURING SC CJ CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL [1]"Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood." SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. SIMILARLY,  when Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid,  speak to a fact in respect to which they cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the reading  of this simple one page "Release or Quitclaim" document  [2]Annex 5,  where  it is vividly shown that the accounts pertaining to my [3]retirement pay had been disbursed as separation pay which is an UNLAWFUL being an act of circumventing the retirement pay law.  It is fundamental that lawyers be allowed to defend a lawyer who is charged of violation the lawyers oath, among others.  But caution and prudence must be exercised by these defense lawyers so as not to justify a wrong and unlawful action with an [4]alibi equally false and reprehensible. It is extremely difficult to exempt them from  the charge of deliberate falsehood that merit  disciplinary action and /or disbarment for all  of them, altogether. (IN RE AC-10084)  through by own volition of the supreme  court, propia voluntate et iudicio. How can people lend you at least an iota of  trust when you let these lawyers be on the  loose in spite of clear and convincing  evidence to support their disbarment or at  least be disciplined for their wrongful actions? This issue, among others, the circumvention of retirement  pay, with respect to case GR-183273, having brought to your  attention, but instead of performing your duty to correct  the wrong, you joined the appellate court wrongful adjudication, as in failure of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts  made by the courts below as succinctly explained here: [5]where the trial courts, labor tribunals were found to have had overlooked important evidences, the  appellate court has the duty to revise the findings of facts made by the court below.  May I most respectfully remind you that when cases are submitted to you for review, you should have functioned with due care and diligence so that these problems of unlawful, wrongful, unfair, unjust and unconstitutional adjudication that tend to erode the remaining honor and credibility of the court should have been avoided. It is worthwhile to listen to no less than the Chief Justice, when she rebuked Atty. Coronel during the oral argument on the validity of the condonation doctrine, saying that when cases are submitted to the court for review, the court considers looking at it from [6]the point of inception all the way up to the writ of preliminary injunction in the court of appeals. By virtue of equal protection of the laws it is earnestly prayed that same be extended to the cases GR-183273 and AC-10084 to serve the interest of justice and avoid miscarriage of the same.    The lower courts and your honors, might have been too naive in believing the false pretenses foisted by Shell, Bersamin, Vargas and Quiroz. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. [7]But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless. Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid employed deceit to earn dismissal of AC-10084. Deceit in this case refers to a false representation of a matter of fact and/or multiples of facts (whether by words or conduct, false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another, in this case the court,  so that the court shall act upon it to the court's, your honors,  legal injury. [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] To stress my point next is verbatim excerpt from sc decision [9]The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21]    verbatim from sc decision [10]The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. end of verbatim excerpt I am most respectfully sending you this message as a matter  of 20th Persuasive Appeal for you to reconsider your  decision with respect to GR-183273 and AC-10084. Yours faithfully, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.  FOOTNOTES ADDITIONAL NOTE : FOOTNOTES IN RED IS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCE DOCUMENT [1] Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5275             August 25, 1953 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants. Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao. Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: XXX The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454, thus: Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating expression of the scope of the rule: As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given false testimony.Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith, 48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610;Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796; Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658. In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said: "As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the case of Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that his entire testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as to one matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether. The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony. And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any material statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far as it was corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement. It is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a material point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82 Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous. When analyzed, it plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F. Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness, whether defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly false on any material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . . The mere fact, however, that he is contradicted as to some material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection of his evidence altogether. In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the court instructed the jury that "if they believe any witness has testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness' testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this instruction the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely upon some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the jury would not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is the corrupt motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury to disregard the testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."  XXX [2]   Annex 5 Shell position paper [3]  Annex 5 retirement pay accounts expanded view [4] [5] SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-39. February 1, 1946.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIAN ABANA, Defendant-Appellant. Maximo Calalang for Appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo and Solicitor Alvendia for Appellee. D E C I S I O N DE JOYA, J. xxx When the trial court has overlooked important evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts made by the court below, and to render judgment accordingly. (United States, v. Singson, 41 Phil., 53; People v. Istoris, 53 Phil., 91.)  xxx [6] THIRD DIVISION [7] ELSA JOSE, G.R. No. 148371 Petitioner, Present: Panganiban, J, Chairman, - versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,* Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; REJIE RAMOS DEL ROSARIO; and the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Promulgated: Court of Makati, Branch 148, Respondents. August 12, 2004 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: xxx P rivate respondent might have been too naive in believing the false pretense foisted by petitioner. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless.   PANGANIBAN, J __________________ * On leave. xxxx xxx [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] [11] Dissenting Opinion of Perfecto, J. in People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72, 95, February 1, 1946, per De Joya, J. xxx [9] FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 3548. July 4, 2002] JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: xxx The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21] xxxx [18] Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 1 February 2002. [19] A.C. No. 2417, 6 February 2002. [20] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [21] Id., p. 629. [10] FIRST DIVISION [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002] ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent. D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. xxx [18] Ducat, Jr. vs. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [19] Id., p. 629. [20] Richards vs. Asoy, 139 SCRA 529 (1985). [21] See Rule 138, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000] JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents. D E C I S I O N DE LEON, JR., J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.[10] xxx [9] Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Cruz vs. Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto,Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000 citing Maligsa vs. Cabantig, 272 SCRA 408 (1997) [10] Leonito Gonato and Primrose Gonato vs. Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza, Adm. Case No. 4083, March 27, 2000 citing Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1(1992)

20TH PERSUASIVE APPEAL_26MAY16__FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS

SENATOR SANTIAGO  ON "FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS" DOCTRINE DURING SC CJ CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL [1]"Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood." SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. SIMILARLY,  when Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid,  speak to a fact in respect to which they cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the reading  of this simple one page "Release or Quitclaim" document  [2]Annex 5,  where  it is vividly shown that the accounts pertaining to my [3]retirement pay had been disbursed as separation pay which is an UNLAWFUL being an act of circumventing the retirement pay law.  It is fundamental that lawyers be allowed to defend a lawyer who is charged of violation the lawyers oath, among others.  But caution and prudence must be exercised by these defense lawyers so as not to justify a wrong and unlawful action with an [4]alibi equally false and reprehensible. It is extremely difficult to exempt them from  the charge of deliberate falsehood that merit  disciplinary action and /ordisbarment for all of t them, altogether. (IN RE AC-10084)  through by own volition of the  court, propia voluntate et iudicio. How can people lend you at least an iota of  trust when you let these lawyers be on the  loose in spite of clear and convincing  evidence to support their disbarment or at  least be disciplined for their wrongful actions? This issue, among others, the circumvention of retirement  pay, with respect to case GR-183273, having brought to your  attention, but instead of performing your duty to correct  the wrong, you joined the appellate court wrongful adjudication, as in failure of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts  made by the courts below as succinctly explained here: [5]where the trial courts, labor tribunals were found to have had overlooked important evidences, the  appellate court has the duty to revise the findings of facts made by the court below.  May I most respectfully remind you that when cases are submitted to you for review, you should have functioned with due care and diligence so that these problems of unlawful, wrongful, unfair, unjust and unconstitutional adjudication that tend to erode the remaining honor and credibility of the court should have been avoided. It is worthwhile to listen to no less than the Chief Justice, when she rebuked Atty. Coronel during the oral argument on the validity of the condonation doctrine, saying that when cases are submitted to the court for review, the court considers looking at it from [6]the point of inception all the way up to the writ of preliminary injunction in the court of appeals. By virtue of equal protection of the laws it is earnestly prayed that same be extended to the cases GR-183273 and AC-10084 to serve the interest of justice and avoid miscarriage of the same.    The lower courts and your honors, might have been too naive in believing the false pretenses foisted by Shell, Bersamin, Vargas and Quiroz. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. [7]But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless. Lawyers Quiroz, Manibog and Leong-Pambid employed deceit to earn dismissal of AC-10084. Deceit in this case refers to a false representation of a matter of fact and/or multiples of facts (whether by words or conduct, false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another, in this case the court,  so that the court shall act upon it to the court's, your honors,  legal injury. [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] To stress my point next is verbatim excerpt from sc decision [9]The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21]    verbatim from sc decision [10]The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. end of verbatim excerpt I am most respectfully sending you this message as a matter  of 20th Persuasive Appeal for you to reconsider your  decision with respect to GR-183273 and AC-10084. Yours faithfully, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.  FOOTNOTES ADDITIONAL NOTE : FOOTNOTES IN RED IS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCE DOCUMENT [1] Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5275             August 25, 1953 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants. Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao. Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: XXX The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454, thus: Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme Court of Illinois made the following very illuminating expression of the scope of the rule: As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully given false testimony.Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith, 48 Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610;Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796; Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658. In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said: "As to the eight instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the case of Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that his entire testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as to one matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether. The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony. And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth instruction in the series given for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in any material statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far as it was corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement. It is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a material point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82 Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous. When analyzed, it plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F. Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness, whether defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly false on any material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . . The mere fact, however, that he is contradicted as to some material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection of his evidence altogether. In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the court instructed the jury that "if they believe any witness has testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness' testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this instruction the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely upon some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the jury would not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is the corrupt motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury to disregard the testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."  XXX [2]   Annex 5 Shell position paper [3]  Annex 5 retirement pay accounts expanded view [4] [5] SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-39. February 1, 1946.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIAN ABANA, Defendant-Appellant. Maximo Calalang for Appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo and Solicitor Alvendia for Appellee. D E C I S I O N DE JOYA, J. xxx When the trial court has overlooked important evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court to revise the findings of facts made by the court below, and to render judgment accordingly. (United States, v. Singson, 41 Phil., 53; People v. Istoris, 53 Phil., 91.)  xxx [6] THIRD DIVISION [7] ELSA JOSE, G.R. No. 148371 Petitioner, Present: Panganiban, J, Chairman, - versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,* Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; REJIE RAMOS DEL ROSARIO; and the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Promulgated: Court of Makati, Branch 148, Respondents. August 12, 2004 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: xxx P rivate respondent might have been too naive in believing the false pretense foisted by petitioner. Others more sensible might not have succumbed to the sweet talk. But the law protects not only the wary and the wily, but more so the gullible and the guileless.   PANGANIBAN, J __________________ * On leave. xxxx xxx [8]Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.[11] [11] Dissenting Opinion of Perfecto, J. in People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72, 95, February 1, 1946, per De Joya, J. xxx [9] FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 3548. July 4, 2002] JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: xxx The Court can not over stress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21] xxxx [18] Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 1 February 2002. [19] A.C. No. 2417, 6 February 2002. [20] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [21] Id., p. 629. [10] FIRST DIVISION [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002] ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent. D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19] Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. xxx [18] Ducat, Jr. vs. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628 (2000). [19] Id., p. 629. [20] Richards vs. Asoy, 139 SCRA 529 (1985). [21] See Rule 138, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000] JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents. D E C I S I O N DE LEON, JR., J.: xxx The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.[10] xxx [9] Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Cruz vs. Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto,Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000 citing Maligsa vs. Cabantig, 272 SCRA 408 (1997) [10] Leonito Gonato and Primrose Gonato vs. Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza, Adm. Case No. 4083, March 27, 2000 citing Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1(1992)