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Tuesday, August 9, 2016
Jill Stein: The Two-Party System Is Broken
Published on May 23, 2016
Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein says the two-party system is broken, and that we should vote our values, not our fears.
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Marcos unfit for hero's burial: historical body
 Marcos unfit for hero's burial: historical body
SHARED FROM:
InterAksyon.com
The online news portal of TV5
MANILA - Philippine activists and a historical body on Monday criticized President Rodrigo Duterte's plan to give late dictator Ferdinand Marcos a hero's burial, saying the ex-leader lied about his military record.
Duterte said Sunday he would fulfil his campaign promise to bury Marcos at the national "Heroes' Cemetery", a contentious issue because of widespread corruption and rights abuses under the late dictator. The National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) released a study over the weekend questioning Duterte's stand that Marcos was qualified for a hero's burial because he was a soldier during World War II. "Marcos lied about receiving US medals... (his) military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies," the agency said. "A doubtful record does not serve as sound, unassailable basis of historical recognition of any sort, let alone burial in a site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes." WE Forum raided after medals exposé
On December 7, 1982, Marcos' military raided the Quezon City offices and printing press of WE Forum,and arrested its publisher, several columnists and key publishing executives, after the the trailblazing "alternative press" newspaper published a series of investigative articles by Col. Bonifacio Gillego exposing the Marcos medals claim as being of doubtful basis.
Publisher Jose Burgos Jr. and his co-accused were released before Christmas owing to an international outcry, and among their defense counsel were some of the leading members of the human rights movement then: Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Jejomar Binay, Martiniano Vivo and Rene A.V. Saguisag.
The cases against the journalists were dismissed in 1984 by the Supreme Court, which ruled the WE Forum raid and shutdown as illegal. Burgos would later be declared by the International Press Institute as one of the 50 World Press Freedom Heroes of the 20th Century.
Marcos was toppled in a military-backed popular revolt in 1986 and died in exile in Hawaii in 1989. But his family has insisted on a hero's burial even though previous presidents refused this. In the meantime, they have kept his preserved body on display in their home town in the northern province of Ilocos Norte. Marcos was elected president in 1965 and declared martial law in 1972, allowing him to rule as a dictator while he, his family and allies enriched themselves through massive corruption as his troops suppressed dissent. 2nd most corrupt of all time Anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International in 2004 named Marcos the second most corrupt leader of all time. Despite his proclaimed stance against corruption, Duterte has heaped praise on Marcos as the Philippines' "best president". He maintains close ties with the Marcos family, who supported his presidential campaign. Duterte boasts that his father served in the Marcos administration and that he voted for Marcos. Duterte's defence secretary ordered the military on Sunday to start preparing for the burial. But activists urged the president to reconsider. "We call on President Duterte not to give a platform for the Marcoses to whitewash the crimes they committed. This man does not deserve any form of honor," said Tinay Palabay, secretary general of rights group Karapatan. Former lawmaker Satur Ocampo, tortured and imprisoned during martial law, said a hero's burial for Marcos would not bring national closure as Duterte promised. "Disunity will continue ... Duterte should not aggravate the injustice done to martial law victims." Marcos' son and political heir, former senator Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, thanked Duterte for granting the family's longstanding wish. "Our campaign has always been towards achieving unity to move the country forward. And it is this kind of pronouncement that we hope could end the decades of divisiveness," Marcos Jnr said on his Facebook page. |
LIBINGAN NG MGA TUNAY AT HUWAD NA BAYANI
 Almost 19,000 sign petition vs burying Marcos at Libingan ng mga Bayani
The online news portal of TV5
MANILA - Close to 19,000 people have signed a petition to ask incoming President Rodrigo Duterte to not push through with his plan to have the late dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
The petition “No to Burying Marcos in Heroes’ Cemetery” was created by Dolly De Leon of Mandaluyong City last week on advocacy platform Change.org. Find it on this link: chn.ge/1RDP8io.
The petition stressed that burying the dictator who ruled for two decades, including nine years under martial law, was “an affront to the thousands of lives tortured and murdered during his reign.”
It stressed that a hero was one who did not take away freedom; rather, he or she “campaigns for it and fights for its survival for the sake of others.”
“Laying (Marcos) to rest at the Heroes’ Cemetery is a disdainful act that will send a message to the future of our nation – our children – that the world we live in rewards forceful and violent hands,” the petition said.
It also outlined six reasons why Marcos should not be buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
First, it cited Duterte as saying that the issue of Marcos’s burial had long been divisive. In fact, Duterte said in a recent interview, “I am sure that (the burial) would erase from amongst our people one hatred.”
The petition said that the reason for the division was not the burial, and that the latter would even “further sever the opportunity for unity, since this is an injustice to the victims of Martial Law and the families they left behind.”
According to the petition, 70,000 people were imprisoned, 34,000 were tortured, and 3,240 were killed under Martial Law, which Marcos proclaimed in 1972.
The second reason, the petition said, was that the United States Army said that Marcos’s claims that he had led a guerrilla resistance unit during the Japanese occupation were “fraudulent” and “'absurd.”
The third reason, the petition said, that Marcos was not being heroic when he fabricated stories about his war accomplishment.
In addition, the petition said, Marcos’s “gross plunder and mass murder trumps his status as a soldier.”
“Serving one’s country in war does not warrant heroism if they place that same country in ruin. Foreign debt increased from $355 million in 1962 to $28.3 billion in 1986. The peso value to the dollar decreased from 3.90 in 1966 to 20.53 in 1986,” the petition explained.
The petition’s fifth reason for not wanting Marcos to be buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani was because not all soldiers were buried there.
“Burying him there will label him a hero whether he was a Philippine soldier or not,” the petition said.
Finally, the petition cited the cemetery’s regulations as saying, “Those who were dishonorably separated, reverted, or discharged from the service, and those who were convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude cannot be buried at the cemetery.”
“Marcos was ousted from power. On these grounds alone, he is not qualified. Ferdinand E. Marcos is not a hero. Only heroes are buried in the Heroes’ Cemetery as the name so literally states,” the petition said.
Duterte nevertheless maintained that he would not change his mind.
“Patay na ‘yung tao. Anong gusto ninyo? You want the cadaver to be burnt? Would that satisfy you?” he said in a press conference, addressing those opposed to his decision.
He earlier said that he was okay with any date for Marcos’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, including the latter’s birthday in September.
“I will allow the burial of President Marcos sa Libingan ng mga Bayani, not because he is a hero, kung ayaw nila ng iba na ‘yun, but because he was a Filipino soldier, period,” Duterte reasoned.
Duterte’s own mother, Soledad, had helped organize protest rallies for the pro-Aquino movement before the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986.
Meanwhile, Senator Bongbong Marcos had thanked Duterte for his statement, saying on his Facebook page that his family always maintained that it was the former president’s right under the law to be buried there being a former soldier and president.
“Our campaign has always been toward achieving unity to move the country forward,” said the losing vice-presidential candidate. “And it is this kind of pronouncement that we hope could end the decades of divisiveness that have been imposed upon us by our leaders.”
For his part, Manila Auxiliary Bishop Broderick Pabillo opposed the plan to bury former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani even though his clan had not returned the billions of money stolen from the government coffers during his regime.
The total amount of the ill-gotten wealth acquired by then President Marcos is reportedly between $5 and $10 billion.
The late Jovito Salonga, former chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), said in his book Presidential Plunder: The Quest for the Marcos Ill-Gotten Wealth, that as of January 14, 1987, “virtually all of the wealth claimed by Mrs. (Imelda) Marcos, allegedly amounting to around 500 billion pesos, had been sequestered during my one-year assignment, subject to final judicial determination of their ownership.”
(This P500 billion pesos is now equivalent to $10.8 billion, with the present dollar-peso exchange rate at $1 = P46.16 and P1 = $0.022. Meanwhile, the exchange rate in 1987 was $1 = P20.57, according to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: bit.ly/1MC7Snb.)
Marcos herself admitted to their vast properties during martial rule. She told The Philippine Daily Inquirer in 1998, “We practically own everything in the Philippines—from electricity, telecommunications, airline, banking, beer and tobacco, newspaper publishing, television stations, shipping, oil and mining, hotels and beach resorts, down to coconut milling, small farms, real estate and insurance.”
In addition, she also revealed in an interview with the Associated Press and Agence France-Presse in 1998 that more money had yet to be discovered.
“There is more money that the government is not yet aware of, but for the time being, I can admit that there is only $800 million kept in various international banks,” she said.
“Papaano ma-u-unite na marami naman tutol dito? Mas lalong ma-di-divide ang country,” Pabillo said. “Palaging hindi nabibigyan ng katarungan ang mga biktima.”
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Monday, August 8, 2016
The full text of Sereno's letter to President Duterte AND REFERENCE SC DECISION SHOWING THE LETTER AS MISPLACED COMMUNICATION
Below is the full text of Sereno's letter to President Duterte:
shared from Rappler.com
8 August 2016
PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE
President of the Philippines
Malacañan, Manila
Through:Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre
Department of Justice
Dear Mr. President:
I hope that this letter finds you in an excellent state of health and spirit as the country needs the leadership that only its President can provide. I congratulate you for outlining very timely and responsive peace and development objectives in your State of the Nation Address.
Allow me to give some observations on seven judges whom you had named in your speech on Sunday morning in Davao City as being involved in illegal drugs, namely:
Lorenda Mupas was dismissed in 2007 as MTC Judge of Dasmarinas, Cavite for gross ignorance of the law/misconduct. We request that her dishonorable discharge be duly considered and that she be not referred to as part of the judiciary as of nine years ago.
Judge Roberto Navidad, formerly of the RTC, Branch 32, Calbayog City, Samar was killed on 14 January 2008 at the age of 69.
Judge Rene Gonzales, formerly of the MTCC, Branch 7, Iloilo City, compulsorily retired last 20 June 2016.
Judge Exequil Dagala of the MTC, Dapa-Socorro, Surigao, does not have jurisdiction over drugs cases, the same way that Judge Gonzales does not. It would be very helpful if the investigators who included the names of Judges Dagala and Gonzales inform the Court how these MTC judges can be considered as influencing the drug trade.
Judge Adriano Savillo, RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City is a family court judge who does not have jurisdiction over drugs cases except in cases where a minor is a respondent.
Judge Domingo Casiple, RTC, Branch 7, Kalibo, Aklan is the judge of a court of general jurisdiction without jurisdiction over drugs cases, i.e., until our recent decision to make all RTCs as drugs courts is implemented with the appropriate administrative circular. It would be helpful to know the specifics on how judges without jurisdiction over drugs cases influence the drug trade in their localities.
Judge Antonio Reyes, RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, Benguet presides over the designated drugs court in that multi-sala court.
The Court would consider it important to know the source and basis of any allegation that specific judges are involved in the illegal drugs trade in line with its duty to exercise administrative supervision over all lower courts. The Court looks with alarm at the proliferation of drugs, in a consensus shared with you, Mr. President, that dangerous drugs have been destroying Filipino lives and families. We abhor its ability to even destroy public institutions, thus our proactive investigation of any report that judges and court personnel abet the drug trade. We are currently investigating a report on a judge who may be so involved. He is not on the above list.
However, Mr. President, a premature announcement of an informal investigation on allegations of involvement with the drug trade will have the unwarranted effect of rendering the judge veritably useless in discharging his adjudicative role. Thus this Court has been careful, all too aware that more often than not, a good reputation is the primary badge of credibility and the only legacy that many of our judges can leave behind. Too many of our judges have been assassinated, 26 since 1999, a large proportion of them reportedly at the behest of crime lords, more specifically, drug lords. Allow me to submit a separate update on this matter.
In order not to cause disruption to public service, we have administrative mechanisms in place to ensure that another judge take over the place of a suspended or disciplined judge. As it appears now, the announcement of the names of some judges is expected to cause problems with the scheduled hearings and conferences in their salas. With all due respect, Mr. President, we were caught unprepared by the announcement. It would matter greatly to our sense of constitutional order, if we were given the chance to administer the appropriate preventive measures without the complications of a premature public announcement.
Moreover, because of the extrajudicial killings, which you had spoken out against, perpetrated by persons and groups that remain unidentified, our judges may have been rendered vulnerable and veritable targets for any of those persons and groups who may consider judges as acceptable collateral damage in the “war on drugs.” Also, because we do not have the personnel to protect our judges, we have requested the Philippine National Police to authorize them to carry defensive firearms. We request that you reconsider your reported order that the judges you named, with the above clarification on who these are, continue to bear these licensed self-defense weapons, if any, until a proper investigation concludes that formal criminal charges should be brought against them.
As the sole entity charged with the discipline of judges, the Supreme Court decides when judges are excused from bench duty and report to it. We appreciate your zeal in helping us cleanse the ranks of the judiciary of misfits but we assure you, Mr. President, even an informal report from the President or his appropriate alter egos would be sufficient to spur us to action and conduct the investigation immediately without need of requiring them to report physically to any entity and cancel scheduled court activities.
To safeguard the role of the judges as the protector of constitutional rights, I would caution them very strongly against “surrendering” or making themselves physically accountable to any police officer in the absence of any duly-issued warrant of arrest that is pending.
Mr. President, the judiciary shares with you and the Filipino people a common desire to see a country that is rid of drugs, in the same manner that you share with the judiciary and the Filipino people a common desire to see a country that is governed by the rule of law.
Please accept my warmest regards and my assurance of continued fervent prayers for your success.
– Rappler.com
BORN OUT OF THE SWORN DUTY OF THE PRESIDENT ARTICLE 7 SECTION 5 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:chanrobles virtual law library
REFERENCE CASE SHOWING CJ SERENO LETTER AS MISPLACED COMMUNICATION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Kincaid and Perkins for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should take interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding, the facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the order of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of your Honor and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and interests of its inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not be administered in accordance with law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad conducts as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made against him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace, far from charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed making the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.
2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.
3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements were true and free from malice.
6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not identified and that the same was immaterial, which objection was partially sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which the attorney for the defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the accused. The records in question are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of the administrative proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this court to call in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can not explain for it was the prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Años" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos delegates.
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the American people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of the Organic Law — of the Constitution — of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note alsoYancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur. I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-General is entirely correct when he says that this case is substantially identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13 Phil. Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been abandoned by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so many words. (Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
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Sunday, August 7, 2016
Roque Files Bill Protecting Spratlys and establishing Spratlys Development Authority
Roque Files Bill Protecting Spratlys and establishing Spratlys Development Authority
OFFICE OF REP. HARRY L. ROQUE PRESS RELEASE 07 AUGUST 2016 REFERENCE: REP. HARRY L. ROQUE HARRY ROQUE FILES BILLS DECLARING SPRATLYS AS PROTECTED AREA, CREATING SPRATLYS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Kabayan Party-list Representative Harry L. Roque has filed two bills seeking to declare the Spratly Group of Islands a protected area under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act of 1992 and creating the Spratlys Development Authority. In his explanatory notes, Roque said the bills were “filed in order to strengthen the Philippines’ claim of sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Spratly group of islands and its maritime areas, a region that contains vast amounts of natural resources – including oil and gas and fisheries – vital to the growth and development of the Philippines.” “To prevent the further denigration of the marine and environmental resources within the island group, the State must establish the Spratlys as a protected area, granting it both the mantle of protection under Philippine laws and the Constitution, to allow the government to properly assess and administer the area, consistent with the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in the South China Sea Arbitration case,” he said. “To maximize the use and conservation of such resources, a development authority should be tasked to administer the area, following the success of the various conversion authorities under Republic Act 7227,” he added. The Spratly NIPAS bill seeks to declare the Spratlys as Spratly Islands Resource reserve, with the islands classified as a national park, and its peripheral areas as buffer zone. The Spratly Islands Conversion Authority (SICA), meanwhile, will have jurisdiction over the Spratlys and will be tasked to “adopt, prepare and implement a comprehensive and detailed development plan embodying a list of projects for a sound and balanced development consistent with ecological and environmental standards.” The SICA will also have the power to plan, program and undertake the readjustment, relocation, or resettlement of population within the Spratly group of islands as may be deemed necessary, in coordination with the appropriate government agencies and local government units. Roque filed the bills after the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippines the status of many features in the contested Spratly islands and Scarborough Shoal with both scientific and legal criteria, in relation to a resource-rich Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. |
32ND PERSUASIVE APPEAL_PETITION THAT AN ORDER BE ISSUED STRIKING OUT OF THE RANKING RECORD
PETITION THAT AN ORDER BE ISSUED REQUIRING SHELL TO STRIKE OUT ANTONIO BUENSUCESO’S RANKING RECORD FOR BEING RIGGED, WRONGFUL AND WHIMSICAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF ADMINISTRATIVE, DISCIPLINARY, CRIMINAL AND/OR CIVIL CASE WHEN APPLICABLE
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SYNDICATED ESTAFA
MY QUEST FOR SWINDLED
RETIREMENT PAY BY SHELL
 
SWINDLING ITO, SYNDICATED ESTAFA
HOT PURSUIT
DUTY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES
SHELL SWINDLING OF RETIREMENT PAY 5TH YEAR
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