Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the administrative matter that originated from the letters dated September 13, 16, 20, and 22, 2011 of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza regarding G.R. No. 178083 Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al.
For a full background of the matter, the antecedent developments are outlined below.
1. The July 22, 2008 Decision
On July 22, 2008, the Courts Third Division ruled to grant[1] the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), finding Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) guilty of illegal dismissal. The July 22, 2008 Decision was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago who was joined by the other four Members of the Third Division. The Third Division was then composed of:
1. Justice Ynares-Santiago,
2. Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez,
3. Justice Minita Chico-Nazario,
4. Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura, and
5. Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro (replacing Justice Ruben Reyes who inhibited himself from the case).
Justice Leonardo-De Castro was included to replace Justice Ruben Reyes who had inhibited himself from the case because he concurred in the Court of Appeals (CA) decision assailed by FASAP before the Court.[2] Then Associate Justice Renato Corona was originally designated to replace Justice Ruben Reyes, but he likewise inhibited himself from participation on June July 14, 2008 due to his previous efforts in settling the controversy when he was still in Malacaan. Under Administrative Circular (AC) No. 84-2007, one additional Member needed be drawn from the rest of the Court to replace the inhibiting Member.[3] In this manner, Justice Leonardo-De Castro came to participate in the July 22, 2008 Decision.
PAL subsequently filed its motion for reconsideration (MR) of the July 22, 2008 Decision. The motion was handled by the Special Third Division composed of:
1. Justice Ynares-Santiago,
2. Justice Chico-Nazario,
3. Justice Nachura,
4. Justice Diosdado Peralta (replacing Justice Austria-Martinez who retired on April 30, 2009), and
5. Justice Lucas Bersamin (replacing Justice Leonardo-De Castro who inhibited at the MR stage for personal reasons on July 28, 2009).
2. The October 2, 2009 Resolution
Justice Ynares-Santiago, as the ponente of the July 22, 2008 Decision, continued to act as the ponente of the case.[4]
The Special Third Division[5] denied the MR with finality on October 2, 2009.[6] The Court further declared that [n]o further pleadings will be entertained.[7] The other Members of the Special Third Division unanimously concurred with the denial of the motion.
To fully explain the movements in the membership of the division, the Special Third Division missed Justice Austria-Martinez (who was among those who signed the July 22, 2008 Decision) due to her intervening retirement on April 30, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro also did not participate in resolving the 1st MR, despite having voted on the July 22, 2008 Decision, because of her own subsequent inhibition on July 28, 2009.[8]
3. PALs 2nd MR
On November 3, 2009, PAL asked for leave of court to file (a) an MR of the October 2, 2009 Resolution, and (b) a 2nd MR of the July 22, 2008 Decision. Both rulings were anchored on the validity of PALs retrenchment program.
In view of the retirement of the ponente, Justice Ynares-Santiago (who retired on October 5, 2009), the Courts Raffle Committee[9] had to resolve the question of who would be the new ponente of the case.
Under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC (Rules on Who Shall Resolve Motions for Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the Divisions of the Court, effective April 1, 2000), if the ponente has retired, he/she shall be replaced by another Justice who shall be chosen by raffle from among the remaining Members of the Division:
2. If the ponente is no longer a member of the Court or is disqualified or has inhibited himself from acting on the motion, he shall be replaced by another Justice who shall be chosen by raffle from among the remaining members of the Division who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or resolution and who concurred therein. If only one member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or resolution remains, he shall be designated as the ponente.
However, on November 11, 2009, the case was raffled, not to a Member of the Third Division that issued the July 22, 2008 Decision or to a Member of the Special Third Division that rendered the October 2, 2009 Resolution, but to Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. who was then a Member of the newly-constituted regular Third Division.[10]
In raffling the case to Justice Velasco, the Raffle Committee considered the above-quoted rule inapplicable because of the express excepting qualification provided under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC that states:
[t]hese rules shall not apply to motions for reconsideration of decisions or resolutions already denied with finality. [underscoring ours]
Stated otherwise, when the original ponente of a case retires, motions filed after the case has been denied with finality may be resolved by any Member of the Court to whom the case shall be raffled, not necessarily by a Member of the same Division that decided or resolved the case.Presumably, the logic behind the rule is that no further change can be made involving the merits of the case, as judgment has reached finality and is thus irreversible, based on the Rules of Court provision that [n]o second MR of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.[11] (The October 2, 2009 Resolution denying PALs 1st MR further stated that [n]o further pleadings will be entertained.) Thus, the resolution of post-decisional matters in a case already declared final may be resolved by other Members of the Court to whom the case may be raffled after the retirement of the original ponente.
Given the denial of PALs 1st MR and the declaration of finality of the Courts July 22, 2008 Decision through the October 2, 2009 Resolution, the Raffle Committee found it unnecessary to create a special Third Division. Thus, it found nothing irregular in raffling the case toJustice Velasco (who did not take part in the deliberation of the Decision and the Resolution) of the reorganized Third Division for handling by a new regular division.
4. The acceptance of PALs 2nd MR
On January 20, 2010 (or while A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC was still in effect), the new regular Third Division, through Justice Velasco, granted PALs Motion for Leave to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 2 October 2009 and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration of Decision dated 22 July 2008. The Courts Third Division further required the respective parties to comment on PALs motion and FASAPs Urgent Appeal dated November 23, 2009. This grant, which opened both the Decision and the Resolution penned by Justice Ynares-Santiago for review, effectively opened the whole case for review on the merits.
The following were the Members of the Third Division that issued the January 20, 2010 Resolution:
1. Justice Antonio Carpio (vice Justice Corona who inhibited himself as of July 14, 2008),
2. Justice Velasco (ponente),
3. Justice Nachura,
4. Justice Peralta, and
5. Justice Bersamin.
Significantly, at the time leave of court was granted (which was effectively an acceptance for review of PALs 2nd MR), the prohibition against entertaining a 2nd MR under Section 2, Rule 52[12] (in relation with Section 4, Rule 56[13]) of the Rules of Court applied. This prohibition, however, had been subject to various existing Court decisions that entertained 2nd MRs in the higher interest of justice.[14] This liberalized policy was not formalized by the Court until the effectivity of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) on May 4, 2010.[15]
With the acceptance of PALs 2nd MR, the question that could have arisen (but was not asked then) was whether the general rule under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC (which was then still in effect) should have applied so that the case should have been transferred to the remaining Members of the Division that ruled on the merits of the case. In other words, with the re-opening of the case for review on the merits, the application of the excepting qualification under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC that the Raffle Committee cited lost its efficacy, as the rulings of the Court were no longer final for having been opened for further review.
A necessary implication is that either the Clerk of Court or the Raffle Committee should have advised Justice Velasco that his Division should refer the case back to raffle for referral of the case to the original Justices who participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution under the terms of the general rule under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC; the Justices who participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution were the best ones to consider the motion and to review their own rulings. This was the first major error that transpired in the case and one that the Clerk of Court failed to see.
Parenthetically, when PALs 2nd MR was filed and when it was subsequently accepted, Justices Nachura, Peralta, and Bersamin were the only remaining Members of the Special Third Division that rendered the October 2, 2009 Resolution. Of these three Justices, only Justice Nachura was a Member of the original Third Division that issued the main decision on July 22, 2008. The case should have gone to Justice Nachura or, at the very least, to the two other remaining Justices. The re-raffle of the FASAP case to Justice Nachura (or to Justices Peralta and Bersamin) would have been consistent with the constitutional rule that [c]ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon[.][16]
5. The Reorganization of the Court
In May 2010, three developments critical to the FASAP case transpired.
The first was the approval of the IRSC by the Court on May 4, 2010. The IRSC codified the procedural rules of the Court, heretofore existing under various separate and scattered resolutions. Its relevant terms took the place of A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC.
The second was the retirement of then Chief Justice Reynato Puno and the appointment as Chief Justice of then Associate Justice Corona.
The third was the reorganization of the divisions of the Court under Special Order No. 838 dated May 17, 2010. Justice Velasco was transferred from the Third Division to the First Division. Pursuant to the new IRSC, Justice Velasco brought with him the FASAP case so that the case went from the Third Division to the First Division:
RULE 2. THE OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 9. Effect of reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases. In the reorganization of the membership of Divisions, cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge shall be transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves, subject to the rule on the resolution of motions for reconsideration under Section 7 of this Rule. The Member-in-Charge is the Member given the responsibility of overseeing the progress and disposition of a case assigned by raffle.
Another significant development in the case came on January 17, 2011 (or under the new regime of the IRSC) when Justice Velasco, after acting on the FASAP case for almost one whole year, inhibited himself from participation due to a close relationship to a party, despite his previous action on the case. The pertinent provisions of the IRSC on the matter of inhibition state:
RULE 2.
THE OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen [from] among the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration [or] clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court.
x x x
RULE 8.
INHIBITION AND SUBSTITUTION OF MEMBERS OF THE COURT
SEC. 3. Effects of Inhibition. The consequences of an inhibition of a Member of the Court shall be governed by these rules:
(a) Whenever a Member-in-Charge of a case in a Division inhibits himself for a just and valid reason, the case shall be returned to the Raffle Committee for re-raffling among the Members of the other two Divisions of the Court. (IRSC, as amended by A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC dated August 3, 2010)[All emphasis supplied.]
The case was then referred to the Raffle Committee pursuant to Administrative Circular (AC) No. 84-2007, as stated in the Division Raffle Sheet. The pertinent provision of AC No. 84-2007 states:
2. Whenever the ponente, in the exercise of sound discretion, inhibits herself or himself from the case for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned in paragraph 1, a to f above, the case shall be returned to the Raffle Committee for re-raffling among the other Members of the same Divisionwith one additional Member from the other two Divisions. [underscoring and italics ours]
Reference to AC No. 84-2007, however, was erroneous. For one, the IRSC was already in effect when Justice Velasco inhibited himself from participation, and the IRSC had already superseded AC No. 84-2007. The prevailing IRSC, though, has an almost similar rule, with the difference that the IRSC speaks of the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge or of a Member of the Division other than the Member-in-Charge in its rule on inhibition, and did not use the ponente as its reference point. This seemingly trivial point carries a lot of significance, particularly in the context of the FASAP case.
Under the rule on inhibition found in Section 3, Rule 8 of the governing IRSC (as Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno found in her dissenting opinion), the inhibition called for the raffle to a Member of the two other divisions of the Court. Thus, Justice Sereno found the subsequent January 26, 2011 raffle of the case to Justice Brion to be legally correct. As discussed by the Division that issued the September 7, 2011 Resolution (the ruling Division), however, the application of the IRSC is not as simple as Justice Sereno views it to be. This matter is discussed at length below.
On June 21, 2011 (after the retirement of Justice Nachura on June 13, 2011), Chief Justice Corona issued Special Order No. 1025, again reorganizing the divisions of the Court. Justice Brion was transferred from the Third Division to the Second Division. Accordingly, the Third Division composed of Justice Velasco, Justice Peralta, Justice Bersamin, Justice Jose Mendoza, and Justice Sereno (who was included as additional Member) referred the FASAP case to the Second Division where Justice Brion belonged, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 2 of the IRSC.[17]
Justice Carpio (the Chair of the Second Division), after voting for the January 20, 2010 Resolution granting leave to PAL to file its 2nd MR, inhibited himself from the case on August 15, 2011. As stated in the Division Raffle Sheet of August 15, 2011, Justice Carpio recused himself from the case per advice of the office of the Member-in-Charge. Justice Peralta became the replacement for Justice Carpio, pursuant to Rule 8, Section 3 of the IRSC.
6. The September 7, 2011 Resolution and Atty. Estelito Mendozas letters
On September 7, 2011, the Court through its Second Division as then constituted resolved to deny with finality PALs 2nd MR through an unsigned resolution. The Second Division, as then constituted, was composed of:
1. Justice Brion (as Member-in-Charge and as Acting Chair, being the most senior Member),
2. Justice Peralta (replacing Justice Carpio who inhibited),
3. Justice Jose Perez,
4. Justice Bersamin (replacing Justice Sereno who was on leave[18]), and
5. Justice Mendoza (replacing Justice Bienvenido Reyes who was on leave[19]).
On September 13, 2011, the counsel for PAL, Atty. Mendoza, sent the first of a series of letters[20] addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. This letter noted that, of the Members of the Court who acted on the MR dated August 20, 2008 and who issued the Resolution of October 2, 2009, Justices Ynares-Santiago (ponente), Chico-Nazario, and Nachura had already retired from the Court, and the Third Division had issued a Resolution on the case dated January 20, 2010, acted upon by Justices Carpio, Velasco, Nachura, Peralta, and Bersamin. The letter then asked whether the Court had acted on the 2nd MR and, if so, which division whether regular or special acted and who were the chairperson and members. It asked, too, for the identity of the current ponente or justice-in-charge, and when and for what reason he or she was designated asponente. It further asked for a copy of the Resolution rendered on the 2nd MR, if an action had already been taken thereon.
On September 16, 2011, Atty. Mendoza sent his second letter, again addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting that copies of any Special Orders or similar issuances transferring the case to another division, and/or designating Members of the division which resolved its 2nd MR, in case a resolution had already been rendered by the Court and in the event that such resolution was issued by a different division.
The Court received Atty. Mendozas third letter, again addressed to the Clerk of Court, on September 20, 2011.[21] Atty. Mendoza stated that he received a copy of the September 7, 2011 Resolution issued by the Second Division, notwithstanding that all prior Court Resolutions he received regarding the case had been issued by the Third Division.[22] He reiterated his request in his two earlier letters to the Court, asking for the date and time when the Resolution was deliberated upon and a vote taken thereon, as well as the names of the Members of the Court who had participated in the deliberation and voted on the September 7, 2011 Resolution.
Atty. Mendoza sent his fourth and last letter dated September 22, 2011, also addressed to the Clerk of Court, suggesting that if some facts subject of my inquiries are not evident from the records of the case or are not within your knowledge, that you refer the inquiries to the Members of the Court who appear to have participated in the issuance of the Resolution of September 7, 2011, namely: Hon. Arturo D. Brion, Hon. Jose P. Perez, Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta, Hon. Lucas P. Bersamin, and Hon. Jose C. Mendoza.
On September 26, 2011, the Clerk of Court issued the Vidal-Anama[23] Memorandum to the Members of the Second Division in relation to the inquiries contained in the first and second letters of Atty. Mendoza dated September 13 and 20, 2011. Justice Brion also furnished the Members of the ruling Division a copy of the Vidal-Anama Memorandum.
The Vidal-Anama Memorandum explained the events that transpired and the actions taken, which resulted in the transfer of the case from its original ponente, Justice Ynares-Santiago, to Justice Velasco, and eventually to Justice Brion. Attached to the Memorandum were the legal and documentary bases for all the actions of the various raffle committees.[24] These included the decisions of the two raffle committees on the transfer of the ponencia from Justice Ynares-Santiago to Justice Velasco and finally to Justice Brion as a regular Second Division case.
On September 28, 2011, the Letters dated September 13 and 20, 2011 of Atty. Mendoza to Atty. Vidal (asking that his inquiry be referred to the relevant Division Members who took part on the September 7, 2011 Resolution) were NOTED by the regular Second Division. The Members of the ruling Division also met to consider the queries posed by Atty. Mendoza. Justice Brion met with the Members of the ruling Division (composed of Justices Brion, Peralta, Perez, Bersamin, and Mendoza), rather than with the regular Second Division (composed of Justices Carpio, Brion, Perez, and Sereno[25]), as the former were the active participants in the September 7, 2011 Resolution.
In these meetings, some of the Members of the ruling Division saw the problems pointed out above, some of which indicated that the ruling Division might have had no authority to rule on the case. Specifically, their discussions centered on the application of A.M. No. 99-8-09-SCfor the incidents that transpired prior to the effectivity of the IRSC, and on the conflicting rules under the IRSC Section 3, Rule 8 on the effects of inhibition and Section 7, Rule 2 on the resolution of MRs.
A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC indicated the general rule that the re-raffle shall be made among the other Members of the same Division who participated in rendering the decision or resolution and who concurred therein, which should now apply because the ruling on the case is no longer final after the case had been opened for review on the merits. In other words, after acceptance by the Third Division, through Justice Velasco, of the 2nd MR, there should have been a referral to raffle because the excepting qualification that the Clerk of Court cited no longer applied; what was being reviewed were the merits of the case and the review should be by the same Justices who had originally issued the original Decision and the subsequent Resolution, or by whoever of these Justices are still left in the Court, pursuant to the same A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC.
On the other hand, the raffle to Justice Brion was made by applying AC No. 84-2007 that had been superseded by Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC. Even the use of this IRSC provision, however, would not solve the problem, as its use still raised the question of the provision that should really apply in the resolution of the MR: should it be Section 3, Rule 8 on the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge, or Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC on the inhibition of the ponente when an MR of a decision and a signed resolution was filed. These two provisions are placed side-by-side in the table below for easier and clearer comparison, with emphasis on the more important words:
A comparison of these two provisions shows the semantic sources of the seeming conflict: Section 7, Rule 2 refers to a situation where the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself from acting on the case; while Section 3, Rule 8 generally refers to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge who does not need to be the writer of the decision or resolution under review.
Significantly, Section 7, Rule 2 expressly uses the word ponente (not Member-in-Charge) and refers to a specific situation where the ponente (or the writer of the Decision or the Resolution) is no longer with the Court or is otherwise unavailable to review the decision or resolution he or she wrote. Section 3, Rule 8, on the other hand, expressly uses the term Member-in-Charge and generally refers to his or her inhibition, without reference to the stage of the proceeding when the inhibition is made.
Under Section 7, Rule 2, the case should have been re-raffled and assigned to anyone of Justices Nachura (who did not retire until June 13, 2011), Peralta, or Bersamin, either (1) after the acceptance of the 2nd MR (because the original rulings were no longer final); or (2) after Justice Velascos inhibition because the same condition existed, i.e., the need for a review by the same Justices who rendered the decision or resolution. As previously mentioned, Justice Nachura participated in both the original Decision and the subsequent Resolution, and all three Justices were the remaining Members who voted on the October 2, 2009 Resolution. On the other hand, if Section 3, Rule 8 were to be solely applied after Justice Velascos inhibition, the Clerk of Court would be correct in her assessment and the raffle to Justice Brion, as a Member outside of Justice Velascos Division, was correct.
These were the legal considerations that largely confronted the ruling Division in late September 2011 when it deliberated on what to do with Atty. Mendozas letters.
The propriety of and grounds for the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution
Most unfortunately, the above unresolved questions were even further compounded in the course of the deliberations of the Members of the ruling Division when they were informed that the parties received the ruling on September 19, 2011, and this ruling would lapse to finality after the 15th day, or after October 4, 2011.
Thus, on September 30, 2011 (a Friday), the Members went to Chief Justice Corona and recommended, as a prudent move, that the September 7, 2011 Resolution be recalled at the very latest on October 4, 2011, and that the case be referred to the Court en banc for a ruling on the questions Atty. Mendoza asked. The consequence, of course, of a failure to recall their ruling was for that Resolution to lapse to finality. After finality, any recall for lack of jurisdiction of the ruling Division might not be understood by the parties and could lead to a charge of flip-flopping against the Court. The basis for the referral is Section 3(n), Rule 2 of the IRSC, which provides:
RULE 2.
OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 3. Court en banc matters and cases. The Court en banc shall act on the following matters and cases:
x x x x
(n) cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention[.]
Ruling positively, the Court en banc duly issued its disputed October 4, 2011 Resolution recalling the September 7, 2011 Resolution and ordering the re-raffle of the case to a new Member-in-Charge. Later in the day, the Court received PALs Motion to Vacate (the September 7, 2011 ruling) dated October 3, 2011. This was followed by FASAPs MR dated October 17, 2011 addressing the Court Resolution of October 4, 2011. The FASAP MR mainly invoked the violation of its right to due process as the recall arose from the Courts ex parte consideration of mere letters from one of the counsels of the parties.
As the narration in this Resolution shows, the Court acted on its own pursuant to its power to recall its own orders and resolutions before their finality. The October 4, 2011 Resolution was issued to determine the propriety of the September 7, 2011 Resolution given the facts that came to light after the ruling Divisions examination of the records. To point out the obvious, the recall was not a ruling on the merits and did not constitute the reversal of the substantive issues already decided upon by the Court in the FASAP case in its previously issued Decision (of July 22, 2008) and Resolution (of October 2, 2009). In short, the October 4, 2011 Resolution was not meant and was never intended to favor either party, but to simply remove any doubt about the validity of the ruling Divisions action on the case. The case, in the ruling Divisions view, could be brought to the Court en banc since it is one of sufficient importance; at the very least, it involves the interpretation of conflicting provisions of the IRSC with potential jurisdictional implications.
At the time the Members of the ruling Division went to the Chief Justice to recommend a recall, there was no clear indication of how they would definitively settle the unresolved legal questions among themselves. The only matter legally certain was the looming finality of the September 7, 2011 Resolution if it would not be immediately recalled by the Court en banc by October 4, 2011. No unanimity among the Members of the ruling Division could be gathered on the unresolved legal questions; thus, they concluded that the matter is best determined by the Court en banc as it potentially involved questions of jurisdiction and interpretation of conflicting provisions of the IRSC. To the extent of the recommended recall, the ruling Division was unanimous and the Members communicated this intent to the Chief Justice in clear and unequivocal terms.
Given this background, the Clerk of Court cannot and should not be faulted for her recommended position, as indeed there was a ruling in the 1st MR that declared the original ruling on the case final. Perhaps, she did not fully realize that the ruling on the 1st MR varied the terms of the original Decision of July 22, 2008; she could not have considered, too, that a subsequent 2nd MR would be accepted for the Courts further consideration of the case on the merits.
Upon acceptance of the 2nd MR by the Third Division through Justice Velasco, the Clerk of Court and the Raffle Committee, however, should have realized that Justice Velasco was not the proper Member-in-Charge of the case and another raffle should have been held to assign the case to a Justice who participated in the original Decision of July 22, 2008 or in the Resolution of October 2, 2009. This realization, unfortunately, did not dawn on the Clerk of Court.
For practically the same reasons, the Third (or Velasco) Division, with Justice Velasco as Member-in-Charge, cannot and should not be faulted for accepting the 2nd MR; the variance introduced by the ruling on the 1st MR and the higher interest of justice (in light alone of the gigantic amount involved) appeared to justify further consideration of the case. Recall that at that time, the IRSC was not yet in existence and a specific rule under the IRSC on the handling of 2nd MRs was yet to be formulated, separately from the existing jurisprudential rulings. Justice Velasco, though, could not have held on to the case after its merits were opened for new consideration, as he was not the writer of the assailed Decision and Resolution, nor was he a Member of the Division that acted on the case. Under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC, the rightful ponente should be a remaining Member of the Division that rendered the decision or resolution.
With Justice Velascos subsequent inhibition, a legal reason that the involved officials and Justices should have again recognized is the rationale of the rule on replacements when an inhibition or retirement intervenes. Since the inhibiting Justice was only the Member-in-Charge and was technically merely a nominal ponente[26] in so far as the case is concerned (because he was not the writer of the Decision and Resolution under consideration), the raffle should have been confined among the Members who actually participated in ruling on the merits of the original Decision or of the subsequent Resolution. At that point, only Justices Peralta and Bersamin were left because all the other Members of the original ruling groups had retired. Since under the IRSC[27] and Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, the case should have been decided by the Members who actually took part in the deliberations, the ruling on the merits made by the ruling Division on September 7, 2011 was effectively void and should appropriately be recalled.
To summarize all the developments that brought about the present dispute expressed in a format that can more readily be appreciated in terms of the Court en bancs ruling to recall the September 7, 2011 ruling the FASAP case, as it developed, was attended by special and unusual circumstances that saw:
(a) the confluence of the successive retirement of three Justices (in a Division of five Justices) who actually participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution;
(b) the change in the governing rules from the A.M.s to the IRSC regime which transpired during the pendency of the case;
(c) the occurrence of a series of inhibitions in the course of the case (Justices Ruben Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Corona, Velasco, and Carpio), and the absences of Justices Sereno and Reyes at the critical time, requiring their replacement; notably, Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro are the four most senior Members of the Court;
(d) the three re-organizations of the divisions, which all took place during the pendency of the case, necessitating the transfer of the case from the Third Division, to the First, then to the Second Division;
(e) the unusual timing of Atty. Mendozas letters, made after the ruling Division had issued its Resolution of September 7, 2011, but before the parties received their copies of the said Resolution; and
(f) finally, the time constraint that intervened, brought about by the parties receipt on September 19, 2011 of the Special Divisions Resolution of September 7, 2011, and the consequent running of the period for finality computed from this latter date; and the Resolution would have lapsed to finality after October 4, 2011, had it not been recalled by that date.
All these developments, in no small measure, contributed in their own peculiar way to the confusing situations that attended the September 7, 2011 Resolution, resulting in the recall of this Resolution by the Court en banc.
On deeper consideration, the majority now firmly holds the view that Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC should have prevailed in considering the raffle and assignment of cases after the 2nd MR was accepted, as advocated by some Members within the ruling Division, as against the general rule on inhibition under Section 3, Rule 8. The underlying constitutional reason, of course, is the requirement of Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution already referred to above.[28]
The general rule on statutory interpretation is that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized,[29] as a statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.[30] Only after the failure at this attempt at reconciliation should one provision be considered the applicable provision as against the other.[31]
Applying these rules by reconciling the two provisions under consideration, Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC should be read as the general rule applicable to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge. This general rule should, however, yield where the inhibition occurs at the late stage of the case when a decision or signed resolution is assailed through an MR. At that point, when the situation calls for the review of the merits of the decision or the signed resolution made by a ponente (or writer of the assailed ruling), Section 3, Rule 8 no longer applies and must yield to Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC which contemplates a situation when the ponente is no longer available, and calls for the referral of the case for raffle among the remaining Members of the Division who acted on the decision or on the signed resolution. This latter provision should rightly apply as it gives those who intimately know the facts and merits of the case, through their previous participation and deliberations, the chance to take a look at the decision or resolution produced with their participation.
To reiterate, Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC is the general rule on inhibition, but it must yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC where the obtaining situation is for the review on the merits of an already issued decision or resolution and the ponente or writer is no longer available to act on the matter. On this basis, the ponente, on the merits of the case on review, should be chosen from the remaining participating Justices, namely, Justices Peralta and Bersamin.
A final point that needs to be fully clarified at this juncture, in light of the allegations of the Dissent is the role of the Chief Justice in the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution. As can be seen from the above narration, the Chief Justice acted only on the recommendation of the ruling Division, since he had inhibited himself from participation in the case long before. The confusion on this matter could have been brought about by the Chief Justices role as the Presiding Officer of the Court en banc (particularly in its meeting of October 4, 2011), and the fact that the four most senior Justices of the Court (namely, Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro) inhibited from participating in the case. In the absence of any clear personal malicious participation, it is neither correct nor proper to hold the Chief Justice personally accountable for the collegial ruling of the Court en banc.
Another disturbing allegation in the Dissent is the implication of the alleged silence of, or lack of objection from, the Members of the ruling Division during the October 4, 2011 deliberations, citing for this purpose the internal en banc deliberations. The lack of a very active role in the arguments can only be attributable to the Members of the ruling Divisions unanimous agreement to recall their ruling immediately; to their desire to have the intricate issues ventilated before the Court en banc; to the looming finality of their Divisions ruling if this ruling would not be recalled; and to their firm resolve to avoid any occasion for future flip-flopping by the Court. To be sure, it was not due to any conspiracy to reverse their ruling to affirm the previous Court rulings already made in favor of FASAP; the Divisions response was simply dictated by the legal uncertainties that existed and the deep division among them on the proper reaction to Atty. Mendozas letters.
Of the above-cited reasons, a major influencing factor, of course, was the time constraint the Members of the ruling Division met with the Chief Justice on September 30, 2011, the Friday before October 4, 2011 (the date of the closest Court en banc meeting, as well as the deadline for the finality of the September 7, 2011 Resolution). They impressed upon the Chief Justice the urgent need to recall their September 7, 2011 Resolution under the risk of being accused of a flip-flop if the Court en banc would later decide to override its ruling.
As a final word, if no detailed reference to internal Court deliberations is made in this Resolution, the omission is intentional in view of the prohibition against the public disclosure of the internal proceedings of the Court during its deliberations. The present administrative matter, despite its pendency, is being ventilated in the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona before the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court, and any disclosure in this Resolution could mean the disclosure of the Courts internal deliberations to outside parties, contrary to the clear terms of the Court en banc Resolution of February 14, 2012 on the attendance of witnesses from this Court and the production of Court records.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution of the ruling Division was a proper and legal move to make under the applicable laws and rules, and the indisputably unusual developments and circumstances of the case.
Between Section 3, Article 8 and Section 7, Rule 2, both of the IRSC, the former is the general provision on a Member-in-Charges inhibition, but it should yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2 in a situation where the review of an issued decision or signed resolution is called for and the ponente or writer of these rulings is no longer available to act. Section 7, Rule 2 exactly contemplates this situation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby confirm that the Court en banc has assumed jurisdiction over the resolution of the merits of the motions for reconsideration of Philippine Airlines, Inc., addressing our July 22, 2008 Decision and October 2, 2009 Resolution; and that the September 7, 2011 ruling of the Second Division has been effectively recalled. This case should now be raffled either to Justice Lucas P. Bersamin or Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (the remaining Members of the Special Third Division that originally ruled on the merits of the case) as Member-in-Charge in resolving the merits of these motions.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc.s Motion to Vacate dated October 3, 2011, but received by this Court after a recall had been made, has thereby been rendered moot and academic.
The Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines Motion for Reconsideration of October 17, 2011 is hereby denied; the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution was made by the Court on its own before the rulings finality pursuant to the Courts power of control over its orders and resolutions. Thus, no due process issue ever arose.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
[1] The dispositive portion of the July 22, 2008 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87956 dated August 23, 2006, which affirmed the Decision of the NLRC setting aside the Labor Arbiter's findings of illegal retrenchment and its Resolution of May 29, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1. FINDING respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. GUILTY of illegal dismissal;
2. ORDERING Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to reinstate the cabin crew personnel who were covered by the retrenchment and demotion scheme of June 15, 1998 made effective on July 15, 1998, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to pay them full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other monetary benefits computed from the time of their separation up to the time of their actual reinstatement, provided that with respect to those who had received their respective separation pay, the amounts of payments shall be deducted from their backwages. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible because the positions previously held no longer exist, respondent Corporation shall pay backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one (1) month pay for every year of service;
3. ORDERING Philippine Airlines, Inc. to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
Costs against respondent PAL.
[2] Justice Ruben Reyes inhibited from the case as of July 14, 2008, per Division Raffle Sheet of the same date.
[3] AC No. 84-2007 states:
4. A Member of a Division, who is not the ponente in the Division, shall recuse herself or himself from a case if she or he participated in the decision of the case in the lower court. The case shall be decided by the four remaining Members and one additional Member from the other two Divisions chosen by raffle.
[4] Paragraph 1 of Administrative Matter No. 99-8-09-SC states:
RULES ON WHO SHALL RESOLVE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION IN CASES ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISIONS OF THE COURT.
The following supplemental rules on who shall take part in resolving motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions promulgated by Divisions are hereby adopted:
1. Motions for reconsideration of a decision or of a signed resolution shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other members of the Division, whether special or regular, who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution sought to be reconsidered, irrespective of whether or not such members are already in other divisions at the time the motion for reconsideration is filed or acted upon; for this purpose, they shall be deemed constituted as a special division of the division to which the ponente belonged at the time of promulgation of the decision or the signed resolution. [Emphasis ours.]
[5] Now a special division because of the permanent change of membership due to the intervening retirement of Justice Austria-Martinez and the inhibition of Justice Leonardo-De Castro.
[6] The dispositive portion of the October 2, 2009 Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. The assailed Decision dated July 22, 2008 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is reduced to
No further pleadings will be entertained.
SO ORDERED. [Id. at 506-507.]
[7] Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 178083, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 473, 507.
[8] Per Division Raffle Sheet of July 28, 2009.
[9] The Raffle Committee was then composed of Justice Corona, Justice Chico-Nazario, and Justice Velasco.
[10] The Third Division had a new membership because of the re-organization of the divisions that came after the retirement of Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, the old Third Division under Justice Ynares-Santiago had a different membership from the new Third Division, of which Justice Velasco was a Member.
The other new Third Division Members included Justices Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Peralta. Justice Corona, however, had already inhibited himself from the case on July 14, 2008 due to his previous efforts in settling the case when he was still in Malacaan and was thus replaced by Justice Carpio. (Division Raffle Sheet of November 11, 2009)
[11] Rule 52, Section 2.
[12] Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration.No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
[13] Section 4. Procedure.The appeal shall be governed by and disposed of in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, Rules 45, 48, Sections 1, 2, and 5 to 11 of Rule 51, 52 and this Rule.
[14] See Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 628, citing Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 324 Phil. 483, 489 (1996).
[15] Rule 15, Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration in the higher interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
[16] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4(3).
[17] Section 9. Effect of reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases. In the reorganization of the membership of Divisions, cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge shall be transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves, subject to the rule on the resolution of motions for reconsideration under Section 7 of this Rule. The Member-in-Charge is the Member given the responsibility of overseeing the progress and disposition of a case assigned by raffle.
[18] Special Order No. 1074-A dated September 6, 2011.
[19] Special Order No. 1066 dated August 23, 2011.
[20] The four letters were dated September 13, 16, 20, and 22, 2011.
[21] Atty. Mendozas Letter dated September 20, 2011; rollo, vol. 2, pp. 3577-3578.
[22] Per record, the parties both received the September 7, 2011 Resolution on September 19, 2011. This started the running of the period for the finality of the Resolution, which would have ended on October 4, 2011.
[23] Referring to Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra Vidal (Clerk of Court, En Banc) and Atty. Felipa Anama (Deputy Clerk of Court, En Banc).
[24] Included in the Vidal-Anama Memorandum were the following: Raffle Report dated June 20, 2007, Raffle Report dated July 14, 2008, Raffle Report dated July 28, 2008, Raffle Report dated September 28, 2009, Raffle Report dated November 11, 2009, Raffle Report dated January 26, 2011, Raffle Report dated August 15, 2011, Resolution dated February 15, 2009 in A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC, Special Order No. 838, Special Order No. 1025, Special Order No. 1066 and Special Order No. 1074-A.
[25] Per Special Order No. 1025 dated June 21, 2011.
[26] Used merely as a convenient term for want of a better description.
[27] Specifically, Rule 2, Section 7, quoted above.
[28] Supra, at page 9.
[29] See Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. v. Hon. Ponferrada, 375 Phil. 901 (1999).
[30] See National Tobacco Administration v. COA, 370 Phil. 793 (1999).
[31] See Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 466.
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Monday, October 10, 2016
PAL's 2ND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GRANTED BY SC_In Re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
PAL VS. PALEA_G.R. No. 85985 August 13, 1993
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85985 August 13, 1993
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ISABEL P. ORTIGUERRA and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents.
Solon Garcia for petitioner.
Adolpho M. Guerzon for respondent PALEA.
MELO, J.:
In the instant petition for certiorari, the Court is presented the issue of whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees.
On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein.
Thus, on August 20, 1985, the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice (Case No. NCR-7-2051-85) with the following remarks: "ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL's Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by Management" (Rollo, p. 41). In its position paper, PALEA contended that PAL, by its unilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article 253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages (pp. 7-14, Record.)
PAL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code. Assailing the complaint as unsupported by evidence, PAL maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code cited by PALEA reffered to the requirements for negotiating a CBA which was inapplicable as indeed the current CBA had been negotiated.
In its reply to PAL's position paper, PALEA maintained that Article 249 (E) of the Labor Code was violated when PAL unilaterally implemented the Code, and cited provisions of Articles IV and I of Chapter II of the Code as defective for, respectively, running counter to the construction of penal laws and making punishable any offense within PAL's contemplation. These provisions are the following:
Sec. 2. Non-exclusivity. — This Code does not contain the entirety of the rules and regulations of the company. Every employee is bound to comply with all applicable rules, regulations, policies, procedures and standards, including standards of quality, productivity and behaviour, as issued and promulgated by the company through its duly authorized officials. Any violations thereof shall be punishable with a penalty to be determined by the gravity and/or frequency of the offense.
Sec. 7. Cumulative Record. — An employee's record of offenses shall be cumulative. The penalty for an offense shall be determined on the basis of his past record of offenses of any nature or the absence thereof. The more habitual an offender has been, the greater shall be the penalty for the latest offense. Thus, an employee may be dismissed if the number of his past offenses warrants such penalty in the judgment of management even if each offense considered separately may not warrant dismissal. Habitual offenders or recidivists have no place in PAL. On the other hand, due regard shall be given to the length of time between commission of individual offenses to determine whether the employee's conduct may indicate occasional lapses (which may nevertheless require sterner disciplinary action) or a pattern of incorrigibility.
Labor Arbiter Isabel P. Ortiguerra handling the case called the parties to a conference but they failed to appear at the scheduled date. Interpreting such failure as a waiver of the parties' right to present evidence, the labor arbiter considered the case submitted for decision. On November 7, 1986, a decision was rendered finding no bad faith on the part of PAL in adopting the Code and ruling that no unfair labor practice had been committed. However, the arbiter held that PAL was "not totally fault free" considering that while the issuance of rules and regulations governing the conduct of employees is a "legitimate management prerogative" such rules and regulations must meet the test of "reasonableness, propriety and fairness." She found Section 1 of the Code aforequoted as "an all embracing and all encompassing provision that makes punishable any offense one can think of in the company"; while Section 7, likewise quoted above, is "objectionable for it violates the rule against double jeopardy thereby ushering in two or more punishment for the same misdemeanor." (pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
The labor arbiter also found that PAL "failed to prove that the new Code was amply circulated." Noting that PAL's assertion that it had furnished all its employees copies of the Code is unsupported by documentary evidence, she stated that such "failure" on the part of PAL resulted in the imposition of penalties on employees who thought all the while that the 1966 Code was still being followed. Thus, the arbiter concluded that "(t)he phrase ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance . . . finds application only after it has been conclusively shown that the law was circulated to all the parties concerned and efforts to disseminate information regarding the new law have been exerted. (p. 39, Rollo.) She thereupon disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent PAL is hereby ordered as follows:
1. Furnish all employees with the new Code of Discipline;
2. Reconsider the cases of employees meted with penalties under the New Code of Discipline and remand the same for further hearing; and
3. Discuss with PALEA the objectionable provisions specifically tackled in the body of the decision.
All other claims of the complainant union (is) [are] hereby, dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (p. 40, Rollo.)
PAL appealed to the NLRC. On August 19, 1988, the NLRC through Commissioner Encarnacion, with Presiding Commissioner Bonto-Perez and Commissioner Maglaya concurring, found no evidence of unfair labor practice committed by PAL and affirmed the dismissal of PALEA's charge. Nonetheless, the NLRC made the following observations:
Indeed, failure of management to discuss the provisions of a contemplated code of discipline which shall govern the conduct of its employees would result in the erosion and deterioration of an otherwise harmonious and smooth relationship between them as did happen in the instant case. There is no dispute that adoption of rules of conduct or discipline is a prerogative of management and is imperative and essential if an industry, has to survive in a competitive world. But labor climate has progressed, too. In the Philippine scene, at no time in our contemporary history is the need for a cooperative, supportive and smooth relationship between labor and management more keenly felt if we are to survive economically. Management can no longer exclude labor in the deliberation and adoption of rules and regulations that will affect them.
The complainant union in this case has the right to feel isolated in the adoption of the New Code of Discipline. The Code of Discipline involves security of tenure and loss of employment — a property right! It is time that management realizes that to attain effectiveness in its conduct rules, there should be candidness and openness by Management and participation by the union, representing its members. In fact, our Constitution has recognized the principle of "shared responsibility" between employers and workers and has likewise recognized the right of workers to participate in "policy and decision-making process affecting their rights . . ." The latter provision was interpreted by the Constitutional Commissioners to mean participation in "management"' (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II).
In a sense, participation by the union in the adoption of the code if conduct could have accelerated and enhanced their feelings of belonging and would have resulted in cooperation rather than resistance to the Code. In fact, labor-management cooperation is now "the thing." (pp. 3-4, NLRC Decision ff. p. 149, Original Record.)
Respondent Commission thereupon disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we modify the appealed decision in the sense that the New Code of Discipline should be reviewed and discussed with complainant union, particularly the disputed provisions [.] (T)hereafter, respondent is directed to furnish each employee with a copy of the appealed Code of Discipline. The pending cases adverted to in the appealed decision if still in the arbitral level, should be reconsidered by the respondent Philippine Air Lines. Other dispositions of the Labor Arbiter are sustained.
SO ORDERED. (p. 5, NLRC Decision.)
PAL then filed the instant petition for certiorari charging public respondents with grave abuse of discretion in: (a) directing PAL "to share its management prerogative of formulating a Code of Discipline"; (b) engaging in quasi-judicial legislation in ordering PAL to share said prerogative with the union; (c) deciding beyond the issue of unfair labor practice, and (d) requiring PAL to reconsider pending cases still in the arbitral level (p. 7, Petition; p. 8, Rollo.)
As stated above, the Principal issue submitted for resolution in the instant petition is whether management may be compelled to share with the union or its employees its prerogative of formulating a code of discipline.
PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor between employer and employee.
Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting the rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]) it was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion.
In San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) vs. Ople (170 SCRA 25 [1989]), we upheld the company's right to implement a new system of distributing its products, but gave the following caveat:
So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
(at p. 28.)
All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play and justice (University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758 [1990]). Moreover, as enunciated in Abbott Laboratories (Phil.), vs. NLRC (154 713 [1987]), it must be duly established that the prerogative being invoked is clearly a managerial one.
A close scrutiny of the objectionable provisions of the Code reveals that they are not purely business-oriented nor do they concern the management aspect of the business of the company as in the San Miguel case. The provisions of the Code clearly have repercusions on the employee's right to security of tenure. The implementation of the provisions may result in the deprivation of an employee's means of livelihood which, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, is a property right (Callanta, vs Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268 [1986]). In view of these aspects of the case which border on infringement of constitutional rights, we must uphold the constitutional requirements for the protection of labor and the promotion of social justice, for these factors, according to Justice Isagani Cruz, tilt "the scales of justice when there is doubt, in favor of the worker" (Employees Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991] 635).
Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes action. PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the Code. Public respondents found to the contrary, which finding, to say the least is entitled to great respect.
PAL posits the view that by signing the 1989-1991 collective bargaining agreement, on June 27, 1990, PALEA in effect, recognized PAL's "exclusive right to make and enforce company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management without having to discuss the same with PALEA and much less, obtain the latter'sconformity thereto" (pp. 11-12, Petitioner's Memorandum; pp 180-181, Rollo.) Petitioner's view is based on the following provision of the agreement:
The Association recognizes the right of the Company to determine matters of management it policy and Company operations and to direct its manpower. Management of the Company includes the right to organize, plan, direct and control operations, to hire, assign employees to work, transfer employees from one department, to another, to promote, demote, discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause; to lay-off employees for valid and legal causes, to introduce new or improved methods or facilities or to change existing methods or facilities and the right to make and enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management.
The exercise by management of its prerogative shall be done in a just reasonable, humane and/or lawful manner.
Such provision in the collective bargaining agreement may not be interpreted as cession of employees' rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto. And one such mater is the formulation of a code of discipline.
Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the labor Code (P.D. 442) was amended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already declared a policy of the State, "(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations . . . as employees." This was, of course, amplified by Republic Act No 6715 when it decreed the "participation of workers in decision and policy making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare." PAL's position that it cannot be saddled with the "obligation" of sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been enacted (Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot thus be sustained. While such "obligation" was not yet founded in law when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial moves affecting employees' rights.
Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering the nature of its business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, its being a local monopoly in the business demands the most stringent of measures to attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account, of their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the questioned decision AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
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PALEA AND PALSA WIN CASE VS. PAL _REFERENCE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
G.R. No. L-31341 March 31, 1976
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION (PALSA), petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE AIR INES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. L-31341-43 March 31, 1976
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo & Ongsiako for Philippines Air lines, Inc.
Laquihon & Legayada for Philippine Air Lines Supervisors' Association (PALEA).
MAKASIAR, J.:
Before US are consolidated petitions to review the Court of industrial Relations en banc resolution dated October 9, 1969 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA.
In G.R. No. L-31341 (PALEA vs. PAL), petitioners question the date of effectivity of the adjudicated pay differentials due to the monthly-salaried employees of Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
In G.R. No. L-31343 (PAL vs. PALEA), petitioner assails the reversal by the Court of Industrial Relations of its earlier resolution on the method employed by the Philippine Air Lines in computing the basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly salaried employees.
On February 14, 1963, the Philippine Air Lines Employees' Association (PALEA) and the Philippine Air Lines Supervisors' Association (PALSA) — petitioners in G.R. No. L-31341 and respondents in G.R. No. 31343 — commenced an action against the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) in the Court of Industrial Relations, praying that PAL be ordered to revise its method of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly salaried employees, and necessarily, to pay them their accrued sala differentials.
Sought to be revised is PAL's formula in computing wages of its employees:
Monthly salary x 12 365 (No. of calendar = x (Basic dailr rate) days in a year)
x 8 = Basic hourly rate
The unions would like PAL to modify the above formula in this wise:
Monthly salary x 12 No. of actual working = x (Basic daily rate) days
x 8 = Basic hourly rate
On May 23, 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista, issued an order denying the unions' prayer for a modified wage formula. Pertinent portion of the order reads:
On the issue of rate of pay, PALSA and PALEA seek to change the long standing method in PAL of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of monthly salaried employees for the purpose of determining overtime pay, Sunday and legal holiday premium pay, night differential pay, vacation and sick leave pay, to wit, the monthly salary multiplied by 12 and dividing the product thereof by 365 and then the quotient by 8. PALEA and PALSA claim that the method of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of monthly salaried employees of PAL prior to the implementation of the 40-hour week schedule in PAL should be by dividing the monthly salary by 26 working days, and after the 40-hour week schedule, by dividing the monthly salary by 20 working days, and then dividing the quotient thereof in each case by 8. From the records, however, it appears that for may years since 1952, and even previously, PAL has been consistently and regularly determining the basic and hourly rates of monthly salaried employees by multiplying the monthly salary by 12 momths and dividing the product by 365 days to arive at the basic daily rate, and dividing the quotient by 8 to compute the basic hourly rate. There has been no attempt to revise this formula notwithstanding the various negotiations PAL and with the unions ever since its operations, and it was only on July 18, 1962, when PALSA, for the first time, proposed that it be changed in accordance with what is now alleged in the petition. This, however, was a mere proposal by PALSA for the adoption of a new formula; it was not a demand for the application of a formula claimed to be correct under the law. Under this circumstance, PALSA and PALEA are estopped from questioning the correctness and propriety of PAL's method of determining the basic hourly and daily rate of pay of its monthly salaried personnel, and considering the long period of time that elapsed before they brought their petition, are barred from insisting or demanding a different rate of pay formula.
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the foregoing, the Court, therefore, declares PAL's method of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly salaried employees as legal and proper, and denies the petition of PALSA and PALEA.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 47-48, 49, rec. G.R. No. L-31343).
On May 30, 1964, complaining unions promptly moved for the reconsideration of the above-sais order (p. 51, rec. G.R. No. L-31343).
On June 9, 1964, the unions filed their memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration alleging that the questioned order is (a) contrary to law, and (b) contrary to evidence adduced during the trial (p. 53, ree G.R. No. L-31343).
The unions attributed error to PAL's wage formula, particularly in the use of 365 days as divisor. The unions contended that the use of 365 days as divisor would necessarily include off-days which, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreements entered into between the parties, were not paid days. This is so since for work done on an off-day, an employee was paid 100% plus 25%, or 100% plus 37-½ of his regular working hour rate.
On the issue of prescription, the unions pointed out:
With respect to the period of prescription, it is clear that since the claim arises from the written contracts or collective bargaining agreements between the petitioner unions and the PAL, the action thereon prescribes in ten years from the time the right of action accrues, in accordance with Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. .... (p. 68, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
On June 26, 1964, the Philippine Air Lines answered point by point the unions' memorandum, in a prompt reply.
On October 9, 1969, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, ordered the reversal of its decision dated May 34, 1964 and sustained the unions' method of age computation.
The industrial court, however, ordered the computation of pay differentials in accordance with the sustained method of computation effective only July 1, 1957.
Said the Court of Industrial Relations in this regard:
... In this connection, however, it will be noted as previously stated, that this case was considered as an incident of Case No. 39-IPA, in which the issues involved were related to the respondent PAL of the 40-Hour Week Law (Rep. Act 1880) from the date of its effectivity July 1, 1957. ...
This Cout therefore belives that in justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, the aforesaid pay differentials due to the employees involved herein by the application of the correct methods of computation of the rate of pay should be paid by the respondent also beginning July 1, 1957 (p. 117, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
From the above resolution, both parties appealed to this COURT. The Philippine Air Lines filed its appeal petition on December 13, 1969, while PALEA filed its petition for review on certiorari on January 3, 1970.
I
For easy comprehension, WE start with the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. versus Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, Philippine Air Lines Supervisors Association, and the Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-31343.
In this appeal PAL emphasizes three assignments of error, to wit:
1. RESPONDENT CIR ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE METHOD OF COMPUTATION USED BY PAL IN DETERMINING TIIE BASIC DAILY OR HOURLY RATE OF ITS MONTLY SALARIED EMPLOYEES WHICH IS:
MONTHLY SALARY x 1 365 (NO. OF CALENDAR DAYS IN YEAR) = x (BASIC DAILY RATE)
x 8 = BASIC HOURLY RATE 8
IS NOT CORRECT, CONSIDERING THAT PAL, A PUBLIC UTILITY WHERE THERE IS WORK EVERYDAY OF THE WEEK FOR MANY YEARS EVEN BEFORE REPUBLIC ACT 602 AND WITH THE CONSENT AND APPROVAL OF THE EMPLOYEES, CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 19 OF REPUBLIC ACT 602 PROHIBITING REDUCTION OF WAGES FOR OFF DAYS-WHICH WAS SUSTAINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT CO., INC. VS. JOSE B. LINGAD, G.R. NO. L- 26406, OCTOBER 31, 1969 — HAS BEEN TREATING OFFSITE DAYS, 11 AS SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS, COMPANY OBSERVED HOLIDAYS OR ANY OTHER DESIGNATED HOLIDAYS AS PAID DAYS.
2. RESPONDENT CIR ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING. THAT RESPONDENT UNIONS, BY THEIR LONG PERIOD OF CONSENT, ACQUIESCENCE, INACTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS THEREUNDER, ARE ESTOPPED AND BARRED FROM CLAIMING THAT PAL'S FORMULA FOR DETERMINING THE BASIC DAILY AND HOURLY RATE OF PAY IS INCORRECT.
3. RESPONDENT CIR ERED AND ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN SENTENCING PAL TO PAY DIFFERENTIALS FOR OVERTIME WORK, NIGHTWORK, HOLIDAY AND SUNDAY PAY FROM JULY 1, 1957 CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE THREE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED IN SECTION 7-a OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 444, AS AMENDED, THE EIGHT-HOUR LABOR LAW, RESPONDENT UNIONS, ASSUMING THEY HAD ANY CAUSE OF ACTION, COULD RECOVER ONLY FROM FEBRUARY 14, 1960 UP TO THE PRESENT, SINCE RESPONDENT UNIONS FILED THEIR ACTION ONLY ON FEBRUARY 14, 1963.
A
PAL's maiden argument has a strong tendency to mislead. In an effort to emphasize that off-days are paid and therefore should be reckoned with in determing the divisor for computing daily and hourly rate, PAL leans heavily on what it considers as additional payment of 125% or 137 ½%, as the case may be, of an employee's basic hourly rate, given to a worker who worked on his off-days. PAL would like us to believe that the word "Additional" all but accentuates the existence of a regular basic rate; otherwise, the 125% or 137½% shall be in addition to what?
The industrial court, however, had this to say:
Moreover, it will be noted that before September 4, 1961, a monthly salaried employee of PAL had to work 304 days only in a year,a nd after said date, he had to work only 258 days in ayear, to be entitled to his equivalent yearly salary. When he worked on his off-day, he was paid accordingly (125% or 137%), indicating that his off-days were not with pay. It seems illogical for said employe to be paid 125% or 137 ½% of his basic daily rate, if such off-days are already wtih pay, as indicated by the company (p. 107, rec., G.R. No. L-31343, emphasis supplied).
WE agree.
There should hardly be any doubt that off-days are not paid days, Precisely, off-days are rest days for the worker. He is not required to work on such days. This finds support not only in the basic principle in labor that the basis of remuneration or compensation is actual service rendered, but in the ever pervading labor spirit aimed at humanizing the conditions of hie working man.
Since during his off-days an employee is not compelled to work he cannot, conversely, demand for his corresponding pay. If, however, a worker works on his off-day, our welfare laws duly reward him with a premium higher than what he would receive when he works on his regular working day.
Such being the case, the divisor in computing an employee's basic daily rate should be the actual working days in a yar The number of off-days are not to be counted precisely because on such off-days, an employee is not required to work.
Simple common sense dictates that should an employee opt not to work — which he can legally do — on an off-day, and for such he gets no pay, he would be unduly robbed of a portion of his legitimate pay if and when in computing his basic daily and hourly rate, such off-day is deemed subsumed by the divisor. For it is elementary in the fundamental process of division that with a constant dividend, the bigger your divisor is, the smaller our quotient will be.
It bears emphasis that OUR view above constitutes the rationale behind the landmark ruling, surprisingly, by the same trial Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of Industrial Relations, in National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, et al., (G.R. No. L-18938, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766, 793-794), to which decision WE gave OUR affirmance.
PAL maintains that the NAWASA doctrine should not apply to a public utility like PAL which, from the nature of its operations, requires a whole-year-round, uninterrupted work by personnel. What PAL apparently forgets is that just like it, NAWASA is also a public utility which likewise requires its workers to work the whole year round. Moreover, the NAWASA is a government-owned corporation — to which PAL is akin, it being a government-controlled corporation.
As will later be stated herein, PAL inked with the representative unions of the employees collective bargaining agreements wherein it bound itself to duly compensate employer working on their off-days. The same situation obtained in the NAWASA case, wherein WE held:
And in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the NAWASA and respondent unions it was agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed by the employees and laborers prior to its effectivity shall remain in force and shall form part of the agreement, among which certainly is the 25% additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays theretofore enjoyed by said laborers and employees. It may, therefore, be said that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 a public utility is not required to pay additional compensation to its employees and workers for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition ofr it to pay such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so. The NAWASA committed itself to pay this additional compensation. It must pay not because of compulsion of law but because of contractual obligation (11 SCRA 766, 776).
The settled NAWASA doctrine should not be disturbed.
B
PAL also vigorously argues that the unions' longstanding silence with respect, and acquiescence, to PAL's method of computation has placed them in estoppel to impugn the correctness of the questioned wage formula. PAL furthermore contends that laches has likewise set in precisely because of stich long-standing inaction.
Our jurisprudence on estoppel is, however, to the effect that:
... (I)t is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or neglignece connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) ... [Beronilla vs. GSISK, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 44, 46, 55, emphasis supplied].
In the case befor US, it is not denied that PAL's formula of determining daily and hourly rate of pay has been decided and adopted by it unilaterally without the knowedge and express consent of the employees. It was only later on that the employees came to know of the formula's irregularity and its being violative of the collective bargaining agreements previously executed by PAL and the unions. Precisely, PALSA immediately proposed that PAL and the unions. Precisely, PALSA immediately proposed that PAL use the correct method of computation, which proposa PAL chose to ignore.
Clearly, therefore, the alleged long-standing silence by the PAL employees is in truth and in fact innocent silence,which cannot place a party in estoppel.
The rationale for this is not difficult to see. The doctrine of estoppel had its origin in equity. As such, its applicability depends, to a large extent, on the circumstances surrounding a particular case. Where, therefore, the neglect or omission alleged to haveplaced a party in estoppel cannot be invoked. This was the essence of OUR ruling in the case of Mirasol vs. Municipality of Tabaco (43 Phil. 610, 614). And this, in quintessence, was the compelling reason why in Lodovica vs. Court of Appeals (L-29678, July 18, 1975, 65 SCRA 154, 158), WE held that a party who had no knowledge of or gave no consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it.
Furthermore, jurisprudence likewise fortifies the position that in the interest of public policy, estoppel and laches cannot arrest recover of evertime compensation. The case of Manila Terminal Co. vs. CIR (G.R. NO. L-9265, April 29, 1957, 91 Phil. 625), is squarely in point. In this case We intoned.
The principle of estoppel and laches cannot well be invoked agains the Association. In the first place, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, under which, as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to extra compensation. In the second place, the law principally obligates the employer to observe it, as much so that it punishes the employer for its employer for its violation and leaves the employee or laborer is in such a disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant or even apprehensive in asserting any claim which may cause the employher to devise a way for exercising his right to terminate the employment.
If the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, it may bring about a situation, whereby theemployee or laborer, who cannot expressly renounce their right to extra compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, may be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere silence or lapse of time,thereby frustrating the purpose of the law by indirection (91 Phil. 625, 633, emphasis supplied).
In another count, the unilateral adoption by PAL of an irregular wage formula being an act against public policy, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to the same (Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110, 112).
II
G.R. No. L-31341 is an appeal from that portion of the en banc resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated October 9, 1969 in case 43-IPA making the payment of the adjudicated pay differentials effective only from July 1, 1957.
In their lone assignment of error, February 14, 1953, or ten (10) years from the date of the filing of their original complaint; because the claim for pay differentials is based on written contracts — i.e., the collective bargaining agreements between PAL and the employees' representative uniuons — and under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, actions based on written contracts prescribe in ten (10) years.
PAL, on the other hand, maintains that the employees' claim for pay differential is"an action to enforce a cause of action under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444, as amended): (p. 592, rec., G.R. No. L-31341). As such, the applicable provision is Section 7-a of CA No. 4444, which reads:
Sec. 7-a. Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued, otherwise such action shall be forever barred; provided, however, that actions already commenced before the effecitve date of this Act shall not be affected by the period herein prescribed (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1993, approved June 22, 1957, emphasis supplied).
Moreover, PAL argues that even assuming that the issue calls for the application of Article 1144(1) of the New Civil Code, a general law, still in case of conflict, Commonwealth ACt No. 444, as amended, should prevail because the latter is a special law.
WE believe that the present case calls for the application of the Civil Code provisions on the prescriptive period in the filing of actions based on written contracts. The rason should be fairly obvious. Petitioners' claim fundamentally involves the strict compliance by PAL of the pvosions on wage computation embodied in the collective bargaining agreements inked between it and the employees representative unions. These collective bargaining agreements were: the PAS-PALEA collective bargaining agreement of 1952-53; the PAL-PALEA collective bargaining agreement of 1956-59; the PAL-PALEA collective bargaining agreement of 1959-61 (with Article VI as supplement); the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 4, 1961; the PAL-ACAP collective bargaining agreement of 1952-54; the PAL-ACAP collective bargaining agreement of September 6, 1955; the PAL-ACAP collective bargaining agreement of 1959-61; the PAL-PALSA collective bargaining agreement of 1959-62; and the supplementary PAL-PALSA collective bargaining agreement (pp. 54-55, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
The three-year prescribed period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444, as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant cases, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended, but because the claim is a demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining agreements. That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 444), and instead inissited that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is principally anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern. (General Insurance and Surety Corp. vs. Republic, L-13873, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 4; Heirs of the Deceased Juan Sindiong vs. Committee on Burnt Areas and Improvements of Cebu, L-15975, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 715; Conde vs. Cuenca and Malaga, L-9405, July 31, 1956; Veluz vs. Veluz, L-23261, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 559).
Finally, granting arguendo that there is doubt as to what labor legislation to apply to the grievances of the employees in the cases at bar, it is OUR view that that legislation which would enhance the plight of the workers should be followed, consonant with the express pronouncement of the New Civil Code that:
In case of doubt, all labor legislation and labor contracts should be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer (Article 1702).
WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED RESOLUTION IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT PAY DIFFERENTIALS BE PAID EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 14, 1953. WITH COSTS AGAINST PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. IN BOTH CASES.
Teehankee (Chairman), Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
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